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This research study explores how the nature and type of usability failures impact task 
performance in a healthcare organization.  Healthcare organizations are composed of 
heterogeneous and disparate information systems intertwined with complex business 
processes that create many challenges for the users of the system.  The manner in which 
Information Technology systems and products are implemented along with the 
overlapping intricate tasks the users have pose problems in the area of usability.  
Usability research primarily focuses on the user interface; therefore, designing a better 
interface often leaves security in question.  When usability failures arise from the 
incongruence between healthcare task and the technology used in healthcare 
organizations, the security of information is jeopardized.  Hence, the research problem is 
to understand the nature and types of usability-related security failures and how they can 
be reduced in a Healthcare Information System.   
 
This research used a positivist single case study design with embedded units, to 
understand the nature and type of usability-related information systems security failures 
in a Healthcare context.  The nature and types of usability failures were identified 
following a four-step data analysis process that used terms that defined (1) user failures in 
a large healthcare organization, (2) Task Technology Fit theory, (3) the Confidentiality 
Integrity and Availability triad of information protection that captured usability-related 
information system security failures, and (4) by conducting semi-structured interviews 
with users of the Healthcare Information System capturing and recording their 
interactions with the usability failure.  
  
The captured reported usability-related information system security failures 
dated back five years within a healthcare organization consisting of a network of 
128 medical centers.  The evaluation of five years of data and over 8,000 
problems reported by healthcare workers allowed this research to identify the 
misalignment of healthcare task to the technology used, and how the 
misalignment impacted both information security and user performance.  The 
nature of usability failures were centered on technical controls, however, the 
cause of the failures was predominately information integrity failures and the 
unavailability of applications and systems.  Usability-related information system 
security failures are primarily not recognized due to the nature of healthcare task 
along with the methods healthcare workers use to mitigate such failures by 
 
  
 
employing workarounds to complete a task.  Applying non-technical security 
controls within the development process provides the clearest path to addressing 
throughout the organization the captured usability-related information system 
security failures. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The healthcare industry faces well-recognized challenges such as high cost of 
operations, inefficiencies, inadequate safety, and insufficient access to 
information.  Past and present United States Presidents have mandated 
restructuring the healthcare industry to alleviate many of these current problems.  
This has led to healthcare organizations becoming more connected through 
Information Technology (IT) both locally and globally using heterogeneous and 
disparate Health Information Systems (HIS) to access and share information.  
These HIS consist of clinical, management, strategic decision support, and 
electronic network and e-health applications (Austin & Boxerman, 2003).  The 
use of heterogeneous and disparate systems within the highly collaborative 
healthcare environment can become problematic, creating usability failures when 
applications and systems converge to retrieve, transport, and deliver information 
between these systems (Bardram, 2005).  Usability failures become an 
organizational security issue when providing HIS users a means to access 
information in a timely and secure manner (Braz & Robert, 2006).  This research 
focuses on understanding usability-related information systems security failures in 
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a healthcare organization and how such failures impact IS security performance in 
a healthcare organization. 
For this research study, usability failures affect users in phases if left 
untreated.  The first phase is the initial failure from a user interaction (usability 
failure) with an application or system.  The first phase consists of the user’s 
inability to access the application or system.  For this research study, a usability 
failure emanates from the user’s inability to access an application or system with 
the sole purpose to obtain information to complete a task.  The usability failure 
could be driven by not remembering a password or it could be technical in nature.  
The user will react to the failure and articulate the constraints that the failure has 
caused.  If left untreated, the usability failure creates the second phase—a 
usability security failure.  A usability security failure occurs when information 
from the initial usability failure is not presented from the interface in a manner 
that allows the user to take the necessary security precautions with the system 
(Sheng, Broderick, Koranda, & Hyland, 2006; Whitten & Tygar, 1999).  Usability 
security failures are directly linked to IS security failures.  For this research, an 
information systems security failure is the most severe security failure, and it 
primarily occurs when users of a system have to create alternative methods not 
prescribed by the organization to complete an assigned task precipitated from 
usability failures.  The effects of the usability failure determines whether an 
information systems security failure exists and the responses of the users can 
further determine the types of security controls an organization has in place. 
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In the areas of usability security, researchers primarily have evaluated 
methods and techniques in designing secure user interfaces while improving the 
human interaction with a computer system (Flechais, Mascolo, & Sasse, 2007).  
However, usability security encompasses a great deal more, as Al-Ghatani and 
King (1999) and Markus (1983) claim poor usability design evokes a greater 
degree of user resistance. Greater user resistance, particularly in healthcare 
settings, means users are likely to denigrate the system, sabotage the computer 
equipment, tamper with the data, or abandon the new systems and continue to use 
the old system (Worthley, 2000). Within a healthcare context, any of these 
behaviors is at best undesirable and, at worst, may lead to the quality of patient 
care to be questioned.  Whitman (2004) identified and ranked technical software 
failures or errors, deliberate acts of sabotage or vandalism, and technical hardware 
failure or errors as threats to information security.  These information security 
threats are fallout from usability failures. 
Bhattacherjee and Hikmet’s (2007) research on user physician resistance 
reported that physicians at Cedars-Sinai hospital in Los Angeles, California, 
rebelled against a new computerized physician order entry system, complaining 
that the system distracted them from their medical duties, which ultimately led to 
the removal of the system.  The research findings suggested the resistance was 
caused by the perceived threat of losing control over their work procedures.  In 
similar healthcare usability literature, Johnson, Johnson, and Zhang (2005) stated 
that healthcare software developers often overlook relevant user characteristics, 
user tasks, user preferences, and usability issues, resulting in systems that 
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decrease productivity or simply remain unusable.  Overlooking user needs in the 
software development process can negatively impact the acceptance and use of a 
newly implemented software or hardware system. 
In healthcare organizations, the processes by which patient care is provided 
are defined by the user task and user characteristics; therefore, productivity and 
system availability become huge issues.  When a user suffers from a failed 
interaction with an application or a system interface from a poorly designed 
business process prevents the user from a completing a task, the user will seek 
other means to complete that task.  Other means of completing a task are done by 
the user circumventing established business processes and security controls 
(Eckman, Bennett, Kaufman, & Tenner, 2007; Johnson & Willey, 2011).  The 
user behavior from the failed interaction is essentially the embarkation point on 
the road towards a usability security failure. 
A usability-related information systems security failure occurs when 
information is unable to be accessed, delivered, mishandled, misinterpreted, or is 
altered by the user from a failed interaction with an application or system.  The 
failed interaction may cause the user to intentionally or unintentionally violate the 
organization’s security policies to complete a task.  Information that is unable to 
be properly protected from user interactions have been researched under the 
technical domain of IT security, i.e., encryption, data, software and hardware 
controls (Anderson, 1972; Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996; Schneier, 
1996).  This researcher argues that focusing specifically on technical aspects of 
security problems creates an unbalanced approach of addressing security issues 
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within an organization; therefore, security failures must be addressed by both 
technical and non-technical means. 
As organizations redesign and implement business processes for their 
Information Systems (IS), the systems development process provides 
organizations a method to analyze, design, test, and implement business processes 
to address usability-related information systems security failures (Siponen, 2001).  
According to Yee (2004), there is a conflict in the systems development process 
aligning security and usability, since “usability improvements yield compromised 
software, and adding security measures have made software tedious to use or hard 
to understand” (p.48).  This is particularly true and problematic in healthcare 
organizations, which are characterized by non-traditional work environments that 
use heterogeneous HIS, where the work flows is often mobile, high-paced, 
chaotic, and highly collaborative (Bardram, 2005).  Bardram (2005) has argued 
usability-related security failures associated with login mechanisms have not 
recognized the nature of medical work; therefore, the consequence has led to 
login procedures being circumvented and the security of the organization being 
jeopardized. 
Essentially, an application or system failure and usability security failures 
share a symbiotic relationship.  In fact, usability security failure is defined as not 
having reliable software that allows expected users to be made aware of the 
security tasks they need to perform (Sheng et al., 2006; Whitten & Tygar, 1999).  
A security task in the healthcare context is a business process that provides 
information to the user through an interface during the usability failure on the 
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next step a user should take in the process after the failure occurs.  In essence, it is 
a security control that protects the organization’s information assets.  
In a healthcare organization, usability-related information systems security 
failures can be fatal.  The consequences of usability-related information systems 
security failures were highlighted in 1999 Institute of Medicine reports stating 
that 44,000 to 98,000 Americans die each year from preventable medical errors, 
and that medical errors cost the United States $37.6 billion each year.  The errors 
were a byproduct of misaligned business processes that were created by 
information-handling failures in effectively diagnosing and treating patients.  The 
information-handling failure arose from systems and communications failures that 
caused misinterpretation of information by patients and physicians (Dennison, 
2005). 
The primary focus of usability security has been on user authentication and 
email encryption (Payne & Edward, 2008).  Thus, there has been very little 
identifiable research in the domain of usability security that has addressed the 
impact usability failures have on the accomplishment of healthcare tasks and 
usability-related information systems security failures.  The aim of this research is 
to identify and enhance the understanding of usability-related security failures and 
how the failures impact IS security performance in a healthcare organization.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The research problem for this study is to understand the nature and types of 
usability-related security failures and how they can be reduced in a HIS.  Ka-Ping 
(2002) and Whitten and Tygar (1999) have stated that usability security research 
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focuses on providing better user interfaces in the area of human computer 
interaction. However, usability security is much more than user interfaces; it is the 
information from the interaction conveyed by the user interface, the domain in 
which the user belongs, and the interpretation of the actions of the user that must 
be considered when evaluating the ramifications of usability-related security 
failures.  Developing a method to identify and understand the nature of usability-
related security failures within a HIS allows an organization’s staff to effectively 
incorporate security controls.  These security controls can help address the 
information systems security risk users’ encounter interacting with applications 
and systems of an HIS. 
Understanding usability-related information systems security failures 
encountered by users of HIS will allow for researchers and practitioners to better 
understand and address information systems security risks as these risks have the 
potential to negatively affect patient care information in the healthcare setting.  
Researchers have argued that there is a need to address usability security controls 
in the software development process (Schecter, Dhamija, Ozment, & Fischer, 
2007) along with a need to add security controls throughout the software 
development process (Baskerville, 1988).  However, there has been little evidence 
that organizations have adopted and succeeded at this approach.  This researcher 
argues that, to reduce usability security failures, organizations must align security 
technology with tasks performed by healthcare workers and ensure such 
alignment does not hamper security performance in a healthcare organization.  
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1.3 Research Question 
The first research question of the proposed study is what are the nature and types of 
usability-related information systems security failures in a HIS?  HIS are comprised of 
heterogeneous and disparate data and systems used to deliver healthcare to patients.  
According to Marcus (2002), the interaction a user has with a computer creates inputs 
and outputs at the local and global levels.  Local-level feedback consists of the 
information returned from peripheral devices from monitors or printers, while the global 
level feedback references contextual issues and task activities from applications and 
systems from within or outside of an organization.  It is the very nature of interactions 
HIS users have along with the information returned from the feedback of the interactions 
at the local and global levels that will determine the source and type of usability-related 
information systems security failure existing within an organization.  The source and type 
of usability-related information systems security failure determines the behavior of the 
application, system and user.  In the literature review section, Jacobson, Booch, and 
Rumbaugh (1999) identified nine types of usability failures that can essentially create a 
reaction from IS users.  Capturing the sources and types of usability failures along with 
understanding the interactions between the user, task, and application or system wherein 
the security failure occurs allows the organization to determine the type of interventions 
that are required. 
The second research question is how does usability-related information 
systems security failures impact task accomplishment in a healthcare setting?  
The antecedent of a usability-related information systems security failure is a 
usability failure occurring when a user encounters a failed interaction from the 
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application or system in use.  Researchers of usability failures have analyzed 
improving the user experience by improving a user interface (e.g., Flechais et al., 
2007) in an effort to reduce the behavior of system users in rejecting, rebelling 
against or misusing the system.  This approach has proven to be problematic as 
users may experience an improvement on the interface, but security is also 
compromised in the design process.  The outlying problem in usability security 
design is it is resolved at the technical level (Payne & Edward, 2008), which 
creates potential information risk in an organization’s security program by not 
using a balanced approach.  Usability research has also shown that a usability 
failure may cause users of an HIS to circumvent the system to complete a task 
(Johnson & Willey, 2011), create their own workarounds (Halbesleben, 
Wakefield, & Wakefield, 2008), or reject the system entirely.  There has been 
very little research that has taken the perspective of evaluating the congruence of 
usability-related information systems security failures in relation to how the 
technology fits the task of the user, and how that fit impacts the performance of 
the user.  Diagnosing task-technology-fit in reference to a usability failure creates 
opportunities to detect where information security failures occur.   
1.4 Key Definitions 
For this research study, four terms are important to shape the context of this 
research through the use of definitions.  In order to assign a definition to 
information, one must follow the path information travels in order to be used by 
the receiver.  When information is described or defined in research, it is often 
done using the Data-Information-Knowledge (DIK) hierarchy.  DIK is grounded 
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in IT to distinguish the differences and the roles DIK plays within an 
organization.  Data are often viewed as being raw and simply exist without any 
significance.  Tejay, Dhillon, and Chin (2005) assert that data are a fundamental 
information asset, while Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) acknowledge the primary 
focus of IS security is on data.  When context is added to data, they are 
transformed into information, and that information then becomes knowledge that 
can be used by the receiver.  The path in which data travel and transform allows 
this study to take on the definition of information per Avison and Fitzgerald 
(1995) as the meaning that comes from selecting, summarizing and presenting 
data in such a way that becomes useful to the recipient. 
The term information systems has often been defined by researchers as the 
way in which computer systems provide information in support of organizational 
structure, business processes, and people.  The information system definition is 
often interpreted by researchers using three levels.  Iivari and Hirchheim (1996) 
described their three levels as the organization level, which is the host 
organization, the language level, encompassing the formalized rules of 
communicating transmitted and received information by users in the organization, 
and the technical level, consisting of the computer systems used in the 
organization. The three levels imply that information must be managed beyond 
technical means to account for social and organizational roles information has 
within an organization.  For the purpose of this research, an information system is 
considered an aggregate of information-handling activities at the technical, formal 
and informal levels of an organization (Liebenau & Backhouse, 1990).  The 
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technical, formal, and informal levels of an information system can be visualized 
using the components of a hard-boiled egg as the point of reference.  The 
technical system is the yolk consisting of the IT used in an organization, the 
formal system is the egg white, encompassing the rules, and policies created 
within an organization, and the informal system is the shell, which is viewed as 
the organizational culture.  The three components combine to form the automation 
and coordination of information-handling activities along with providing guidance 
to the information users. 
In respect to information systems security, it has been viewed as providing 
technical means to secure the infrastructure of an organization.  Information 
systems consist of information-handling activities at the technical, formal and 
informal levels respectively; therefore, security controls must be addressed and 
balanced at all three levels to mitigate risk in an organization.  In this research 
study, information systems security is defined as a well-informed sense of 
assurance that information risks and controls are in balance (Anderson, 2003).  
Information is an asset in an organization that has varying levels of value.  The 
value of the information determines the level of controls along with the level of 
resources that should be committed to protect the information.  The amount of 
resources committed to protect information should not outweigh the value of the 
information; therefore, a balance and “sense of assurance” is obtained when 
protecting information assets. 
There are a host of usability definitions held by researchers in the domain of 
human computer interaction that centers on adding quality and value to the user’s 
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experience.  Usability is often defined based on how it is viewed along with how 
it should be measured (Bevan, Karakowski, & Maissel, 1991).  The product-
oriented view measures ergonomic attributes, the user-oriented view measures the 
mental effort and attitude of the user, and the user-performance view examines 
how the user interacts with the product, seeking to measure ease-of-use and 
acceptability of the product (Bevan et al., 1991).  This research will adopt the 
definition proposed by ISO 9241-11 (1998) as the extent to which a product can 
be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency 
and satisfaction in a specified context of use.  This definition encompasses the 
entire user experience interacting with an IS. 
1.5 Summary 
Usability failures can become an organizational security issue when providing 
HIS users a means to access information in a timely and secure manner.  In the 
areas of usability security, researchers have primarily evaluated methods and 
techniques in designing secure user interfaces while improving the human 
interaction with a computer system (Flechais, Mascolo, & Sasse, 2007).  
However, usability security encompasses a great deal more, particularly when 
researchers have linked usability failures to user resistance, sabotage of computer 
equipment, tampering with data or creating their own workarounds.  This can be 
highly problematic within a healthcare organization; thus, the premise of this 
research study is to understand the nature and types of usability-related security 
failures and how they can be reduced in a HIS.   
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the extant literature in the 
area of usability, while highlighting the gaps in the usability domain that provide 
opportunities to use IS security practices to improve the organizational security program.  
The review of usability and IS security literature was conducted following the methods 
of Ellis and Levy (2006).  Papers were selected and examined from key researchers in 
the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and IS security fields emphasizing the search 
criteria under the research domains of usability and IS security development.  The 
underlined argument of this literature review is usability failures lead to IS security 
failures if not addressed, but can be reduced by aligning healthcare tasks with the 
technology within an HIS.  This can be accomplished by applying the proper IS security 
controls. 
2.2 IS Security 
In this research study, the IS security context follows the views of Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2000), Liebenau and Backhouse (1990), and Klein and Hirschheim (1987) 
which consider an organization is constituted of informal, formal, and technical parts.  
The technical, formal, and informal parts must be addressed at each level in the form of 
information systems security controls that are balanced in an organization.  To ensure 
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information security controls are applied accurately, the organization’s risk management 
program must assess IT resources and information assets to identify threats and 
vulnerabilities and apply the appropriate measures to mitigate the risk. 
2.2.1 Technical Security 
The intent of technical security is to secure computer resources such as hardware, 
software, and the data that reside in a computer system (Dhillon, 2007).  Dhillon stated 
that hardware, software, and data are primarily vulnerable to six threats: (a) data 
modification, (b) destructions, (c) disclosure, (d) interception, (e) interruption, and (f) 
fabrication.  Data modification occurs when data held in the computer system are 
accessed and changed without permission.  Destruction occurs when hardware, software, 
or data are destroyed because of malicious intent.  Disclosure happens when data are 
made available or access to software is made available without consent.  Interception 
occurs when an unauthorized person or software application gains access to data or 
computer resources, and interruption is when a computer system becomes unavailable for 
use.  The final threat, fabrication, happens when unauthentic transactions or records are 
inserted or added to an organization’s database system.  At the technical level, data are 
one of the resources that organizations seek to protect by applying technical controls. 
One stream of research has dealt with controls for securing data itself, often 
using different types of encryption (Blythe, 2008).  A second research stream has 
focused on the use of digital signatures to facilitate trusted transactions between 
parties (Blythe, 2008; Rivest, 1978; Tompkins & Handley, 2003).  Software 
controls seek to secure infrastructures from the inside by strengthening the 
applications that are present on IS (August & Tunca, 2006; Shimeall & 
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McDermott, 1999).  Finally, many studies have focused on numerous hardware 
solutions, including intrusion detection and firewalls (Denning, 1987; Frincke, 
2000; Vigna & Kemmerer, 1999). 
2.2.2 Data Security Requirements 
Data security requirements are linked to the classic CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, 
and Availability) triad of information protection (Dunkerley, & Tejay, 2009).  
Confidentiality is the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information, integrity is 
the guarantee that the message sent is the same as the message received, and availability 
is the guarantee that information will be available to the user in a timely and 
uninterrupted manner.  With the advent of networked organizations and the usage of the 
Internet in reference to Electronic Commerce, authentication and non-repudiation have 
been discussed as important security requirements based on the context of application and 
system use.  Authentication guarantees the message is from the source it claims to be 
from, and non-repudiation prevents an individual or entity from denying having 
performed a particular action related to data (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007); 
however, for this research study, the CIA triad will be the area of focus in relation to 
technical security controls. 
Technical security controls in relation to the CIA triad focus on protecting the 
resources of systems through the means of authentication and access control (Siponen & 
Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007).  Authentication methods include passwords (Denning, 1992) 
and token-based authentication using special purpose devices such as smart cards 
(Hendry, 1997).  Authenticating with a password is primarily done through passwords 
mechanisms such as (a) traditional passwords, (b) system-generated passwords, (c) 
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passphrases, (d) cognitive passwords and (e) associative passwords (Zviran & Haga, 
1993).  The goal of access control is to guarantee that the requirements of integrity, 
availability, and confidentiality of security objects are not compromised.  Security objects 
(resources) are files, directories, tuples, or relations (Sandhu, 1993).  Access control 
includes the prevention of all unwanted flows of information between objects and 
subjects, including any flows of information that could be used to attain information, 
which needs to be secure (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007)  Access control techniques 
includes access matrix (Mclean, 1990), mandatory, discretionary, and role-based access 
control policies (Boswell, 1995; Sandhu & Samarati, 1996).  Access control matrixes are 
a means of establishing the type of access control policies that will be applied to an 
organization, while mandatory, discretionary, and role-based access control policies are 
applied based on the type of access control matrix that will best benefit the users and 
resources that are being protected in an organization. 
2.2.3 Risk Management 
Organizations apply risk management techniques using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  According to Saleh and Alfantookh (2011), there are over 200 risk 
management methods used in industry primarily because organizations typically seek to 
adopt a method that is in alignment with their specific information security management 
program.  Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) argued that most available risk management 
methods derive from a scientific core, thus focusing on technology that proposes 
technical solutions, which negates addressing human, organizational strategic or 
environmental factors.  Most quantitative risk methods are based on using loss exposure 
as a function of the vulnerability of an asset to a threat multiplied by the probability of a 
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threat becoming a reality (Rainer et al., 1991).  These methods are called expected 
valuate analyses, which include annualized loss expectancy (ALE) (Post & Diltz, 1986), 
the Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology (LRAM), (Guarro, 1987) and Stochastic 
Dominance (Post & Diltz, 1986).  Qualitative methodologies attempt to express risk in 
descriptive variables rather than precise dollar amounts (Ranier et al., 1991).  Ranier et al. 
(1991) stated that qualitative risk methods are based on the assumptions that certain 
threats or loss of data cannot be appropriately expressed in dollars or discrete events, and 
that precise information may be unobtainable.  Some of the qualitative methods are 
Scenario Analysis (Hammond, 1988; Newton & Snyder, 1987), Operational Critical 
Threat Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation OCTAVE (Woody, 2006), and CCTA risk 
analysis and management method CRAMM (Sun, Srivastava, & Mock, 2006). 
Risk analysis and risk management do not lack critics highlighting their shortcoming 
such as lacking a scientific approach (Baskerville, 1991), lack of clarity (Alter & Sherer, 
2004), and, according to Spears (2006), being based largely on guesswork.  The 
criticisms of “lacking of a scientific approach,” to “lack of clarity,” and “guesswork” in 
the risk management process stems from how an organization determines the value of 
intangible assets such as information (Gerber & von Solms, 2005) along with 
determining the vulnerability of an asset along with other factors.  Gerber and von Solms 
(2005) argued that it is difficult if not impossible to estimate the value of information, 
and Suh and Han (2003) stated that organizations typically consider replacement cost, but 
the financial loss caused by the disruption of operation is highly subjective.  Lastly, the 
impact of a breach and the loss of customer confidence are extremely difficult to estimate 
(Bennett & Kailay, 1992). 
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According to Voster and Labuschagne (2005), the common goal of risk management 
methods are to prioritize and estimate the risk value and to suggest the most suitable 
mitigation plan to eliminate or minimize risk to an acceptable level, but other scholars 
(Huang, Ding, & Hu, 2008; Niekerk & Labuschagne, 2006; Zuccatto, 2004) have called 
for a more holistic approach to risk management that minimizes the shortcoming of risk 
management methods.  A holistic approach to risk management focuses equally on 
minimizing risk in the areas of technology, information, people, and processes (Spears, 
2006).  One of the benefits of using a holistic approach to information security 
management is that it involves business users to the extent necessary to identify a 
comprehensive set of risk while also promoting security awareness throughout the 
organization (Lategan & Solms, 2006).  Several researchers have created information 
security risk management frameworks (Huang et al., 2008; Saleh & Alfaantookh, 2011; 
Zuccato, 2007) to holistically address information security risk in organizations with a 
focus on the technology, the people, the business processes, and the environment. 
2.2.4 User Security 
User security delves into the human experience a computer user has with computer 
resources such as an information system within an organization.  Human-related 
information security research covers the social aspects of security an organization is 
faced with as it relates to organizational members, such as usability, security culture, 
security awareness, training, along with the behavior of the user and other human-related 
issues.  Current human-related information security research has been categorized into 
four main directions by Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2005):  (a) user 
interfaces of security-related systems; (b) information security management concerns for 
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risk, business processes and finance; (c) organizational issues related to information 
security behavior; and (d) counterproductive computer usage.  This research study 
touches on all four categories in that a usability failure from an interaction with an 
interface creates information risk based on the behavior the user will have after the 
usability failure.  The behavior of the user can result in counterproductive computer 
usage.  To address “human-related” information security issues is to understand the 
users’ point of view as it relates to information systems security.  Wier, Douglas, 
Richardson, and Jack (2010) have observed that security is not the main goal of a user’s 
interaction with a computer system.  Post and Kagan (2006) stated that employees in an 
organization are more likely to bypass security measures in order to complete a task.  To 
further expand on the chasm between users of an information system and information 
security, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) argued that there is a digital divide between 
information security managers and users that has created a misalignment of the security 
practices levied by the organization in relation to the dynamics of the user’s workday. 
A useful tool in aligning computer users in an organization with the security 
guidelines and rules an organization implements in relation to the use of computer 
resources is through the use of security policies (Ifinedo, 2012; Knapp & Marshall, 
2006s).  Understanding the impact a computer user’s behavior can have on information 
security has allowed researchers to develop concepts, theories, and research relevant to 
human behavior in organizations and how the behavior affects information security 
(Stanton et al., 2005).  Two streams of information security research that address user 
behavior is counterproductive computer usage (Stanton, 2002; Weatherbee, 2010) and 
insider threat (Post & Kagan, 2006; Warkentin & Wilson, 2009).  Counterproductive 
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computer usage consists of a computer user in an organization that exposes the 
information assets to risk or liability or a loss of productivity time by engaging in 
activities that are counter to established computer resource usage policies (Mastrangelo, 
Everton, & Jolton, 2006).  Insider threat refers to intentionally disruptive, unethical, or 
illegal behavior enacted by individuals who possess substantial internal access to the 
organization’s information assets (Stanton et al., 2005). 
Counterproductive computer usage and insider threats research both focus on users of 
information systems that primarily subvert organization security policies for their own 
benefit.  The security controls implemented for counterproductive computer usage and 
insider threats do not account for the misalignment of a user task and the technology 
implemented in an organization.  The misalignment of a user task and the technology 
creates a breakdown in security controls that skews the behavior of the user, particularly 
in a healthcare organization where the task has an impact on the outcome of human life.  
Evaluating misaligned task, technology, and the behavior of the user of an IS will provide 
valuable insight into addressing user security. 
2.3 Usability 
Usability falls under the research domain of HCI.  HCI in IS are “concerned 
with the ways humans interact with information, technologies, and tasks, 
especially in business, managerial, organizational, and cultural contexts’’ (Zhang, 
Benbasat, Carey, Davis, Galletta, & Strong, 2002, p. 334).  Usability is derived 
from HCI principles, wherein designers of software application interfaces 
understand that systems for users should be easy to learn, useful, contain 
functions people really need in their work, and be easy and pleasant to use 
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(Bevan, 2005).  The manner in which this is done is through adding the 
appropriate usability design techniques and usability evaluation methods that 
evaluate the task, the context, and behavior of the user as the user interacts with a 
computer application or system. 
User interface literature primarily focuses on developing better interfaces 
(Shneiderman, Jacobs, Cohen, & Plaisant, 2009), securing the interface (Bourimi et al., 
2012; Brostoff, 2004), analyzing and critiquing software tools used for interface 
development (Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005), and assessing usability evaluation methods 
(Cockton, 2008; Hartson, Andre, & Williges, 2001).  User interfaces are the portal to a 
user’s experience with a computer system.  The extant literature discusses user interfaces 
in the context of interactive products that are used primarily to help the user perform a 
task via the product’s user interface.  According to Juristo, Moreno, and Sanchez-Segura 
(2007), the user interface can be characterized narrowly as an interface comprising the 
input and output devices and the software that services them, while also using broader 
terms characterizing a user interface that includes everything that shapes users’ 
experiences with computers, including documentation, training, and human support. 
Usability improves the design of user interface by evaluating the organization, 
presentation, and interactivity of the interface (Shneiderman et al., 2009).  Shneiderman 
(1987) provided seminal research in the area of interactive user interface design, 
discussing strategies for designing high-quality interactive systems by applying the 
syntactic and semantic model of user knowledge.  The syntactic/semantic model 
suggests that users have both syntactic knowledge about device details and semantic 
knowledge about concepts, which are separated into task concepts and computer 
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concepts.  Syntactic knowledge is gained through repetitive actions and familiarity with 
a specific task or computer systems while semantic knowledge is gained through 
meaningful learning.  Despite the blue print user-interface design strategies provided by 
Shneiderman, researchers continue to look for methods to design interfaces to reduce 
errors a user can encounter. 
A user’s interaction with an application or system when a usability failure occurs is 
central to determining whether security controls are aligned with an organization’s 
business process.  Blandford, Thimblebly, and Bryan-Kinns (2003) suggest users 
encounter interaction traps as a consequence of misunderstanding their ability to 
complete a task due to a system failure.  The interaction trap occurs when the user 
encounters detours, barriers, or objectives that are unable to be achieved.  According to 
Marcus (2002), the results created interacting with a computer include the input and 
output techniques, status displays, and feedback at the local and global levels.  At the 
local level, feedback users receive are related to the behavior of the physical aspects of a 
computer system, such as a visual display of a computer screen or peripheral devices like 
the response of a printer when initiated by the user.  At the global level, context issues 
and task activities at a larger scale are presented to users. 
Context is gathered in an automated fashion using a combination of sensing and 
complex rules to allow applications to react to relevant changes in an organizational 
environment (Dey & Newberg, 2009).  Context of use and the interaction of a user serve 
as a barometer to measure the impact a failed task from a usability failure has on the 
impact of performance.  Crowley et al. (2002) described “context of use” for an 
interactive system as consisting of three key attributes:  (a) users of the system who are 
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intended to use (and/or who effectively use) the system; (b) hardware and software 
platform(s), that is, the computational and interaction device(s) that can be used for 
interacting with the system; and (c) the physical environment where the interaction can 
take place.  The context of use attributes can be applied to hospital and clinical settings 
in the mere business practices used.  A user in the healthcare environment can vary 
based on the nature of the task, from the patient to the physician, which can determine 
the system used and the environment in which the task will be accomplished.  Hospital 
and clinical settings are among the many organizations that are often used for context-
aware applications in their environment to take action without explicit user input (Dey & 
Newberg, 2009).  Research in the area of context-aware applications suggest that users 
become frustrated when they do not understand why a system performs an action, not 
allowing the user the ability to fix the problem (Barkhuus & Dey, 2003). 
2.3.1 Usability Failure 
Software usability deficiencies are determined by the problems users have in 
carrying out a standard set of actions using software (Rubin, Chisnell, & Spool, 2008).  
In this research study, user problems from software usability deficiencies are 
synonymous with usability failures.  According to Winograd and Flores (1986), usability 
failures often result in interaction breakdowns.  Winograd and Flores and Blandford et 
al. (2003) have stated that breakdowns occur when a user faces enough difficulty 
accomplishing a task so that the user is able to identify that the user interface is the 
source of the problem.  Jacobson et al. (1999) defined usability failure as being indicated 
by any of nine criteria: (a) the user articulates a goal and cannot succeed in attaining it, 
(b) the user explicitly gives up, (c) the user articulates a goal and has to try a different 
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method to find a solution, (d) the user produces a result different from the task given, (e) 
the user expresses surprise, (f) the user expresses some negative affect or says something 
is a problem, (g) the user makes a design suggestion, (h) the system crashes, (i) the 
evaluator generalizes a group of previously detected problems into a new problem. 
Jacobson et al. (1999) provided a usability failure definition as a foundation of where 
to begin in applying methods to address and reduce usability failures.  Based on this 
definition, it can be concluded that a usability failure, particularly when a system fails, is 
essentially the same as an information systems security failure.  Therefore, usability 
failures, and usability-related information security failures should be addressed using the 
same strategies organizations use to improve their overall security program. 
2.3.2 Usability Development and Design 
Usability development and design is the primary area of focus in the HCI and 
usability domain.  In the domain of usability development, usability design principles are 
the basis for designing usable software applications.  According to Juristo et al. (2007), 
with some notable exceptions, software development is primarily concerned with the 
inner workings of the system, while usability development focuses on the user.  In the 
software development process, the user’s role is a manner in which the development 
team can elicit requirements, while in the context of usability development, also termed 
user-centered development, the users are the reason for designing the system (Gould & 
Lewis, 1985; Peslak, 2005). 
The difference in usability development design perspectives highlights the challenge 
in the software development process; however, the development process presents a 
means to understand how the varying development perspectives create an opportunity to 
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address the issues that stem from the development staff’s disconnect with the users.  For 
example, a usability error such as the failure for a user to access a system due to an 
authentication breakdown between two systems may not be viewed as a failure in the 
application that was developed.  The failure may be viewed as a “memorability” or 
“learnability” problem by the user; however, the inability to access an application is also 
an IS security failure, and should be addressed accordingly.  The ability to have 
usability-related security failures come to the fore reported by users that suffer such 
failures and address the security failures through adequate security controls adds security 
value to both the usability and information system security communities. 
Usability evaluation methods (UEM) are used to measure and identify potential issues 
affecting usability attributes of a system or devices with respect to particular users 
performing a particular task in a particular context (Hilbert & Redmiles, 2000).  The 
usability attributes are learnability, efficiency, memorability, errors, and satisfaction 
(Nielsen, 1993).  Applying usability attributes can vary depending on the background 
knowledge and experience of users, the task for which the system is used, and the context 
in which it is used (Hilbert & Redmiles, 2000).  Usability researchers have proposed 
several classifications of UEMs.  Fernandez, Insfran, and Abrahao (2011) observed that 
UEMs are principally are classified into two different types: empirical methods and 
inspections methods.  According to Fernandez et al., empirical methods are based on 
capturing and analyzing usage data from end users, and inspection methods are 
performed by expert evaluators or designers.   
The most common types of UEMs are Heuristic Evaluations (Nielsen & Molich, 
1990), cognitive walkthroughs (Wharton et al., 1992), goals operator methods and 
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selection (Card et al. 1983), and cogtools (John et al., 2004).  According to Reisterer and 
Oppermann (1993), a complete evaluation of usability must consider the user, the task, 
the computer, and the organization.  UEMs are evaluated during the testing or 
implementation stages of the development process (Akers, Jeffries, Simpson, & 
Winograd, 2012), which leaves unanswered questions in the usability domain in relation 
to managing usability-related information security failures once software is released into 
the organization. 
2.4 Healthcare Information System 
There has been a great deal of literature chronicling the evolution of healthcare 
organizations and their ability to adopt IT.  The adoption of IT within the healthcare 
organization has brought about a cornucopia of terms and definitions to describe the 
software and hardware technology used within the organization.  Healthcare literature is 
bombarded with such terms as hospital information systems, healthcare information 
systems, health information systems, medical information systems, clinical information 
systems, patient care information systems, and nursing information systems to describe 
both the applications and systems that process data and produce information for the user 
to provide point of care to patients.  Users who provide point-of-care to patients within 
the healthcare context are physicians, clinicians, and healthcare workers.  Physicians and 
clinicians provide direct observation and care to patients, while healthcare workers assist 
in the process by carrying out orders issued by physicians and clinicians. 
In addition to identifying the types of systems that process data and produce 
information along with the types of users in the healthcare environment, there are also 
applications (subsystems) that require identification.  Computerized Order Entry Records 
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(CPOE), Electronic Health Records (EHR), Electronic Medical Record (EMR) and 
Computer-Based Patient Records (CBPR) are essentially subsystems or byproducts of the 
information system.  Decisions regarding Healthcare IT (HIT) implementations are often 
made at the department level, with each department developing subsystems based on its 
needs, beliefs, practices, and expertise (Harkee, Alessi, & Collan, 2003; Kim & 
Unmanath, 1999).  The fact that these subsystems contain multi-platform, multi-vendor 
application wrappers built around multivariate data sources contributes to the complexity 
of HIS (Orgun & Vu, 2006).  The results of decisions to acquire and implement HIT are 
autonomous and heterogeneous systems (Devaraj & Kohli, 2000; Toussaint, Bakker, & 
Groeneweegen, 1992) that access and retrieve data from disparate sources, which is the 
healthcare environment.  There is a rich stream of literature in the healthcare environment 
reporting problems caused by autonomous and heterogeneous systems such as user 
resistance, HIT implementation and project failures primarily due to interoperability and 
usability failures (Bhattacherjee & Hikmet; 2007; Johnson & Willey, 2011; Vega, 
Schieferdecker, & Din, 2010). 
With the numerous terms used to describe systems in the healthcare environment 
along with the many subsystems used, the healthcare environment terms used in this 
research study will be operationalized.  The subsystems described previously are the 
interfaces where information handling activities (interactions) take place, and the 
definition of an HIS is aligned with Backhouse and Liebenau (1990) as an aggregate of 
information-handling activities at the technical, formal and informal levels of an 
organization.  These information-handling activities comprise subsystems composed of 
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autonomous, heterogeneous and disparate software applications and hardware systems 
that interoperate to provide information to the users of the system. 
2.5. Summary 
Healthcare organizations are composed of heterogeneous and disparate information 
systems intertwined with complex business processes that create a great deal of 
challenges for the users of the system.  The manner in which IT systems and products are 
implemented along with the overlapping and intricate tasks the users have pose problems 
in the area of usability.  Usability research primarily focuses on the user interface; 
therefore, designing a better interface often leaves security in question.  When usability 
failures arise from the misalignment between healthcare task and the technology used in 
healthcare organizations, the security of information is jeopardized.  Information is 
jeopardized when the CIA of computer resources are rendered vulnerable from usability 
failures.  Usability failures are a technical security issue; therefore, technical security 
controls must be evaluated and applied accordingly.  Applying the appropriate IS security 
controls will reduce usability security failures while also improving the practices used to 
design, develop and implement user interfaces. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework, research model, and research 
method will be discussed.  This chapter begins by discussing the theoretical 
framework of Goodhue (1988; 1995) and Goodhue and Thompson (1995) to 
study the research problem.  The development of the research model is then 
discussed.  Finally, the research method is discussed.  
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework in this research study is an extension of the work of 
Goodhue (1988; 1995) and Goodhue and Thompson (1995) regarding TTF theory and the 
Technology-to-Performance Chain (TPC) fit focus model.  The TTF theory holds that, for 
IT to have a positive impact on individual performance, the technology must be utilized 
and it must be a good fit with the task it supports.  The TPC model “draws on insights 
from two complimentary streams of research (user attitudes as predictors of utilization 
and task-technology fit as a predictor of performance)” (Goodhue & Thompson, p. 213).  
The TPC model tests user evaluation and performance impacts, which are consistent with 
the research model proposed by DeLone and McLean (1992) in that utilization and user 
attitudes lead to individual performance impacts.  However, the TPC model goes beyond 
the IS Success model of Delone and McLean where the TPC model explains how 
technology leads to performance impacts, along with explicitly detailing the manner in 
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which the TTF constructs provides the theoretical basis for evaluating the issues related 
to the impact of IT on performance. 
Goodhue and Thompson’s (1995) TTF model is measured using eight factors 
that are distributed among the TTF constructs of task, technology, and individual 
characteristics respectively.  The dimensions of TTF along with the eight factors 
are listed in Appendix A.  The factors will be discussed at length later in this 
section.  Goodhue and Thompson suggest decomposing the TTF theoretical 
model into more detailed components to facilitate the usage of TTF as a 
diagnostic tool to measure how well the technology of an organization fits a task, 
and how that task ultimately impacts performance.  TTF with a “fit focus” 
provides that opportunity as it proposes that IS has a positive impact on 
performance only when there is a corresponding “fit” between their functionality 
and the task requirements of users.  Figure 1 contains the TTF “fit focus” model 
preceded by an explanation of the constructs. 
 
Figure 1.  TTF “Fit Focus” model (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995) 
Technology characteristics are tools used by individuals in carrying out their 
tasks.  In an IS research context, the tools consist of hardware, software, data, and 
user support services (training and help lines, etc.) provided to assist users in their 
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task.  Task characteristics are actions carried out by individuals turning inputs into 
outputs.  Task characteristics of interest include those that might move a user to 
rely heavily on certain aspects of the information technology.  The example 
Goodhue and Thompson (1995) use is relying on the organization’s IS to process 
queries against a database.  TTF, the degree to which a technology assists 
individuals in performing their portfolio of tasks, is the correspondence between 
task requirements, individual abilities, and the functionality of the technology.  
Antecedents of TTF are the interactions between task, technology, and 
individual.  For example, certain tasks require specific kinds of technological 
functionality from various organizational units, which encompasses integrated 
databases being accessible to all users in the organization.  As the gap between 
task requirements and the functionality of the technology widens, TTF is reduced.  
Performance impact in this context is related to an accomplishment of a portfolio 
of tasks by an individual.  Higher performance is characterized by improved 
efficiency, improved effectiveness, and/or higher quality.  High TTF increases the 
likelihood of utilization, but also increases the performance impact of the system. 
The task-technology fit theory allows organizational members to assess the 
capability of their IT systems, along with how those systems impact individual 
performance, while also assessing the behavior and attitudes of the individual user 
while interacting with an IS.  The TTF model aligns very well with the healthcare 
environment, particularly with the constant implementation of IT products that are 
often driven at the department level to improve point of care for patients. 
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3.3. Task-technology Fit in IS Context 
TTF theory has evolved from Goodhue (1988; 1995) to Goodhue and 
Thompson (1995).  The evolution of TTF has benefited the IS community with 
key research studies extending the TTF theory as suggested by Goodhue (1988; 
1995) and by Goodhue and Thompson (1995).  For example, Zigurs and Buckland 
(1998) examined the TTF construct focusing on Group Support Systems (GSS) 
environment.  Zigurs and Buckland evaluated the fit between complex tasks and 
how those tasks impacted group performance.  The GSS literature indicates a 
direct correlation between the importance of the task between fit and effective 
GSS use.  However, GSS literature has not been able to use a single method to 
evaluate the various GSS task characteristics i.e., simple task, single solution task, 
or idea-generation task.  Zigurs and Buckland were able to address the issues of 
evaluating various task characteristics using TTF by analyzing the task using 
complexity dimensions instead of focusing on the components of a task.  
Complexity dimensions consist of four constructs that take into account the task 
attributes used in the GSS environment. 
A second extension of TTF used in the IS domain is the TPC model, which follows 
the research stream of utilization and fit (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995).  Goodhue (1995) 
and Goodhue and Thompson (1995) have stated that, when utilization can be assumed, 
the utilization construct of TTF is not required.  This research study assumes the 
utilization of an HIS is mandatory; therefore, this research aligns with the fit focus model 
of TTF theory.  Further, there has been a small number of researchers who have 
conducted IS research utilizing TTF theory primarily focusing on the fit conceptual 
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model.  The researchers have argued that performance impacts will result from TTF when 
a technology provides features that fit the requirement of a task.  Benbasat et al. (1986) 
and Dickson et al. (1986) used the “fit focus” model to examine the impact of graphs 
versus tables on individual decision-making performance.  The researchers used a series 
of laboratory experiments that reported how two types of technology characteristics 
directly influenced user performance based on the fit with the task.  
3.4. Research Model 
In order to further develop both the research model and the hypotheses to be 
tested, we must first operationalize the TTF constructs.  The operationalized 
research model is presented in Figure 2 extending the TTF theory in a healthcare 
setting.  The original task characteristics construct of TTF will be termed 
healthcare task characteristics, while the technology characteristic construct will 
be termed security technology characteristics.  The TTF construct will remain 
unchanged, while the performance impact construct is concerned with HIS 
security performance impacts.  These constructs are further discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 2.  Research model with hypotheses testing 
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Healthcare task characteristics.  The goal is to assess whether or not the 
healthcare worker is supported by the HIS to complete the task.  The healthcare 
task will be measured by the identification of the type of task the user is engaged 
in, and the job role of the user with which the task is associated.  The task will be 
categorized as routine or non-routine, along with the number and types of 
applications and systems that are required for task accomplishment. 
Goodhue (1995) used the attributes of non-routineness and interdependence to 
measure task characteristics.  Non-routineness is the difficulty level required to 
complete a task.  Goodhue suggested that, since users who engage in routine and 
repetitive tasks are familiar with the task, users have the ability to work around 
the IS to complete their task with the minimum amount of interruption or 
frustration where non-routine task are characterized by the dependence of 
multiple applications, systems, and business processes used to complete the task.  
The second attribute interdependence is identified and measured by a user being 
engaged in a task that must integrate with multiple systems to access and retrieve 
data to allow the task to be completed.  Problems often occur in this area when 
data are incompatible or unable to be accessed or delivered in the form expected. 
Security technology characteristics.  The goal is to assess the level of technical 
security controls that are in place when healthcare workers attempt to complete their 
assigned task.  The security technology will be measured by identifying the type of 
resources, which includes hardware, software, and data that was used and rendered 
vulnerable when a usability failure occurred.  Usability failures associated with hardware, 
software, and data threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these 
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resources are is a fundamental security requirement that must be protected.  Capturing 
and identifying the resources that were rendered vulnerable that are associated with the 
task the healthcare worker is engaged in, allowing this research study to further 
understand the nature of usability failures from the technical security perspective.  This 
allows a linkage to form between the task and technology at the point of the technology 
failure, but it also provide a means to better understand what the healthcare worker was 
exposed to during the interaction with the technology.  This will provide and shape the 
context of how a healthcare worker’s security performance is impacted when a usability 
failure occurs. 
Task Technology Fit.  The TTF factors are linked to the task and technology 
characteristics respectively.  TTF is measured by eight factors: (a) data quality 
(DQ), (b) locatability of data, (c) authorization to access data, (d) data 
compatibility (between systems), (e) training and ease of use, (f) production 
timeliness (IS meeting scheduled operations), (g) systems reliability, and (h) IS 
relationships with users.  The first five factors of TTF have links from the 
healthcare task construct to TTF, while the last three have links with security 
technology characteristic regarding TTF.  The combined eight TTF factors form 
the three hypotheses that will be tested by dissecting the research model into two 
components.  Component A will focus on testing hypotheses one and two that link 
both the task characteristic and security technology characteristics construct to 
TTF, while component B will test how TTF links to HIS security performance 
impacts.  The following is a breakdown of the hypotheses:  
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3.4.1 Hypotheses Component A 
Hypothesis 1:  Healthcare Task Characteristics Linkage to TTF.  The factors 
that will be measured are directly linked with TTF are DQ, locatability of the 
data, authorization to access the data, data compatibility between the systems, and 
training and ease of use.  DQ seeks to identify the currency of the data, so that the 
right data are maintained with the right level of detail.  Locatability of the data is 
centered on locating the data along with the ability to easily find out the meaning 
of the data.  Authorization is users having access to the data to complete a task.  
Compatibility is having access to data that are accessed and used from 
heterogeneous and disparate IS.  Ease of use/training is providing hardware or 
software that is easy to use, while providing the appropriate level of training and 
IT support where necessary.  A solid relationship among healthcare task 
characteristic factors signals the link between the two constructs, creating an 
efficient healthcare task; therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H1:  Healthcare task characteristics will be associated with Task-Technology Fit. 
Hypothesis 2:  Security Technology Characteristic Linkage to TTF.  The 
factors that will be measured are directly linked to TTF, which are production 
timeliness, system reliability, and IS relationships.  Production timeliness 
provides the ability of a user to schedule reports or run automated tasked jobs 
with the expectation that the system will provide an output within the time frame 
required.  System reliability consist of having the HIS to be available when 
needed without unexpected or lengthy downtimes, and the third variable of IS 
relationships with users consists of ensuring the IS has the flexibility to meet the 
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changed business needs of the user of the system.  The measured factors of 
security technology characteristics are effectively the computer resources of 
hardware, software and data that must be protected.  A stable relationship between 
security technology characteristic factors in relation to computers, software, and 
data signals a link of TTF; therefore, the following hypotheses will be tested. 
H2:  Security technology characteristics will be associated with Task-Technology 
Fit. 
3.4.2 Hypotheses Component B 
Hypothesis 3:  HIS Security Performance Impacts.  Performance impacts are 
affected by healthcare task and by HIS security technologies that are evaluated by 
the user based on the results of the TTF fit.  The performance impacts should be 
positive, if the task fits the technology.  Combining the constructs of the research 
model provides a means to measure the factors to determine the level of 
effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction to complete a task, with the given 
heterogeneous and disparate systems.  If the healthcare task characteristic and HIS 
security technology characteristics fit, the healthcare workers will complete their 
task, and there will be an impact on the system, and IS security controls can be 
confirmed.  Additionally, if the healthcare task characteristics and HIS security 
technology characteristics fit, TTF correlates with HIS Security Performance; 
therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested. 
H3:  Task-Technology Fit is associated with HIS Security Performance Impact. 
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3.5. Research Method  
This research study is exploratory in nature and used a single case design 
approach with embedded units as specified by Yin (2009).  As Yin stated, “a case 
study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth within its real-life context, especially if the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18).  According to Yin, 
experiment and survey methods are limited in their approach when investigating 
contemporary phenomenon.  Experiments typically remove a phenomenon from 
its context by focusing on a few variables, while survey method designers focus 
on having an acceptable amount of variables analyzed to ensure they have the 
proper amount of respondents for the study, which essentially can limit the 
investigation.  Based on Yin’s assertions, the case study approach is a method that 
can be used to address a phenomenon and context in real-life situations 
thoroughly addressing data collection and data analysis strategies respectively. 
This study was conducted using the positivist case study perspective and 
paradigm.  According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), the positivist paradigm has 
three dimensions: the first is the ontological position which states that an 
objective reality is assumed which can be systematically and rationally 
investigated through empirical investigating and is driven by causal laws that 
apply to social behavior.  The second dimension is the epistemology position 
wherein the researcher and the phenomenon being investigated are assumed to be 
independent and the research remains detached, neutral and objective.  Guba and 
Lincoln believe that any reduction in independence is a threat to the validity of the 
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study and should be reduced by following prescribed procedures.  The third 
dimension noted by Guba and Lincoln is the methodological position which calls 
for general theories to be used to generate propositions that are operationalized as 
hypotheses and subjected to replicable empirical testing. 
Executing a positivist case study essentially requires the researcher to 
understand that there is a single reality that the subjects of the study will express; 
therefore, the researcher must observe and measure the phenomenon adhering to 
the traditional validity and reliability tests used in the natural sciences (Yin, 
2009).  This study followed the guidelines of Yin (2009), Dube and Pare (2004) 
and Lee (1991) in executing this approach.  In essence, this study follows a 
natural science approach, while applying the three-level framework of subjective 
understanding, interpretive understanding, and positivist understanding prescribed 
by Lee.  The framework allows the researcher to understand how human subjects 
see themselves, the researcher interpreting and understanding the human subjects 
under study, and lastly creating the test to explain the empirical reality that is 
being investigated. 
This case study analyzed usability failures in one healthcare organization that 
has 128 medical centers that utilize multiple types of clinical and HIS to share 
information across the United States.  A usability failure develops from the user’s 
inability to access an application or system with the sole purpose of obtaining 
information to complete a task.  The continuous development and expansion of 
HIS to meet legislative mandates has, in some instances, impacted performance of 
the healthcare worker.  The performance impact was measured in the form of 
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usability failures, which often become an organizational security issue in an effort 
to provide HIS users a means to access information in a timely and secure manner 
(Braz & Robert, 2006). 
This research study captured and identified the nature and types of reported 
usability failures from the 128 medical centers to determine how alignment 
problems between the HIS security technology and the healthcare task can have 
an impact on HIS security performance.  The nature and types of usability failures 
was analyzed based on the type of task-related and technology-related usability 
failures respectively.  Ten usability failure cases were randomly selected: five 
representing task-related usability failures, and five representing technology-
related usability failures.  The ten selected usability failures cases essentially 
encapsulate the single case study design with embedded unit of analysis.    
3.5.1 Unit of Analysis 
 Yin (2009) stated that the selection of the unit of analysis occurs when the primary 
research questions are accurately specified.  Selecting well-focused research questions 
allows for the unit of analysis to be formed, which, according to Yin, is the “case” being 
studied and allows for time boundaries to establish a beginning and ending point for the 
study.  Based on these parameters, the unit of analysis for this research study is the 
usability failure identified and captured in a large healthcare organization by users of an 
HIS.  The unit of analysis aligns with the research problem, the research questions, and 
hypotheses used to build the foundation of this research study.  Furthermore, the 
identified and captured usability failures were decomposed into two subunits consisting 
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of task-related and technology-related usability failures respectively.  The two subunits 
create the embedded case study and were the focus of analysis. 
3.5.2 Participants 
The participants in this research study are healthcare workers who reported 
usability failures while working to complete a task and the support staff personnel 
assigned to resolve the problem.  The healthcare workers who reported usability 
failures were selected by the systematic sampling method using the “kth” record 
on the list.  The term “kth” is defined as the number between 0 and the size of 
sample to be selected (Salkind, 2006).  The research study participants consisted 
of members from 14 states and 12 medical centers.  The names of the participants 
and the name of the medical centers will remain anonymous.  Of the list of 
candidates interviewed, nine were IT specialists, five were nurses, three were 
product application specialists, two were program analysts, and one each of a 
human resource specialist, pharmacist, and a medical administrative specialist 
respectively.  Based on the size of the population and the sample size of usability 
failures, ten cases were selected for this study.  This researcher is a member of the 
organization that has direct access to the data under study.  The process of gaining 
access to the organization and receiving approval to conduct the study was 
provided at the conclusion of the Institution Review Board process. 
3.5.3 Data Collection 
According to Bonoma (1985), collecting different types of data by different methods 
from different sources produces a wider scope of coverage and may result in a fuller 
picture of the phenomenon under study.  Yin (2009) noted that the most important 
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advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence from data collection is the 
development of “converging lines of inquiry” (p.42) which is a process of triangulation 
and corroboration for the study.  Triangulation occurred in the data collection process in 
two phases.  The table below lists the data collection steps for this research study.  The 
first phase consists of gathering information from the organization’s help desk database 
where usability failures are reported, along with collecting documentation of 
organizational records that reflect the practices and policies used to support the 
technology that is used and developed in the organization.   
Structured Query Language (SQL) was used to retrieve help desk records of reported 
usability failures dating back five years.  The query retrieved all records within the time 
frame of September 1, 2008, to September 31, 2013, of help desk tickets that required an 
intervention by the development staff.  The captured help desk records followed a four-
phased process that created codes and categories to identify the nature and types of 
usability failures.  Phase two of the data collection process and another form of 
triangulation consisted of conducting semi-structured interviews with the case study 
participants.  Phase two data collection process, the researcher conducted 22 semi-
structured interviews guided by the theoretical framework of the study.  There were 15 
usability failures cases selected 9 usability failures were task-related failures, while 6 
were technology-related failures.  The interview data were transcribed, coded, and 
analyzed using the Atlas.TI qualitative analysis tool. 
The data collected and analyzed from the organization along with the confidentiality 
of the participants was preserved throughout this research endeavor by substituting the 
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participant names with codes.  The following information further describes the two 
phases of the data collection process. 
Table 1  
Data Collection Technique 
Data Collection Steps for this 
Research Study: 
Yin 
(2009) 
Pare 
(2004) 
Sarker & Lee 
(2003) 
Database Repository X X X 
Company Documents X X X 
Emails X X X 
Interviews (Formal & Informal) X X X 
Note. The “X” in the data collection technique table represents triangulation for 
this research study through construct validity, external validity, and reliability as 
prescribed by Yin (2009). 
 
3.5.4 Data Collection Phase One 
 
The purpose of phase one of the data collection process is to identify and 
capture the nature and types of reported usability failures in the healthcare 
organization.  The healthcare organization in this study stores the data to be 
collected in an Enterprise Solutions Support (ESS) database in Figure 3.  The ESS 
database is a repository of the cradle-to-grave information of all problems 
reported by the users in the organization along with the information of the 
solutions provided by the organization.  The information is captured and stored in 
a relational database that links data elements into categories that list the task, 
technology, user information, and a description and summary of the usability 
failure.  The categories in which the data are stored are the bridge that was used to 
create the coding structure for phase two of the data collection process.  The SQL 
query created returned reported usability failures that required an intervention by 
the development staff.  This researcher postulates a usability failure that required 
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an intervention by development staff is of a serious nature and can be linked to 
the misalignment between a task and technology.   
 
Figure 3.  Enterprise support solutions screen capture 
Collecting and analyzing such data gets to the core of the studied 
phenomenon.  The returned data lists the support case identification number, the 
date the problem was reported, type of usability failure, the application interface 
or system used, a summary and description of the problem, the name of the user 
that encountered the usability failure, the failed task, and the name and location of 
the organization. 
Once the data are collected from the database, a key word search was 
executed in four stages focusing on the summary and description fields of the 
extracted data.  Figure 4 list the four data collection stages that were used in phase 
one of the data collection process.  Further, a list of key word search terms is 
listed in Appendix B.  The first key word search stage used anecdotal terms used 
to describe usability and technology failures in this healthcare organization.  The 
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anecdotal terms are derived from applications, systems, and communication 
failures reported by members of the healthcare organization under study.   
 
Figure 4.  Phase one data collection stages 
The second key word search stage used a form of axial coding prescribed by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) to further identify additional categories of usability 
failures that were discovered from the first stage of the key word search.  Axial 
coding is a process used to reassemble and capture data that were fallout from the 
previous stage of captured, categorized and coded data.  The third key word 
search stage incorporated the terms used by Goodhue and Thompson (1995) to 
identify the attributes of the eight TTF factors.  The eight TTF factor attributes 
can directly link usability failures to a task characteristic or a technology 
characteristic usability failure.  The fourth and final stage is the capturing of 
usability failures from the key word search.  The collected usability failures were 
analyzed to determine the nature and types of usability failures.  Additionally, 
collected usability failures were parsed into task characteristic and technology 
characteristic usability failures, which essentially is the focus of the embedded 
case study.  The task characteristic and technology characteristics usability 
failures went through a final review to ensure the usability failures have not been 
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resolved by the support staff before data analysis begins.  Final review required an 
evaluation of additional information that was added to the initial reported 
usability failure.  The additional information provided by support staff added 
more detail to the reported usability failure, and in some cases, required a 
reclassification, and re-routing of the usability failure.  Nonetheless, the additional 
information ensured an accurate classification of the reported usability failure. 
3.5.5 Data Collection Phase Two   
The purpose of phase two of the data collection process was to conduct semi-structured 
interviews to understand how usability-related information system security failures 
impacted task accomplishment in a healthcare setting.  Yin (2009) suggested conducting 
a pilot study to help researchers to determine the appropriate unit of analysis, to refine the 
data collection instruments, and/or to familiarize the researcher with the phenomenon 
itself.  Having a clear unit of analysis, and data collection process, along with a good 
understanding of the phenomenon, a pilot study was not required.  Therefore, semi-
structured interviews are used when the researcher knows most of the questions to ask but 
cannot predict the answer (Pare, 2004).  Twenty two semi-structured interviews were 
conducted via the telephone with healthcare workers and support staff personnel who 
reported or supported the usability failures from the data collection process.  A summary 
of the interview process is discussed in the phase two data collection process in Chapter 
5. 
The present study follows the IS research of  Levina (2005) and Beaudry and 
Pinsonneault (2005) who conducted qualitative case study design consisting of 
semi-structured interviews from the range of 17 to 20 participants in less than a 
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year’s time frame.  Levina (2005) conducted a longitudinal qualitative field study 
of web application development projects to understand collaborative practices that 
unfolded from diverse members of a project team.  Beaudry and Pinsonneault 
(2005) explored the strategies users chose in an effort to adapt to new IT 
introduced into a banking environment.  Both research studies share features that 
are similar to this current study; however, the number of interviews that were 
conducted, ended when theoretical saturation was met.  Theoretical saturation is 
the point at which gathering additional data about a theoretical category reveals 
no new properties nor yields any further theoretical insights about the emerging 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006). 
According to Yin (2009), there are two jobs to be accomplished during the 
interview process: (a) follow the line of inquiry as reflected by the case study 
protocol and (b) ask (conversational) questions in an unbiased manner that also 
serves the needs of the line of inquiry.  The interviews addressed the research 
questions and test the hypotheses while also evaluating TTF theory based on the 
answers provided.  The complete list of semi-structured interview questions is 
listed in Appendix C.  Applying both interview processes recommended by Yin 
created a rapport that allowed the respondents to provide the insight and answers 
to the phenomenon under study. 
3.5.6 Data Analysis 
Data analysis began upon the conclusion of the data collection process after the 
interview data have been transcribed into text.  Table 2 lists the data analysis steps that 
fulfill internal validity through pattern matching, coding, memo writing, computer 
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assisted tool (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and hypothetico-deductive logic (Lee, 1991).  
The primary data analysis technique of Miles and Huberman (1994) is used where coding 
of the transcribed data was completed line by line.  Codes are tags or labels for assigning 
units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).  Each line of text analyzed from the interviews was linked to 
the set of codes developed for this study.  Code development and reliability were 
established by linking specific terms from the categories of reported usability failures 
established by the organization to the TTF theory.  The linkage provides the level of 
inter-code reliability and agreement by projecting a logical flow and meaning of 
identified and captured usability-related information systems security failures.  The 
transcribed interviews were placed into the case study database, where each interview 
was coded to extricate the answers sought from the research problem of the study. 
Table 2  
Data Analysis Technique 
Data Analysis Process 
for this Research Study: 
Yin (2009) 
Miles and 
Huberman           
(1994)    Lee (1991) 
Pattern Matching X X X 
Hypothetico-deductive  
logic 
  
X 
Coding (Axial & Pattern) 
 
X 
 Memo Writing X X 
 Computer Assisted Tool X  X 
 Note. The “X” in the data analysis technique table represents the data analysis steps to 
reach internal validity, along with triangulation prescribed by Yin (2009).  
 
Through the application of hypothetico-deductive logic, as suggested by Lee (1991), 
data analysis tested the premise to reduce usability security failures; organizations must 
align security technology with tasks performed by healthcare workers and ensure that 
such alignment does not hamper security performance in a healthcare organization.  
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Following the preferred practices of Miles and Huberman (1994), the data analysis 
followed primarily a three-step process while also incorporating a contingency plan of 
revaluating the data analysis method to ensure theoretical saturation is fulfilled.  The first 
step consists of the creation of a list of start codes before the interview phase is 
conducted.  The initial start list codes are created from the research problem, research 
questions, research model, factors from the theoretical model, and hypotheses.  For 
example, the theme of this research study is to understand the nature and types of 
usability failures in a healthcare setting; therefore, a start list code of “UF” which 
indicates a usability failure. 
The second data analysis step is the development of pattern codes, explanatory or 
inferential codes that identify an emergent theme or explanation (Miles & Huberman, 
1994).  Pattern coding allows the grouping and summarizing of sub-codes, themes and 
constructs that are discovered from the interview process.  In this data analysis process, 
pattern coding was conducted with the assistance of a computer-aided software tool, 
Atlas.TI.  Atlas.TI is a tool that assists with coding and categorizing large amounts of 
narrative text that are often collected from open-ended interviews.  The third step of data 
analysis is memo writing.  Memo writing is the pivotal intermediate step between data 
collection and writing drafts of papers (Charmaz, 2006).  Memo writing allows for the 
continued analysis of the codes and data collected throughout the research process.  
Memo writing was conducted at the end of each interview and after the codes and data 
have been assigned after the transcription process.  Constant memo writing allows 
connections to develop, comparisons to be made, and the crystallization of questions and 
directions to pursue within a research study (Charmaz, 2006).   
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3.5.7 Reliability and Validity 
Research design is supposed to represent a logical set of statements by which one can 
test and judge the quality of the design using the concepts of trustworthiness, credibility, 
conformability, and dependability (Yin, 2009).  Yin (2009) recommended the use of 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability respectively as the 
methods to test the quality of the case study.  Construct validity was established by 
creating a chain of evidence.  To increase reliability of a case study, Yin (2009) lists six 
sources of case study evidence:  (a) documentation (b) archival records, (c) interviews, 
(d) direct observations, (e) participant observation, and (f) physical artifacts.  A chain of 
evidence allows an outside observer to follow the trail of derived evidence from the 
research problem to the research questions, on to the conclusion of the case study.  For 
this research study, construct validity was established using four out of the six sources of 
case evidence: the collection of documentation, archival records, interviews, and physical 
artifacts.  The four sources of case study evidence was integrated into the case study 
report, case study database, and case study protocol, which further establish external 
validity and reliability for this study. 
According to Yin (2009), internal validity seeks to establish a causal relationship 
where certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions distinguishable by 
spurious relationships.  Analyzing the data from the dialogue of healthcare workers and 
support staff confirms the relationships developed from usability-related information 
systems security failures.  Following the data analysis steps suggested by several scholars 
(e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1994; Sarker & Lee, 2003; Yin, 2009) confirms that internal 
validity exists in this study. 
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External validity is knowing whether a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the 
immediate case study (Yin, 2009).  The ability to capture a usability failure and linking 
the failure to a specific task as well as the technology used to complete the task provides 
a means to understand the factors that created the usability failure.  Once the relationship 
of the usability failure is established, an assessment of the failure can be determined, 
which allows the means to address or reduce the usability-related information systems 
security failure.  The process used to study the nature of usability-related information 
systems security failures can be applied in most organizations that provide IT support to 
their staff.  The key to obtaining generalizability is to understand when a usability failure 
occurs.  Identifying the interaction that takes place between the task and the technology 
determined the effect the usability failure has on performance. 
Reliability is obtained when the study can be repeated.  Having a high level of 
repeatability provides the creation of a credible research project.  Reliability can be 
verified by following the case study protocol developed for the case report.  The case 
study protocol contains the instrument as well as the procedures and general rules in case 
study research to guide the investigator in carrying out the data collection from a single 
case study design (Yin, 2009). 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the theoretical basis was discussed along with the 
methodology to address the research questions, and hypotheses of this study.  The 
use of a single case study design with embedded units allows for the phenomenon 
of usability security failures to be identified, understood, and linked to a specific 
type of task and technology used in a HIS.  The data collection and data analysis 
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process provides the reliability and validity that not only provides the credibility 
and repeatability of this research endeavor, but it also creates the ability for many 
organizations and disciplines, particularly the HCI community a perspective of 
evaluating usability and security issues in a different vein.  Lastly, a chain of 
evidence was provided, including the case study protocol, case study report, and 
case study database, which is available for outside observers. 
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Chapter 4 
Case Study: Phase One Data Collection and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the complete phase one data collection 
and data analysis process.  The purpose of the phase one data collection and data 
analysis process was to address the first research question “What are the nature 
and types of usability-related information security failures in a HIS?”  In the data 
collection phase one process, a SQL query was created to retrieve help desk 
records of reported usability failures dating back five years.  The query retrieved 
all records within the time frame of September 1, 2008, to September 31, 2013, of 
help desk tickets that required an intervention by the development staff.  Help 
desk tickets are stored in a database repository of cradle-to-grave dialogue of 
information of all problems reported by the users in the organization along with 
the information of the solutions provided by organizational staff.  Analyzing the 
discourse between healthcare workers, support staff, and development teams 
allowed the identification and enhanced understanding of usability-related 
security failures and how the failures impact IS security performance within the 
healthcare organization. 
Help desk tickets that require an intervention by the development staff are 
those that could not be resolved at the medical center or by the second-level 
national support teams.  To apply the appropriate context to the problem under 
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study, from this point forward, help desk tickets will be referred to as usability 
failures. 
After the identification of the usability failures, a priori coding methods 
applying terms that describe and define the definition of TTF theory, the CIA 
triad, and the manner in which the organization under study classified and 
reported user problems provided the foundation of code and category 
development.  Sub codes, codes, sub categories, and categories were the process 
that wove the identification, classification, theming, and understanding of 
usability failures in the organization.  The following section describes the detailed 
approach to identifying and understanding the nature and types of usability 
failures.   
4.2 Organization 
The history of the current Veterans Affairs department (VA) can trace its roots 
back to 1626.  From 1776 to 1811, to 1911, all which were prominent times in the 
history of the United States, specifically in times of national and international 
conflict, the sacrifice of American soldiers and their families was recognized by 
United States elected officials with the establishment and continual 
transformation of the VA to support the nation’s veterans.  The transformation 
consisted of providing medical and hospital treatment for all injuries and diseases 
of veterans, whether or not of service origin, along with the providing programs 
for disability compensation, insurance for service persons and veterans, and 
vocational rehabilitation for the disabled.  The VA is organizationally structured 
into three main service lines: the Veterans Benefits Affairs (VBA), Veterans 
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Health Administration (VHA), and National Cemetery Administration (NCA).  
The VHA is responsible for all VA healthcare services administered by VA 
Medical Centers, Ambulatory Care and community-based outpatient clinics.  The 
focus of this study has been within the VHA organization; therefore, from this 
point forward, only the VHA will be referenced in this study.  The VHA is home 
to the United States’ largest integrated health care system consisting of 128 
medical centers, nearly 1,400 community-based outpatient clinics, community 
living centers, Veteran Centers and Domiciliaries.  The VHA employs more than 
239,000 staff at the aforementioned organizational elements, providing 
comprehensive care to more than 8.3 million veterans each year.  
The VHA has an integrated healthcare system comprising a multitude of 
disparate and heterogeneous computer applications and systems.  Those 
applications and systems are interoperable with VA system architecture composed 
of multiple programming languages and a diverse number of operating systems 
and hardware.  Within the VHA, the Health Product Support (HPS) division are 
composed of teams of IT specialists who provide ongoing support to operational 
systems and are charged with analyzing the portfolios of existing products.  The 
HPS support teams ensure prompt and effective problem resolution of 
organizational-deployed software, as well as ensure that such resolutions are 
executed in the most cost-effective manner available.  HPS employees provide 
support to over 115 software applications.  The 115 software applications along 
with the interactions and experiences of the users of the applications are the 
source of the study. 
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4.3 Code and Category Development 
Saldana (2012) stated that a code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or 
short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, 
and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data.  
Charmaz (2001) described coding as the critical link between data collection and 
their explanation of meaning.  In the phase one data collection process, code 
identification was derived from the words and short phrases of users of the 
organization who encountered and reported usability failures.  The usability 
failures reported by the study participants are the critical link that leads to theory 
testing in this study.  The evolution of code identification to code creation was 
performed by capturing and synthesizing the words from study participants who 
reported usability failures to words that led to defining TTF theory and the CIA 
triad.  The combination of TTF theory and the CIA triad is the link that identifies 
information system security failures.  For example, when users report that they are 
unable to access a software application while attempting to complete a task, the 
phrase “unable to access” symbolizes that there was a potential task failure and a 
potential technical security failure.  Therefore, an “unable to access” code is 
created.  Further exploring the “unable to access” code can explain the root cause 
of the problem, as well as the user experience which essentially leads to testing 
the hypotheses in this study. 
Code creation in this study follows the method prescribed by Miles and 
Huberman (1994).  Miles and Huberman suggested creating start codes from the 
research problem, research questions, research model, factors from the theoretical 
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model, and hypotheses.  Following Miles and Huberman was the starting point in 
the code-creation process.  The second step in the code-creation process was the 
data analysis step wherein patterns in the data are declared, termed pattern coding.  
Pattern codes are explanatory or inferential codes that identify an emergent theme 
or explanation (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  Pattern coding allows the grouping 
and summarizing of sub-codes, themes and constructs that are discovered from 
the interview process.   
Capturing start codes was done using the a priori coding method.  A priori 
coding develops codes before the collected data are examined (Charmaz, 2006).  
In this research study, a priori codes were developed during first cycle coding to 
create start codes using the terms and conditions that caused usability failures.  
First cycle code review led to the extrication of 660 usability failures that 
ultimately developed the list of identified usability failures.  The codes used to 
identify usability failures were organized into a hierarchy based on the TTF 
construct of task characteristic failures and technology characteristics failures.  
The hierarchical grouping were constructed iteratively through the development 
of sub codes transforming into codes, to codes transforming into sub categories, to 
sub categories transforming into categories that identified the nature and type of 
usability-related information systems security failures. 
4.3.1 Code Development and Analysis 
The foundation of code development was derived from the ESS screen capture 
(see page 44).  The ESS screen capture depicts three key fields (a) Category, (b) 
Type, and (c) Item (CTI) that are essentially communicated to support staff 
 
58 
 
personnel the nature of the usability failure.  In figure 3, the category describes 
the type of system the healthcare worker attempted to use, while the type 
represents the application used, and the item represents the problem the healthcare 
worker encountered.  Applying the CTI, this research study is able to develop a 
taxonomy of usability-related information systems security failures based on both 
healthcare task characterizations and security technology characteristics 
respectively.  The process used to establish the usability-related information 
systems security failure taxonomy followed the phase one data collection process 
displayed in figure 4 (see page 45), applying the terms to each phase that is listed 
in Appendix B.  
The combination of CTI, along with the reported problem summary and case 
log data created the sub code lists in Appendices D and E for both healthcare task 
characteristic and security technology characteristic failures.  The process that 
classified whether the usability failure was task-related or technology-related was 
determined by the CTI, the problem summary, and the TTF theory defined by 
(Goodhue & Thompson, 1995).  The initial task usability failure report in table 3 
allowed the nature of the usability failures to be determined.  The nature of the 
usability failures are essentially the root cause of usability failures.  The nature of 
the usability failure was ultimately determined by the data from the case log, 
primarily because the combination of perspectives from the healthcare worker that 
reported the usability failure along with the support staff was required to 
accurately identify and classify the problem.  An example of the code analysis 
process can be described by examining the first entry in table 3 as a reference.  
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The type of task was determined by reviewing the CTI and the problem summary.  
The first entry suggests that the healthcare worker encountered an application 
failure attempting to complete the task of scanning an Intravenous Order.  The 
problem description states that there was an informational message presented that 
consisted of an “invalid lookup error.”  The “invalid lookup error” translates to an 
“unable to retrieve information” usability failure.  The inability of the healthcare 
worker to retrieve information is the nature of the failure.  
A second task-related usability failure example requires highlighting the 
complex nature of diagnosing and troubleshooting usability-related information 
systems security failures.  The second row entry in table 3 captured the CTI of 
HealtheVet-VistA.  The HealtheVet-VistA CTI represents multiple disparate and 
heterogeneous applications and systems interacting in an effort to assist the 
healthcare worker complete a task.  In this example, the healthcare worker was 
unable to obtain information using the reporting tool using the HealtheVet-VistA 
application and system.  However, using a workaround of accessing the VistA 
system (alternate HIS), the needed information was pieced together to complete 
the task. 
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Table 3 
Initial Task Usability Failure Report 
CTI Problem Summary Case Log Summary 
Applications-VistA  
Inpatient Medications 
5.0  
IV Orders Issue 
Unable to scan IV 
orders 
Local support, IRM, reports 
nurses are unable to scan 
particular IV orders.  The 
nurses are receiving the 
following error message:  
Invalid lookup, do not give.  
The site will provide the IV 
order numbers.  The site does 
have Remedy access and can 
grant system access if needed. 
Applications 
HealtheVet-VistA 
Multi-divisional 
reporting needed 
The integrated data issue 
relates to the medical center 
location. It includes three 
locations. This was a former 
VISN, in which all medical 
centers were merged.  
Everyone was aware they were 
seeing the data from other 
medical centers. Everyone is 
aware of the sharing of patient 
information. Our major 
problem is the reporting. They 
cannot obtain reports for the 
different medical centers, 
which are identified.  Med 
center has been continually 
using the NUMI application, 
but cannot separate out the 
RLOC data for medical center. 
The wards are identified with 
an alpha character representing 
each site for most reports, so 
people can select their MC 
wards, but this option is not 
available for RLOC and also in 
the Physician Advisor report. 
 
Table 4 provides a list of security technology characteristic usability failures 
examples along with an explanation and interpretation of the data that allowed the 
classification of the failure.  Technology characteristic usability failures follows 
 
61 
 
the same process as healthcare task characteristic failures by combining the CTI 
with the problem summary to classify the nature of the usability failure.  In table 
4, the first example states that the Adverse Reaction Tracking application was 
receiving undefined errors.  The interpretation of the CTI error with the problem 
summary suggest that the undefined error was due to data being missing that 
prevented both the healthcare worker from completing their task, and the software 
application from executing a programming step that would have created an 
adverse reaction report on a patient.  The classification of the usability failure 
being technology-related was materialized by (a) missing data prevented the 
software from executing properly, (b) the problem was linked to a software 
execution failure, and (c) the healthcare worker was unable to complete the task 
using a workaround, hence requiring the development staff to intervene to resolve 
the problem. 
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Table 4 
Initial Technology Usability Failure Report 
Category Type Item Problem 
Summary 
Case Log Summary 
Applications-Vista 
Adverse Reaction 
Tracking 4.0 
Receiving Error 
(Undefined, Null 
Subscript, etc.) 
58)<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1 
*GMRAL(64395)13:43:09  
ROU:PUGR1PA04    11178   55)  
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1 
*GMRAL(64395)13:41:05  
ROU:PUGR1PA01     9319   54)  
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1 
*GMRAL(64395)13:39:09  
ROU:PUGR1PA04    27578   53)  
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1 
*GMRAL(64395)13:37:51  
ROU:PUGR1PA05    15822   52)  
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1 
*GMRAL(64395)13:36:54  
ROU:PUGR1PA01    20907   50)  
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1 
*GMRAL(64395)13:27:46  
ROU:PUGR1PA02    12565    46)  
<UNDEFINED>DSPLY+4^PSODGAL1 
*GMRAL(64395)12:43:40  
ROU:PUGR1PA04    24541   45)  Let me 
know who I can send the data information to 
in encrypted outlook message. 
Applications-
HealtheVet-VistA 
Enrollment 
Systems 
Redesign  
HL7 Messaging 
Issue: 
We are having a problem with a patient's 
rated disability not showing an effective 
date.  Our MAS Adpac says it shows in ESR 
but is not crossing over to our Vista system. 
 
A second example of a security technology characteristic usability-related 
information security failure requires discussing the Application HealtheVet-VistA 
CTI in the second row of table 4.  In this example, a data element is stored in the 
VistA system; however the data element was not transmitted over to the 
HealtheVet system.  The programming code in the application between the VistA 
system and the Enrollment system should have transmitted the data element to the 
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HealtheVet system.  In this particular example, the data element is required in 
order to process a Veteran’s record on the HealtheVet system. 
The CTI discussed earlier was not enough data to accurately classify task 
characteristics and technology characteristic usability-related information systems 
security failures.  The dialogue from the summary field and case log fields listed 
in figure 3 (see page 44) was also required to determine the nature and type of 
usability failures.  Table 3 lists examples of the initial failure report data from 
healthcare workers that framed the code analysis and essentially led to the 
classification of healthcare task characteristic usability failures.  In essence a form 
of triangulation was employed to the code analysis process in order to accurately 
identify and analyze usability failures. 
There were 660 records that followed the healthcare task characteristic and 
security technology characteristic code analysis process, however only a few 
examples are provided for understanding.  Additionally, all duplicate sub codes 
were eliminated leaving 44 healthcare task characteristic sub codes and 53 
security technology characteristic sub codes. 
The sub codes were collapsed into a set of codes by grouping sub codes that 
were similarly related.  For example, the sub codes of healthcare task 
characteristic usability failure of access denied, access violation error, unable to 
log into the system, user access violation, represents the code of access failure.  
The security technology characteristic usability failure sub codes were collapsed 
in the same fashion as the healthcare task characteristic usability failures.  Using 
the sub codes from Appendix E as an example, the sub codes of unable to transfer 
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data, unable to transmit data, unable to upload data, unsolicited data merge, 
unable to receive data, system created duplicate transmission represents the data 
transmission code. 
At the conclusion of first cycle code review, the second cycle code review 
began.  Second cycle code review was conducted to develop the categories 
developed from first cycle code review.  According to Saldana (2012), the 
primary goal of second cycle code review was to develop a sense of categorical, 
thematic, conceptual, and/or theoretical organization from first cycle coding.  The 
second cycle code review process allowed the transformation of sub codes into 
codes, and codes into sub categories, and sub categories into categories. 
Additionally, during the first cycle and second cycle code review development 
process, the sub codes of “data” and “information” required distinct clarification 
to properly understand and categorize usability-related information systems 
security failures.  This research study defined raw data as having no significance, 
while information was defined as coming into existence when context was added 
to data (Avison & Fitzgerald, 1995).  To parse the difference between the two sub 
codes in the identified usability-related information security failures, data-related 
errors are presented under the group of security technology characteristics 
failures, while information-related errors are presented under the group of 
healthcare task characteristics failures.  Data-related errors are errors discovered 
at the database and database repository level prior to the conversion of data into 
information, while information-related error are errors that occur after data are 
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transmitted, received, and interpreted by the user where an action or response is 
expected from the interaction with information. 
4.3.2 Category Development and Analysis 
Categories were formed via the analytical coding processing.  The 
establishment of categories in qualitative data analysis allows patterns to emerge 
from the data.  Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest framing categories by applying a 
process of classification and reasoning while using a tacit sense of intuitiveness to 
determine what data look alike while grouping into categories when evaluating 
codes to form patterns and themes.  To manage, guide and refine the categories 
being developed, the rule of inclusion was used (Maycut & Morehouse, 1994).  
The rule of inclusion is a process where a category emerges followed by a 
proposed statement about the category along with an example of the respondent’s 
words that contributed to the formation of the codes.  Examples of the rule of 
inclusion used to develop pattern codes and themes are listed in Appendix F. 
The category analysis process consisted of development terms that accurately 
represented the combination of usability failures codes developed.  Combining the 
codes that were similarly related, to include the terms that defined TTF theory, the 
CIA triad; along with the analyzing the dialogue of the usability failures framed 
the categorical nomenclature.  Additionally, the ESS repository user interface 
screen depicted in figure 3 (see page 44) are comprised of a combination of fields 
(CTI, summary field, and case log) that formed the code and category 
development.  Analyzing the CTI along with the summary field and case log 
allowed this research study to classify task-related and technology-related 
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usability failures.  The healthcare task characteristic failures are comprised of the 
terms and attributes that describe healthcare task-related failures that healthcare 
workers encountered interacting with applications and systems.  The security 
technology characteristic failures are comprised of the terms and attributes that 
describe security technology-related failures that healthcare workers encountered 
interacting with application and systems, however the distinct difference between 
healthcare task-related failures and security-technology related failures are that 
security technology failures are failures that (a) missing data prevented the 
software from executing properly, (b) the problem was linked to a software 
execution failure, and (c) the healthcare worker was unable to complete the task 
using a workaround, hence requiring the development staff to intervene to resolve 
the problem.  The combination of code and categorical analysis provided the 
avenue for establishing a distinct difference among usability failures.  The 
following paragraphs describe both the code and category development and 
analysis process.   
4.3.3 Healthcare Task Characteristic Failure Categories 
Construction of the task failure category code group was refined by grounding 
the sub codes, codes, and sub categories with the terms that provided clarity to the 
evolution of usability-related information systems security failures from a task 
failure in a healthcare organization.  The two major categories in the task failure 
category group are Task Failure and Application Failure.  The task failure 
category is the origin of encounters and interactions users of an HIS have and 
report within the organization under study.  The encounters and interactions will 
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provide a source of information to understand the synergy created when usability-
related information systems security failures materialize while using the HIS.  The 
application failure category was created to capture the CTI that the healthcare 
worker had the interaction failure.  As discussed previously, the CTI represents 
the combination of system, application, and task that the healthcare worker was 
having an interaction with when the usability failure originally occurred.  This 
application failure category allows this research study to thoroughly analyze the 
nature of the usability failure along with how the specific CTI affects security 
performance.  Evaluating the historical performance factors of the CTI via the 
application failure category discussed in the case log entries of the usability 
failure provided the needed perspective to empirically investigate usability 
failures.  The usability-related information systems security failures provide 
informational messages when the users encounter failures.  Combining the CTI 
with the informational messages contributed to an enhanced understanding of the 
nature of the failures.  The sub categories of the two major categories of the task 
characteristic code group will further explain the rationale in code and category 
choice development for this study. 
Task Failure. The task failure codes of access failures, interruption failures, 
security failures, service request, training, and unexpected behavior failures are 
the codes that surfaced from the usability failure reports.  The codes of access 
failures, interruption failures, security failures, and unexpected behavior failures 
occur during the execution of a task using the HIS.  Access failures along with the 
security failure code errors are related to log-on issues or problem with the 
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software handling a user’s security credentials.  In essence, the user interface is 
where the interaction begins and ends with the software user.  User interface 
literature primarily focuses on developing better interfaces (Shneiderman, Jacobs, 
Cohen, & Plaisant, 2009), and security for the interfaces (Bourimi et al., 2012; 
Brostoff, 2004); however, the combination of the former and latter approaches 
poses challenges, while leaving security in question.  Interruption failures error 
codes are encountered by users when the software prevents task completion.  It is 
commonplace that the software will provide an informational message suggesting 
the cause of the failure.  The unexpected behavior failures error code is when the 
software performs in an unexpected manner.  In those instances, the task could 
have been completed, but the end results were not expected which must be 
investigated to determine the potential risk that may exist to the HIS.  Service 
request and training codes are requests the users of an application or system 
makes to support staff to improve upon the HIS or ask to learn how to 
appropriately use the HIS. 
Application Failure.  The application failure category provides an anchor to 
connect the type of task failure to a specific application failure down to the root 
cause of the healthcare task characteristic usability failure.  Combining the task 
failure, application failure, and root cause of the problem essentially created a 
method to capture, identify, and understand non-technical usability-related 
information systems security failures.  Having multiple types of information-
related failures, there was a need to establish sub categories to appropriately 
manage codes and categories, therefore two sub categories were created.  The sub 
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categories of Information Quality (IQ) and Information Security were created.  
The IQ codes of display failures, inaccurate failures, inconsistent failures, 
incompatible failures, and report error failures were codes that surfaced with a 
high level of frequency from reported usability failures.  The IQ codes were not 
errors generated and returned by the software application after a failure was 
identified by the application.  Rather, IQ failure codes were detected by the users 
of the HIS as a result of viewing the feedback from a task that appeared to have 
been executed correctly.  IQ has been discussed extensively in IS research 
literature and has been dubbed a critical success factor to an IS by Delone (2003) 
and Delone and McLean (1992).  IQ is the fitness of the use of information, and is 
a multidimensional concept (Ballou, Wang, Pazer, & Kumar, 1998; Wang & 
Strong, 1996) with dimensions of accuracy, consistency, interpretability, 
timeliness, and completeness.  In the healthcare context, IQ errors such as the 
inability of a healthcare worker to display data or a graph, as well as healthcare 
workers reporting they were receiving inaccurate, inconsistent, and incompatible 
information can result in serious negative consequences.  An example of received 
inaccurate, inconsistent, or incompatible information is the healthcare worker 
receiving the wrong results of a patient’s blood test.  The application may provide 
an informational message stating an error, in which the healthcare will evaluate 
the information by checking the blood test results against another clinical source 
where the inaccuracy, inconsistency, or incompatibility error confusion can be 
addressed with absolute certainty.  The report error code also create a high level 
of concern, particularly when healthcare organizations conduct critical incident 
 
70 
 
investigations, as healthcare workers and administrators use reports as one of the 
tools to evaluate medical incidents.  The information gleaned from medical 
reports has the potential to save lives.  
Information Security Failure. The information security failure codes of 
misinterpretation failures, mismatch failures, missing failures, and unavailable 
failures are codes that surfaced with a high level of frequency from the usability 
failure reports.  The information security codes are similarly discovered as the IQ 
codes.  They are typically not codes that are generated from the software 
application; they are codes discovered by the users of the HIS while attempting to 
complete their task.  The information security codes were adopted via the in vivo 
coding process by using the exact words of the user who reported the failure.  For 
example, the HIS user would have received information that he or she was unable 
to interpret correctly—thus stating it was “misinterpreted.”  Healthcare workers 
stated they received “mismatched” information, as well as information was 
“missing” or “unavailable.”  What distinguishes the difference between IQ failure 
sub category codes and information security failure sub category codes as it 
relates to the handling of information lie in the results and actions of the user 
when encountering the failure.  The information security sub category seeks to 
understand from the participant of the study, the role and relationship a usability 
failure had on information security.  In this study, the expectation was to have the 
user security practices unveiled through the steps chosen by the users when they 
encounter handling misinterpreted failures, mismatched failures, missing failures, 
or unavailable failures.  This approach has been discussed by Wier, Douglas, 
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Richardson, and Jack (2010), in that security is not the main goal of a user’s 
interaction with a computer system; moreover, Post and Kagan (2006) asserted 
that employees in an organization are more likely to bypass security measures in 
order to complete a task.  Hence, discussing and evaluating the thoughts and 
actions of a user after an information security failure gained new insight on how 
to address such failures.  
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Figure 5.  Healthcare task characteristic failures 
4.3.4 Technology Failure Categories 
Security Technology Characteristic Failures.  The primary categories that 
emanated from the pattern coding process are system production failure, system 
reliability failure, and network connectivity failure.  The codes in the technology 
characteristic code grouping are related to hardware components that comprise a 
HIS.  In the healthcare environment, the HIS falls into four major categories:  (a) 
clinical, (b) management, (c) strategic decision support, and (d) electronic 
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networking and e-health applications (Austin & Boxerman, 2003).  Clinical 
information systems support patient care; management information systems 
support non-patient care activities; decision-support systems assist senior 
managers in the area of strategic planning; and electronic data exchange and 
networking allows a healthcare organization to connect to national databases as 
well as to communicate with all users connected to the network.  The security 
technology characteristic failure category grouping is shaped by both the HIS 
categories and Goodhue and Thompson’s (1995) definition of technology 
characteristics: meeting the day-to-day operational needs of the users of the 
system.  The information security context is applied and evaluated using the 
security requirements of confidentiality, integrity, and availability when the 
source of the usability failure is linked to the HIS. 
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Figure 6.  Security technology characteristic failures 
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The system production failure category consists of data security failure, data 
storage failure, data transmission failure, flexibility failure, operations failure, 
and reporting failure codes.  The system production codes were discovered via in 
vivo coding by analyzing the reported usability failure data.  Data security failure 
in this context is maintaining the integrity of information by healthcare workers as 
they enter data into the information system.  Data storage failure and data 
transmission failures are the error codes reported by healthcare workers while 
making data request from databases or data repositories.  The codes of flexibility 
failures, operations failures, and reporting failures are related to the feedback 
provided by the users as they access and use the information systems in an effort 
to complete their task.  More specifically, as users of an HIS task and work 
processes change, the users will need the HIS to adapt and provide the flexibility 
needed to complete their task.  For example, a new task request can be issued that 
requires the healthcare worker to run a report on a new outpatient clinic that is a 
division of a medical center.  If the healthcare worker is unable to run a query to 
obtain the data, due to programming restrictions, the programming restrictions 
was the essence of a technical failure with the root cause being that the HIS did 
not have the “flexibility” required for the healthcare worker to complete the task.   
System reliability failure category codes were generated using the same 
method and process used to identify system production codes.  In vivo coding was 
used to capture the high-frequency pattern codes reported by the users who 
encountered failures.  System reliability failure codes consist of informational 
messages that the HIS user will receive back from an application or system while 
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attempting to complete a task.  The failure codes are incompatibility failure, crash 
failures, delay failures, down failures, unavailable failures, and unresponsive 
failures.  The system reliability failure codes are centered on the users’ ability to 
connect to a HIS.  The HIS within the healthcare environment are disparate, 
autonomous, heterogeneous systems, which can result in compatibility issues 
during the interoperability phase of computer systems’ connecting and 
communicating.  
Network connectivity failure category codes were generated using the same 
method and process that was used to identify system reliability codes.  In vivo 
coding was used to capture the high-frequency pattern codes reported by the users 
that encountered failures.  Network connectivity codes consist of authentication 
failures, lost connectivity failures, and security failures.  The authentication error 
failure occurs as a user attempts to connect to an application or system while 
using a network connection.  The most common occurrence that has been 
recognized in this healthcare environment is with web-based applications and 
with disparate, autonomous systems.  With the high number of applications and 
systems connected to networks which are used throughout the healthcare 
environment, authentication failures, loss of connectivity failures, and security 
failures frequently occur when healthcare workers are unable to access software 
applications or systems.  The loss of connectivity error code is network-related, 
while the security failure code is primarily related to a user’s inability to transmit 
patient or confidential information via encrypted email or using file transfer 
protocols to send or receive large amounts of sensitive data.  
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4.4 Nature of Failures 
To understand the nature of failures in this research study, the focus is on the 
failed interactions a user had with the HIS.  The failed interaction is a healthcare 
task that was unable to be successfully completed or required other methods such 
as a workaround to obtain a satisfactory result.  Ammenwerth et al. (2006) 
characterized the makeup of a healthcare task as comprising the wholeness of a 
working process to be completed (e.g., nursing documentation, order entry, etc.) 
by the user who is supported by the given technology.  Focusing on the wholeness 
of the healthcare task by evaluating usability failures that required an intervention 
by development staff leads to understanding the nature of a failure.  In the 
organization under study, a healthcare task and healthcare technology failures are 
linked to the inability of a user to accomplish his or her goal.  The failure is 
primarily due to data or information not being delivered through technology that 
allows the necessary action to be taken based on established policies, standards, 
and working processes within the organization. 
The nature of a usability failure requires the discernment of task-related and 
technology-related usability failures.  The perception of task-related failures 
within a healthcare environment is slightly skewed based on the manner in which 
healthcare workers can mitigate their failures.  Healthcare workers will use 
alternative means such as a workaround to survive a task failure, however that 
does not discount the ramifications of the task failures.  The ramifications are a 
lack of productivity and lost time when workarounds are pursued due to task 
failures.  Contrary to task failures, technology failures create a different reaction 
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to healthcare workers in this study.  Technology failures are caused by the tools of 
data, hardware, systems, and services failing as healthcare workers attempt to 
accomplish their tasks.  Additionally, a technology failure in this research study 
included task failures that were unable to be circumvented via workarounds, 
which ultimately caused the reported usability failure to require an intervention by 
the development staff, leaving the reported usability failure left unresolved. 
A usability failure is the inability of a user to use a healthcare product to 
effectively, efficiently, and satisfactorily to achieve his or her goal.  Within the 
information security domain, an information security failure is the inability to 
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability, of the information.  The 
combination of healthcare task failures, technology failures, usability failures, and 
security failures has transformed the aforementioned failures into usability-related 
information systems security failures (see Figure 7).  Therefore, the nature and 
type of usability-related information system security failures consist of the 
attributes and characteristics of healthcare task failures, technology failures, 
usability failures, and information system failures respectively.   
The attributes and characteristics of both healthcare task failures and security 
technology characteristics failures are caused by information integrity issues 
along with the unavailability of application and systems to healthcare workers.  
Information integrity errors occurred when the information transmitted was not 
the same as expected when it arrived to the healthcare workers and unavailability 
errors occurred when the information including applications and systems was not 
available to the healthcare workers at the time needed.  Further, the terms and 
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conditions that caused usability-related information systems security failures are 
the nature of the usability failure, and was the foundation used to develop a set of 
codes and categories that was used to evaluate and understand the nature and 
types of usability-related information security failures. 
 
Figure 7.  Usability failure transition process model 
4.5 Results 
A total of 4,819 help desk tickets met the search criteria that captured and 
identified usability-related information systems security failures.  The 4,819 
captured failures were streamlined into 660 usability failures.  The code and 
category connection is based on the TTF theory of (Goodhue & Thompson, 
1995).  The task characteristic code and category failure group linked back to the 
five factors of TTF:  quality, locatability, authorization, compatibility, and ease of 
use/training.  The technology characteristic code and category failure group 
linked to the technical factors which are production timeliness, systems reliability, 
and relationship with users.  The usability failures were grouped into task 
characteristic failure groups and technology failure characteristic groups 
respectively.  Combining the CTI from usability failures reported by healthcare 
workers with the summary and case log data of usability-related information 
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system security failures allowed for an accurate identification of the nature and 
types of usability-related information systems security.  The nature of a usability 
failure is the cause of a usability failure applying the definition of TTF, CIA triad, 
and anecdotal information provided by the ESS repository.  The cause of usability 
failures are linked directly to information integrity and the unavailability of 
applications and systems.  The combination of codes for the task characteristic 
group, and the technology characteristic group addressed the first research 
question “What are the nature and types of usability-related information security 
failures in a HIS?”  In essence, the data collection and data analysis cycle was 
fulfilled following Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2013), Charmaz (2006), and 
Miles and Huberman (1994).  
4.6 Summary 
This chapter described the complete phase one data collection and data 
analysis process to capture the nature and types of usability-related information 
systems security failures.  There were 4, 819 help desk tickets captured through a 
SQL query that evolved from usability failures into usability-related information 
systems security failures.  Usability-related information systems security failures 
were determined by the combination of healthcare task failures, technology 
failures, usability failures, and information security failures.  Defining the 
combination of failures using TTF theory, the CIA triad, and the reported 
usability failures led to identifying the nature and types of usability-related 
information systems security failures in the organization.  The code development 
process advanced the construction of a coding scheme for both task characteristic 
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failures and technology failures respectively.  The coding scheme will aid in 
phase two of the data collection and data analysis process.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Case Study: Phase Two Data Collection and Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the complete phase two data collection 
and data analysis process.  The purpose of the phase two data collection and data 
analysis process is to address the second research question “How does usability-
related information systems security failures impact task accomplishment in a 
healthcare setting?”  In the phase two data collection process, the researcher 
conducted semi-structured interviews guided by the theoretical framework of the 
study.  The interview data were transcribed, coded, and analyzed using the 
Atlas.TI qualitative analysis tool.  In addition to addressing the second research 
question, the analyzed data tested the hypotheses in figure 2 of this study.  The 
following paragraphs will describe the details of the phase two data collection and 
data analysis process. 
5.2 Data Collection Process  
Participant selection for data collection was based on systematic sampling 
(Salkind, 2006).  The query used to extract usability failures returned 660 
potential usability failure cases.  The systematic sampling process was started 
with the first usability failure cases returned, and, from that point forward, every 
4th usability failure case was selected in an effort to obtain ten usability failure 
cases.  The original goal was to analyze five task cases and five technology cases 
totaling 20 interview participants; however, the participant pool decreased when 
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approval was not granted to solicit participants from one of the departments, as 
well as potential subjects declining to participate in the study.  Based on the 
decrease in the participant pool, from the 660 cases, the research study increased 
the usability case analysis from 10 to 15.  There were nine task usability-related 
information security failure cases, and six technology usability-related 
information security failure cases.  The total number of participants in the study 
increased from the projected 20 to 22.   
Although the case study increased along with the number of participants, data 
saturation was determined by cross case analysis (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 
2013).  Cross case analysis is primarily used when multiple case studies are 
analyzed.  As explained by Miles et al. (2013), cross case analysis can be used to 
deepen understanding and explanation, while also pinning down data quickly that 
allows understanding how general categories of data are related.  By analyzing 
usability failure cases separately first, data saturation was obtained at 15 usability 
cases, and 22 participants when it was determined that there were no new data 
being unveiled.  
This research established the candidate pool by soliciting participation from 
organizational users who directly experienced the phenomenon under study.  The 
research study participants consisted of members from 14 states and 12 medical 
centers.  The names of the participants and the name of the medical centers will 
remain anonymous.  The term participants and respondents will be used 
interchangeably when discussing the interviewee.  The participants were tracked 
by referencing the task or technology failure, the case number being investigated, 
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along with identifying the respondent by number.  For example, if the first task 
case failure was being investigated, and the first respondent of the case was being 
interviewed, then the case was coded as TSKC1R1.  The task is displayed as 
(TSK), the case number is displayed as (C1), and the respondent is displayed as 
(R1).  Following the same scenario with a technology failure, the technology 
failure was coded as TECHC1R1.  In nine out of the 15 cases studied, the 
researcher was able to get the perspective of two participants which enhanced the 
analysis of the usability-related information systems security failures.  In the 
instances two participants were unable to be identified for a case; organizational 
documents, archived records, and observing the participant reproduce the 
usability-related information systems security failure provided research data to 
further analyze the case.  Of the list of candidates interviewed, nine were IT 
specialists, five were nurses, three were clinical application coordinators, two 
were program analysts, and one each of a human resource specialist, pharmacist, 
and a medical administrative specialist respectively.  The combined group of 
participants had a total of 316 years of experience working in the organization. 
5.3 Data Analysis Process 
 
Phase one code and category development was guided by the TTF theory.  
Code development guided by the theory used in this study is essentially 
theoretical coding, a sophisticated level of focused coding that specifies the 
possible relationships between categories developed during focused coding 
(Charmaz, 2006).  Glaser (1978) argues that theoretical codes preclude a need for 
axial coding because they “weave the fractured story back together” (p.72).   
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Using the definition provided by Goodhue and Thompson (1995) for TTF, task 
characteristics construct is the actions carried out by individuals in turning inputs 
to outputs, while the technology characteristic is viewed as tools used by 
individuals in carrying out their task.  Technology in this context is hardware, 
software, data, and user support services.  Category emergence will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  
5.3.1 Interview Process 
The interview process for all participants was conducted by telephone, where 
the researcher captured the data by taking notes.  The interview process lasted 
between 45 and 120 minutes, primarily due to the method used to collect the 
interview data.  Appendix G list the case study interview record.  The interview 
process consisted of the participant answering the interview question and 
providing an opportunity for the interviewer to recite the answer as it was stated 
to include an acknowledgement period whereby the participant agreed that the 
answers were recorded accurately.  During the interview process, special attention 
was given to voice inflections of the participant to ensure the proper context of the 
answer was recorded.  Further, any emotions displayed by the participants were 
questioned for understanding, allowing for an authentic analysis and reporting of 
the answers provided.  Ten semi-structured interview questions in Appendix C 
were developed based on the theoretical framework to specifically address the 
second research question and the hypotheses; however, additional questions were 
asked to elicit the full meaning and understanding of the participants, while fully 
addressing the research questions and testing the hypotheses. 
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In conjunction with asking additional questions for clarity, two specific 
questions were added to the interview that further enhanced the data analysis 
process.  The first question called for the participant to describe the originally 
reported problem.  The question allowed the participant to recount his or her 
experience of the original interaction which ultimately added to the context that 
the researcher was attempting to capture.  In addition to capturing the 
participant’s interaction, asking the question allowed the researcher to accurately 
classify the cases under study with the appropriate usability-related information 
systems security failure type.  After confirming the identified problems under 
study, the nine task characteristics usability-related information security failures 
are listed in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Task Characteristic Usability-related Information Systems Security Failure Cases 
Case ID                                                                                                   Nature of Failure Category
Sub 
Category  Code Sub Code 
TSKC1 Unable to add  
information 
Task Failure   Unexpected 
Behavior 
Unable to 
add  
information 
TSKC2 Solicited 
information  
unreturned 
Task Failure   Unexpected 
Behavior 
Solicited 
information  
unreturned 
TSKC3 Wrong 
information  
returned 
Application 
Failure 
Information  
Quality 
Inaccurate Wrong 
information 
returned 
TSKC4 Information not  
displaying  as 
expected 
Application 
Failure 
Information  
Quality 
Display Missing 
Information 
TSKC5 Wrong 
information  
returned 
Application 
Failure 
Information  
Quality 
Inaccurate Wrong 
information 
returned 
TSKC6 Unable to access  
information 
Application 
Failure 
Information  
Security 
Unavailable Unable to 
access 
system 
TSKC7 Unable to update  
record 
Task Failure   Unexpected 
Behavior 
Unable to 
complete  
task 
TSKC8 Unsolicited 
information  
displaying 
Application 
Failure 
Information  
Quality 
Display Incorrect 
information 
TSKC9 Unable to enter  
accurate 
information 
Task Failure   Unexpected 
Behavior 
Unable to 
enter  
accurate 
information 
 
Of the nine types of task characteristic usability-related information systems 
security failure cases, four of the failures types align with the task failure 
category, while the remaining five cases align with application failure category.  
Within the task failure category, the usability-related information systems security 
failure cases are linked to the unexpected behavior code.  The unexpected 
behavior code is characterized by the user’s inability to manage information due 
to the software providing an unexpected informational output preventing the task 
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from being completed.  The sub category of IQ usability-related information 
systems security failure cases have codes that are linked to display errors, and 
receiving inaccurate solicited and unsolicited information. 
The technology characteristic usability-related information security failure 
lists five cases in table 6 that are aligned with the system production category, 
while the sixth case is aligned with the system reliability category.  Within the 
system production category, four of the cases are linked to the operations failure 
code, one flexibility failure code, and one unavailability failure code respectively.  
The technology characteristic usability-related information systems security 
failure codes are characterized by users of the HIS inability to meet day-to-day 
operational needs of the users of the system.  The flexibility code corresponds to 
adapting to the needs of the user, and the unavailable failure code represents 
hardware, software, data, and support services are unavailable (Goodhue & 
Thompson, 1995).  
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Table 6 
Technology Characteristic Usability-related Information Systems Security 
Failure Cases 
Case ID Nature of Failure Category Code Sub Code 
TECHC1 Unable to update 
Database 
System 
Production 
Flexibility 
Failure 
Unable to 
update data 
TECHC2 Invalid Data 
Display 
System 
Production 
Operations 
Failure 
Data 
Inconsistencies 
TECHC3 Incorrect Data 
Stored in Database 
System 
Production 
Operations 
Failure 
Data Storage 
Failure  
TECHC4 Data Inconsistencies System 
Production 
Operations 
Failure 
Data 
Transmission 
Failure                           
TECHC5 Missing Data System 
Production 
Operations 
Failure 
Data Storage 
Failure 
TECHC6 Data Unavailable System 
Reliability 
Unavailable 
Failure 
Data 
Unavailable 
 
5.3.2 Pattern Coding and Theme Emergence   
A separate set of codes and categories were developed to extricate patterns 
and themes that were discussed by the participants during the interview process.  
These codes are essentially the transition point from the nature and types of 
usability-related information security failures that were discovered through the 
coding process to the information discovery process that will answer research 
question two, and test the hypotheses of this study, while using TTF theory to 
guide the analysis.  The 20 codes generated during the code development process 
were reduced to 11 after further code analysis created three major theme 
categories.  Applying in vivo coding from the interview transcripts were the 
process used to generate the code set.  According to Miles et al. (2013) in vivo 
coding is appropriate for virtually all qualitative studies, but particularly for 
beginning qualitative researchers learning how to code data, and studies that 
prioritize and honor the participant’s voice.  Figure 8 displays the hierarchy of 
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patterns and themes developed which was prescribed by Charmaz (2001) and 
Saldana (2012).  The information security threat theme is the domain that house 
and describe the pattern codes that were discovered during the data collection and 
analysis process.  The pattern codes are the area of focus within the domain and 
theme of information security threat.  In other words, the interview process 
unveiled the information security threat of information integrity failures, 
inadequate security policies, and user security actions. 
 Pattern Codes
 and
Theme Grouping
Information Security
Threat
 
Usability
Assessments
 
Task
Alignment
Assessment
Technology
Alignment
Assessment
Misaligned
Support
Processes
Organization
Culture
Misaligned
Development
Processes
User
Security
Actions
Inadequate
Security 
Policies
Information
Integrity 
Failures
Organizational
Security
Performance Impact
User
Behavior
User
Attributes 
 
Figure 8.  Pattern code and theme grouping 
After the interviews concluded, the collected interview data were analyzed 
based on the usability information systems security failure case groups and the 
interview questions.  For instance, all task characteristic usability information 
systems security failures were grouped and separated by question, and all 
technology characteristic usability information systems security failures followed 
the same analysis pattern.  In addition to analyzing each usability failure case 
groupings, a comparison was done between the task characteristic group and the 
technology characteristic groups to discover additional patterns and themes in the 
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data.  The following sections describe the major themes along with the 
information gleaned from feedback from the respondents under study. 
5.3.3 Information Security Threat Theme 
The first theme emerged from pattern coding was the information security 
threat theme.  The pattern codes emerged as the participants described their 
interaction with their respective software application and system.  There were six 
cases and 11 participants that provided data by which to analyze hypothesis two.  
Four interview questions were developed to test the hypothesis.  The predominant 
code count consisted of information integrity failure (6), organization culture (6), 
inadequate security polices (10), technology alignment assessment (11), and user 
security actions (10).  The less dominate codes were development challenges (3), 
and support challenges (3).  With respect to the dominate codes, inadequate 
security policies, technology alignment assessment, and user security actions 
were analyzed and determined to be the catalyst to the information security threat 
in this study.  When analyzing the interview data, the pattern codes of information 
integrity failures, inadequate security policies, and user security actions arose as 
the participants described the processes used to protect sensitive information that 
had to be shared to solicit individuals in the organization that could provide 
adequate support.  Sensitive information was often extracted from their respective 
applications and systems and transmitted via encrypted email.  The manner in 
which the respondents described how they managed sensitive and confidential 
information were described by both respondents from task case 3, one respondent 
from task case 6, along with tech case 2 respondent, where TSKC3R1 states:  “I 
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had to send the support staff the patient information via email.  I sent the 
information using an outlook encrypted email message.” 
TECHC3R2 comment was:  “We use test patients.  We blanked out patient 
names and ssns.  We make sure no one can see screen names, and went 
through all the security prevention steps, such as locking the computer screen.  
Also use encrypted messages when patient data is sent via outlook mail.” 
 
TECHC2R2 stated:  “When we identify problem, we need information to talk 
about the problem, it does include patient information.  I sent tier 2 an 
encrypted email message.  Anytime we look at the error trap, it contains 
sensitive information, we have to be very careful to how we display or send 
the information.” 
 
TSKC6R1 said:  “I never had to give patient health information in this case.  
What I have done in the past, I would send encrypted information with screen 
shots of the data, or I would black out personal information as I provided a 
screen capture.” 
 
The respondents for both task and technology failures described how they 
were in compliance with organization security policy in relation to handling 
patient identifiable information.  As the respondents discussed their reported 
usability failure, it was clear that 99% of participants were aware of security 
practices based on the dialogue.  By the participants discussing their security 
practices whether or not they had to handle sensitive information, they were 
providing valuable insight that linked the inadequate security policy pattern code 
to the information security threat theme.  There was one outlier security policy 
comment that questions how following the organization’s security policies can 
also obstruct users from accomplishing their task as respondent from task case 1 
shared by stating: 
“I send personal identifiable information via PKI; however what I have found 
is working with contractors pose a problem.  The contractors that support the 
EDIS servers, does not have PKI, therefore I have found it difficult to share 
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the information needed to troubleshoot some of the problems.  Contractors are 
not held to the same standards as regular employees.” 
 
Task case 1 response reflect that although the respondent was cognizant of the 
organizational security policies, there was a clear level of frustration in how the 
organization supports its support staff personnel by employing contract personnel 
to develop and maintain applications.  Contract personnel are not vetted for 
employment in the same fashion as VA employees, primarily due to contract 
personnel are hired to fulfill a task or job in a negotiated contract from a vendor.  
The contract may not have fully considered the individual ability to obtain the 
security clearance required to interact with confidential or private information.  
The respondent was essentially highlighting how applying one dimensional 
security controls (technical security) present additional challenges.  Having 
contract personnel that organizational staff cannot share confidential information 
to provide accurate and timely support to healthcare workers negatively impacts 
patient care, and highlights how information security threats arise when 
organizational staff members are following organizational security policies.  The 
researcher postulates that organizational security policies are inadequate and 
should be addressed when task accomplishment is negatively impacted when 
members of the organization follow organizational security policies.  
Additionally, the observation of this respondent also speaks to how software is 
currently being developed within the organization.   
In this study, healthcare workers threat to information security did not occur 
from the actions the healthcare worker used to handle sensitive information.  The 
threat appeared from the misalignment of the healthcare task and technology used 
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by the healthcare worker.  The threat to security was linked to the inability of 
healthcare workers to update data, data inconsistencies, data storage, and data 
transmission complications.  To assess the length and degree of the information 
security threat related to the alignment of healthcare task characteristics with the 
security technology characteristics, the participants were asked questions about 
their ability to access the applications and systems used, to include the accuracy 
of the information the users were receiving while utilizing the HIS.  The dialogue 
in which the healthcare workers expressed healthcare task-related and security 
technology-related failures came from four participants that reported both task-
related and technology-related failures.  TSKC3R1 comments were:  “Yes the 
system is readily available.  I can retrieve my information using the CPRS toolbar 
as well as using roll and scroll VistA.” 
TECHC2R2 said:  “Yes the system is readily available. We also have system 
monitors that tells us about system availability.” 
 
TECHC1R2 said:  “No the system is not providing accurate data.  Since it is a 
calculated extract data field element that we are trying to fix, it is not currently 
accurate.” 
 
TECHC1R1 said:  “Yes it provides accurate and current information.  It is 
integrated and pulls information from various applications.  It stays current.” 
 
There are interesting contradictions in how users of an HIS perceive the 
performance of their HIS.  The contradictions are captured in analyzing the 
responses from the participants as they described system availability and 
performance.  To highlight the contradictions, the reported usability failures that 
were linked to information integrity and unavailability failures are listed along 
with the respondents that was interviewed that were involved with the same 
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reported usability failure.  The case scenario below, TSKC1, discussed the nature 
of usability failure which was classified as a healthcare worker unable to add 
information: 
“This was a national problem with the worksheet.  The application would not 
allow emergency room staff to put a patient in the room, assign a nurse or give 
an acuity, until they assign a provider.” 
 
Following the reported usability failure, the two respondents that encountered 
and supported the usability failure had different points of views by saying:  
TSKC1R1 stated “yes, the system is readily available.”   
The second respondent (TSKC1R2), an IT specialist that provides national 
support to multiple applications and systems said:  “There is a problem where 
data is being lost, based on how the architecture is setup.  Network latency has 
created the loss of a patient data from the emergency room board.” 
The above case was a national problem that affected 128 medical centers.  The 
first respondent stated that the system is “readily available,” however what is not 
reflective in this answer that was evident during the interview, was the comfort 
and experience level the medical center employees had with the use of the 
application.  This particular medical center participated in the testing of the 
application during the development process; therefore the medical center had a 
level of knowledge and experience to manage task and technology failures that 
simply did not exist for other medical centers.  Respondent 2's perspective was 
from a national perspective, thus the evaluation of the system being “readily 
available” stemmed from viewing all 128 medical centers.  This failure was an 
information security failure, in that the integrity of information was called into 
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question, along with the application and system not being available.  In the case 
described, the data discussed by the two respondents provided varying 
perspectives of the state of the application; however both respondents were 
consistent in the their answers as they reflected on their role by broaching topics 
on information integrity failure, organization culture, and technology alignment 
assessment that emerged from the information security threat theme. 
A second example of contradictory responses in the failure description is seen 
below, with TECHC3 when the healthcare worker reported: 
We enter patient scores into the application.  Once I put the data in, I had the 
option of putting start goals, and finishing or following up scores.  Those are 
essential for us to do bench marking.  If the type, start, goal, or finish date is 
not entered, the application should not allow me to continue adding data in the 
system.  The application should not accept the case without having one of 
those not entered.  The care type for the episode of care is important, but with 
the missing dates, the system was still working.  That was wrong. 
 
In the usability failure described above, there were four respondents that 
provide their perspective to the failure below: 
TECHC3R1, a registered nurse said, “yes, it is a user friendly application.” 
 
TECHC3R2, an IT specialist said, “yes, the system is readily available.  I have 
direct access to the systems, so whenever users in the field start having access 
problems, or notice delays, someone out in the field either calls me or send me 
an email message asking me what is wrong with the system.” 
 
TECHC1R, a registered nurse said, “yes it provides accurate and current 
information.  It is integrated and pulls information from various applications.  
It stays current.” 
 
TECHC1R2, an IT specialist said, “for individual patients yes.  Aggregate 
patients have issues.  You sometimes cannot get the information you need 
quickly, and you sometimes have to double check the information to make 
sure it’s right.” 
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The task and technology data gets to the core of the information security 
threat theme healthcare workers have in common in this study.  Healthcare 
workers understand the importance of protecting patient information, therefore 
following organizational security policies as it relates to sensitive information 
translates well to employees.  However, healthcare workers have a strong desire 
to complete tasks that require them to protect patients, hence workarounds and 
alternative tasks that may circumvent organizational security policies.  Therefore 
information security is more complicated in the healthcare environment with the 
methods available to users to mitigate information integrity failures and the 
unavailability of an application or system–thus a healthcare worker perspective 
differs based on the amount of obstacles that are present that prevents or delays 
task accomplishment.  The question that is posed from the healthcare environment 
in relation to the information security threat, is to how to reduce the methods 
healthcare workers apply to mitigate information integrity failures along with the 
unavailability of data, hardware, software, and support services?  This researcher 
postulates by evaluating inadequate security policies to address user security 
actions have when healthcare tasks are not aligned with the technology promotes 
security awareness and improves organizational security culture.   
Based on the healthcare worker’s perspective, the understanding of how 
information security was viewed was related to the codes of information integrity 
failures, organization culture, inadequate security policies, technology alignment 
assessment, and user security actions.  Usability security failures along with the 
impact of IS security performance was influenced by information integrity, and 
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the unavailability of applications and systems used by healthcare workers.  When 
usability failures occur, the security of information is placed into jeopardy based 
on the organization predominantly using technical security controls, along with 
the healthcare worker having a strong desire to provide patient care in an effort to 
complete their task.   
Identifying usability security failures are a unique endeavor in this study.  
While information integrity and the unavailability of information to users in the 
healthcare environment are prominently displayed in the captured usability 
failures, the root cause of the failures does not resonate to healthcare workers, 
primarily because the healthcare organization culture is well-versed at mitigating 
usability failures.  Mitigating usability failures, coupled with the healthcare 
organization primarily applying technical security controls required focusing on 
the actions of the healthcare workers along with analyzing what was not said 
while discussing and understanding their usability failures.  The actions of the 
healthcare workers under study explains how information security is applied 
within the organization, as well as how IS security performance is impacted 
during a usability failure.  The dialogue captured within the information security 
threat theme displays how the full cycle of the information security threat 
materializes and is jeopardized when information integrity errors and the HIS is 
rendered unavailable to its users. 
5.3.4 Organizational Security Performance Impact Theme 
The second theme that emerged from pattern coding is the organizational 
security performance impact theme.  The organizational security performance 
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impact themes house the pattern codes of misaligned development processes, 
misaligned support processes, and the role organizational culture plays.  The 
pattern codes gleaned from the interview process elicit the role each have on the 
organizational security performance impact as presented by the respondents in 
this study.  The organizational support theme is understood from the combination 
of healthcare task characteristic and security technology characteristic constructs 
to determine the overall effects the failures have on an organization.  Misaligned 
development processes, misaligned support processes, and organization culture 
were the patterns that formed to provide the imprint of the organizational security 
performance impact theme.  The amalgamation of healthcare task and HIS 
security technology failure data was analyzed to determine the support needs of 
healthcare workers while interacting with their usability-related information 
systems security failure.  To understand the HIS security performance impact, 
which can be traced to organizational support, additional interview questions were 
added asking the respondents to describe their specific usability-related failure 
case along with how the user was impacted by the failure.  With the combination 
of all cases being used in the analysis of both the task characteristic and 
technology characteristic usability failures, a combination of answers from the 
information security threat theme and the usability assessment theme were used to 
realize the ramifications the failures had on the healthcare workers, thus forming 
the organizational security performance impact theme. 
The organizational security performance impact theme data formed the pattern 
codes where the participants described the exterior interaction from use of the 
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HIS.  The pattern codes that were formed were misaligned development 
processes, misaligned support processes, and organization culture.  The 
participants regularly interacted with co-workers, and support staff as they 
attempted to manage their failure encounter.  The dialogue of how participants 
responded to the usability failure they encountered in two instances were: 
TSKC1R1, an IT specialist said:  “After triage didn’t assign a provider in the 
application, I submitted a helpdesk ticket to see if it was a new feature that is 
being displayed in the application, or if it was a bug that caused the failure.  It 
was indeed a bug.” 
A second respondent from TECHC2R2, an IT specialist that discussed a 
technology failure stated: 
“Sometimes I talk to the user and tell them that I found an error in the error 
trap, and they may not recall or notice a problem.  That indicates that the data 
may not have been filed in VISTA correctly.” 
 
TSKC2R2, an IT specialist stated:  When the lab technician reported the 
problem, she said it was urgent, since it was related to IV medication, I knew 
it was important.  It was not the type of medication that you can get from the 
pharmacy, so I knew to respond quickly. 
 
The manner in how users of the HIS interact inside and outside the 
organization reflect how the organization culture pattern code emerged as a 
member of the organizational security performance impact theme.  Healthcare 
workers and support staff members often interacted with subject matter experts at 
other medical centers before helpdesk tickets are submitted.  That interaction 
process creates an opportunity of resolving usability failures in an expeditious 
manner.  The dialogue by the respondents reflect how usability failures are 
analyzed at the beginning stages of a usability failure which leads to 
understanding the role of organizational culture play in resolving usability 
failures. 
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The following dialogue below from two respondents reflects the mindset of 
healthcare workers and support staff as they analyze and troubleshoot the 
usability failure.  The organization culture is displayed by the respondents as they 
interact with the usability failure, and they are also providing a glimpse at both 
misaligned development processes and misaligned support processes.  The 
experience healthcare workers provides often result in allowing support staff 
members to better understand the usability failures as well as how the usability 
failures impact the healthcare workers.  
TSKC1R1 response while interacting with an application associated with the 
emergency room follows:  “I ran through the problem in our test account, and 
noticed what was happening, so I was able to duplicate the problem in the test 
account.  The only troubleshooting we can do is add a patient, and go through 
the process.  There is not much troubleshooting that can be done with a web-
based system, so all I could do was refer the ticket to tier 2 support.” 
 
TSKC6R1, a utilization manager that was interacting with a reporting 
application said:  “I know it’s a new program, and when it rolled out, the 
impact of this problem didn’t exist, so the functionality of this problem may 
not have been realized.  Let’s work on this to get fixed.  My on-going reaction 
is that it has gone on for many years, and it still hasn’t been fixed.” 
 
The dialogue from task case 1, and task case 6 represents four challenges that 
has been predominately discussed throughout the research study (a) the manner in 
how applications and systems are developed and introduced into the organization 
reduces the ability of support staff to support applications and systems, (b) 
healthcare workers and support staff believes organization managers are not 
providing the support required to allow the employees to accomplish their task 
efficiently, (c) organizational managers have not recognized the impact of 
usability failures have on healthcare workers, and (d) organizational security 
performance is impacted on multiple levels when usability failures occur. 
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The impact of usability failures are captured from two respondents, where 
TECHC3R1, a registered nurse stated: 
“I was upset.  I thought I had done something wrong because I was new.  I 
reviewed my information, because I had written instruction and I put all the 
information like I was supposed to, so when I didn’t have the score type, I 
knew I had done it right.  I tried putting in the score type, and it wouldn’t take 
it, but it should not have accepted the application.  I tried putting it in again, 
so I was frustrated and confused, so I contacted the national team.  I wanted to 
have someone look at it to see if I was doing something wrong.” 
 
The second respondent from TECHC3R2, a clinical application coordinator 
stated: 
 
“Initially, I got curious about how frequent this thing was happening, and 
whether or not if it was a fluke, so I ran a Fileman routine on the order file to 
determine if any other orders existed and whether there were additional 
inpatient med orders that had a display group of outpatient and a few other 
turned up.  I determined that this was not a onetime problem, and that a 
system failure was going on, and it was happening more than once.” 
 
The dialogue from the participants covered in the above quotes highlight the 
thoughts of individuals based on the experience level within the organization, 
which ultimately encapsulates the organizational culture in respect to usability 
failures.  Participants drew on their experience to manage a usability failure, but 
there are security implications around each failure, however information security 
failures are not easily detected and are addressed appropriately based on the 
nature of a usability failures because (a) the organization primary focus is on 
technical security failures and (b) patient care may not have been identified as 
being placed in jeopardy.  The implications to this researcher’s assertion is that 
the organization does not understand the risk usability failures present on the 
organization or the risk is negligible based on other information assets that may 
be placed at risk.  The dialogue from TSKC9R, who is a pharmacist, discusses a 
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clear usability failure that has caused the integrity of information to be placed at 
risk:   
“There is a field called Frequency in minutes.  A field within the standard 
schedule enter-edit option.  So this field determines for inpatient medication.  
It calculates when the next dose is due.  The maximum number of that field is 
129,600 minutes which is 90 days.  We have medications right now in the 
system that is dispensed every six months.  So it obviously does not account 
for that.  That is the longest that I can account for, but I can imagine there are 
medications that are longer than that—yearly.” 
 
The respondent had more thoughts about the healthcare task failure: 
“The system does not allow us to account for doses that are standard doses for 
medication.  It is set up to fail.  It is no way for us to correct because the nurse 
is going to be prompted to give this medication three months early.  There is 
no way for us to consistently notify the nurse that it needs to be given three 
months later.” 
 
The second usability failure captured is from a security technology-related 
usability failure.  The nature of the failure is the invalid data display which is 
essentially an information integrity failure albeit presented differently when 
TECHC2R1, a clinical application coordinator states: 
“When pharmacist dispenses a medication to a patient, the provider or 
pharmacist does not want to prescribe a medication that the patient is allergic 
to.  That’s the purpose of the assessment.  Either you have reaction assessment 
or you don’t have an assessment.  You cannot have both.  This particular 
ticket had both.” 
 
After questioning the respondent about the usability failure encounter, 
TECHC1R1, a program analyst stated: 
“I was not sure if the problem was related to the task or the process I was 
trying to complete.  The problem seemed to be tied to a programming error, 
because of how the data was returned.  This was a unique problem related to 
one patient record.  If that error was happening a lot that would make me think 
it was a process problem.” 
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The data from the respondents illuminate the complex relationship between 
task, technology, and the user.  An analysis is required to determine the cause and 
resolution of the problem, therefore the dialogue that exists from a reported 
usability failure is key to accurately adjudicating a failure.  What must be brought 
to the fore in the data described by the respondents is these cases have not been 
slated for an intervention by the development staff.  The healthcare workers 
perspective is to protect the health of their patients, which includes personal 
identifiable information, however the information security aspects of their 
usability-related information systems security case failures are not known, 
understood, or discussed by the participants. 
According to the participants in this study, the fallout of the organizational 
mandates and how software is implemented into the organization have created 
organizational challenges with respect to both the support and development 
processes.  With the advent of web-based applications, and organization data 
being re-located to data centers around the country, the organization now has a 
host of support challenges.  The support challenges are centered on the loss of 
corporate knowledge, support staff reorganization, disparate support notification 
and communication tools, and access to software and hardware, which all 
ultimately result in poor response time to address problems, leaving a high 
amount of problems unresolved.  The dialogue below from the respondents 
reflects the development of the organizational security performance impact theme 
from the misaligned support processes pattern code.   
TECHC3R1 thoughts were:  “I am a registered nurse, in which have been 
employed with the VA since 2000.  I work with spinal cord veterans.  It would 
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be nice to have a troubleshooting guide for all users to have access to that 
communicates a list of problems that the application is experiencing.  That 
way, when problems are not fixed it a timely manner; we would at least know 
the cause of the problems to help us make decisions.” 
 
TECHC2R2 stated:  “I must say I have been a Clinical Applications 
Coordinator since 1999.  I usually research a problem before I log a ticket.  I 
know who to call, and I know where to look.  In this particular case, there was 
no explanation as to why the problem happened, and that’s why we logged the 
ticket.  We never got a resolution, and unfortunate the problem never 
happened again, but I see from the transcript you sent me, the problem is still 
open.”  
 
TSKC1R2 stated:  “I am an IT specialist that have been employed with the 
VA for 30 years.  Testing should have been better, and the problem would 
have been discovered.  The development team should have been held 
accountable for the problem.  The contractor was able to walk away from the 
problem without fixing it, before the 30 day point.” 
 
TSKC2R2 stated:  “I am an IT specialist that have been working with BCMA 
since 1987.  I thought this problem had been fixed, because the development 
team released an emergency patch to clean up the variable that was not being 
renewed.  It surprised me that you contacted me about this problem, and I was 
shocked that they only fixed half the problem.  The nurses are using a 
workaround to clear IV drips.” 
 
There are three points of clarity that the respondents have revealed in their 
comments (a) the organization has highly skilled and experienced work force 
(organization culture) that has the potential to provide insight to reducing 
usability-related security failures, (b) there is a temporal element that is linked to 
usability failures that has been exhibited, particularly in how this healthcare 
organization addresses usability failures, and (c) the methods used to implement 
and develop software within the organization is not totally in alignment with the 
task the healthcare users are attempting to complete.   
While respondents discussed their interaction with their support staff, the 
interactions produced profound results from the experiences communicating with 
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staff members within the organization.  Two respondents linked to both healthcare 
task characteristic failures along with security technology characteristic failures 
articulated the user perspective in relation to the organizational security 
performance impact theme when the following was shared:  
TSKC1R2, an IT specialist stated:  “There are project managers, and 
developers that do not know the VA process.  All they know is the PMAS 
process, if they didn’t want to listen to the point of view of seasoned support 
staff; they basically missed an opportunity to use corporate knowledge.”  
 
TECHC4R2, a clinical application coordinator stated:  “The field has no 
expectations.  When nothing happens, no one is pounding on the door.  I have 
a problem that users don’t report problems to me, because they feel nothing 
will be done about it.” 
 
The participants in this research study applied their experience to manage the 
usability failure they encountered by using resources to analyze the failure to 
determine the steps required to  reduce the productivity loss due to the failure 
while also mitigating the failure.  The analysis of the dialogue from the 
participants highlighted both support and development challenges healthcare 
workers are confronted with.  For example, the development challenges are 
centered on the misaligned development processes employed within the 
organization.  The misaligned development processes chooses from a pool of 
developers based on the competency level of the developer, and the project 
requirements.  The fallout of the “developer project selection process,” resides on 
how familiar the developer assigned to the project is with the application being 
developed.  The misaligned support processes have been exacerbated by the 
restructuring of support teams within the organization that created new support 
policies that restricted  support personnel access to medical center HIS.  
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Additionally, removing medical centers HIS and staging them at regional data 
centers that are now managed by contract personnel, has created a communication 
chasm that has increased the time usability-related information systems security 
failures are managed.  The pattern codes of misaligned development processes, 
misaligned support processes, and organizational culture, were articulated by 
healthcare workers and members that supported usability failures to form the 
organizational security performance impact theme. 
5.3.5 Usability Assessment Theme 
The final theme garnered from analyzing interview data is usability 
assessment.  The usability assessment theme houses the pattern codes of task 
alignment assessment, technology alignment assessment, user attributes, and user 
behavior.  The pattern codes gleaned from the interview process elicit the role 
each have on the usability assessment theme as presented by the respondents in 
this study.  The usability assessment theme consist of the overall user experience 
before, during, and after the failure encounter occurs.  The emotions of the failure 
were confirmed when the participants articulated their experience while 
describing the usability failure.  Finger pointing, frustrations, empathy, assigning 
blame assisted in developing the user behavior pattern code.  The remaining 
pattern codes that were formed were task alignment assessment, technology 
alignment assessment, user attributes.  When users in this study encountered a 
usability failure, their natural instincts were to assess whether or not their task was 
aligned with the technology in order to determine the root cause of the problem 
and the appropriate response to the usability failure based on their circumstances.  
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Based on the user attributes, which consist of experience and skill level, the user 
made choices on how to manage the usability failure.  The user attributes often 
dictated the user behavior.  Additionally, the usability assessment theme and 
pattern codes afford researchers an opportunity to evaluate the actions of users 
that encounter usability failures in a healthcare setting.  The discussion with the 
respondents reflects the captured pattern codes when the respondents’ state: 
TECHC6R1, a registered nurse said:  “They have had ample time to fix some 
of these problems, and yet they have continued to dog that system…it is very 
frustrating when you’ve done the review; you need to put it into the system to 
document it.  Now you can’t document the record you have obtained from the 
review, because the system locks up.” 
TSKC7R2, an IT specialist comments were: “I looked at the problem after it 
was reported by the clinician in the test account.  I tried to recreate the 
problem, but was unable to do so.  I was not that familiar with the problem at 
the level that the error was occurring, so I had to escalate the ticket to the 
national team.” 
Once the user was able to complete their assessment whether there was a 
“task,” failure or there was a “technology” failure with the application or system, 
the user behavior shifted into determining the source of the problem 
(task/technology alignment assessments) along with how to mitigate the failure.  
When the participants expected the cause of the problem was not related to their 
actions, a shift in behavior was detected.  Five healthcare workers provided their 
thoughts and emotions towards their usability failure with the following dialogue: 
TECHC1R1, a program analyst stated:  “None of this would be a problem if 
billers and coders would do what they are supposed to do.”  
 
TECHC3R1, a registered nurse comment was:  “I was upset.  I thought I had 
done something wrong because I was new.  I reviewed my information, 
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because I had written instruction and I put all the information like I was 
supposed to, so when I didn’t have the score type, I knew I had done it right.”   
 
TSKC3R1, a registered nurse said:  “I was slightly irritated, because it was a 
setback as I was on a tight schedule to get something done.  Since I had a 
backup plan, I used the spreadsheet to complete the task.”  
 
TSKC1R2, who is a seasoned professional stated:  “I was pissed.  The reason I 
was upset, was the way the software is developed today is based on PMAS 
and a timeline, and contracts that were not adequately made.  The application 
contractor’s contract ended, so they had not provided the amount of 
forethought that would adequately support the release of the software.” 
 
TSKC4R2, an IT specialist said:  “The initial troubleshooting consisted of 
asking HR staff to look into the old system to see how the data was displayed.  
It was displayed correctly, so I looked at the data dictionary at that specific 
field.  The data dictionary showed that the numbers can be between 0 and 
9.9999, so the root cause of the problem is percentages above 10 cannot be 
displayed.  The development staff needs to change that data element to 
accommodate us employees, and it should be easy to do.  I have no idea why 
it has taken so long to fix.” 
Evaluating the feedback from usability-related information system security 
failures discussed by respondents has led to three possible outcomes reported by 
users.  The outcomes were:  (a) An intervention was required by local or national 
support team members, (b) the healthcare worker utilized a workaround, or (c) the 
task was unable to be completed.  Additionally, an intervention by local or 
national support team member indicates that the user was unable to come up with 
a solution for the healthcare task failure.  Further, by contacting a support staff, 
the member suggested that there was a time element that factored into the 
intervention process.  In the cases investigated, the time limit recorded to assist 
the user to complete the healthcare task failure cases ranged from 2 hours to 36 
hours.  The temporal element within the support process, ultimately attributed to 
emotional responses caused by inefficient, ineffective, and unsatisfactory 
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interactions with the user interface, primarily because the healthcare workers 
understood task accomplishment would be delayed. 
The outcome of a usability failure whether related to a healthcare task or a 
security technology failure, resulted in the healthcare worker utilizing alternative 
methods such as a workaround to complete the task.  Workarounds and alternative 
methods were prevalent in this study.  A typical workaround followed three 
paths.  First, the healthcare worker would use the current software application in a 
different manner to produce the result expected from the original task; secondly, 
the user would look to use a different application or system to produce the 
expected outcome; and, thirdly, the healthcare worker would revert to a manual 
process by using paper products to complete the task.  While discussing 
workarounds, it was confirmed that workarounds were limited to routine 
tasks.  Furthermore, the use of workarounds and alternative methods presents a 
separate layer of challenges, such as the time required to complete the newly used 
task, the communication required throughout the organization to ensure all 
healthcare workers exposed of healthcare task failures use the same process, and 
to minimize information risk implied by the use of a new process. 
When healthcare workers did not have alternative methods in which to choose 
from, their task was unable to be completed.  While the sound of the healthcare 
worker’s inability to complete the task was reverberating throughout the 
organization, the effect of a healthcare worker’s inability to complete a task was 
not always immediately known.  However, there was a high probability based on 
the data collected that non-routine tasks were unable to be completed due to 
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access and skillset (user attributes) required to support the application and 
systems, as well as the limited troubleshooting capability of the web-based 
applications and systems the organization has integrated into its architecture.  The 
pattern codes presented in the usability assessment theme are task alignment 
assessment, technology alignment assessment, user attributes, and user behavior 
of healthcare workers.  The conversations with the respondents demonstrated 
usability-related information systems security failure created an internal process 
where the user assessed whether or not they executed the task correctly, if the task 
failure was not attributed to a user error, a process of troubleshooting the problem 
ensued.  The more difficult the task accomplishment became, the more emotional 
the user became as they described their interaction with the usability failure.  
Hence, the development of the usability assessment theme, which encompasses 
the user attributes and interaction with a usability failure throughout the usability 
failure process.   
5.3.6 Impact Analysis on Task Accomplishment  
Healthcare tasks were compartmentalized into routine and non-routine tasks.  
A routine healthcare task is characterized by a task that users are adept at 
completing, and typically has a repetitive or intuitive nature to them, which allows 
for the creation of workarounds when roadblocks are encountered from task 
failures.  Non-routine tasks required the use of multiple applications or systems 
(interdependence) to execute a task to completion.  The difference between the 
two task types meant an additional strategy and user interaction existed as a non-
routine task often depended on the operation of additional resources in order to 
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function properly.  Non-routine task were the tasked that created both intervention 
from national support teams and development staff personnel.   
The interventions were primarily of a temporal nature that had a certain level 
of complexity based on communication challenges with support staff in the 
organization.  The communication and support challenges centered on the 
structure of the organization, how usability failures were reported, and who had 
access to the support tools to add the essential troubleshooting and resolution 
information.  During the interview process several respondents stated that they did 
not have access to the usability failure reporting tool, therefore the level of 
interaction was resigned to communicating with the support staff using email 
messages.  In the cases investigated, the time limit recorded to assist the user to 
complete the healthcare task failure cases ranged from 2 hours to 36 hours.  
Among the 16 usability failure cases investigated, 86% of the cases have not been 
resolved.  The open usability-related information systems security failures cases 
suggest that an information system security risk currently exist, and can be 
directly linked to the identified usability failures.  The dialogue of the last entry 
placed on October, 2012, of a reported usability failure TSKC2 studied had the 
following entry:  “This ticket is still a valid issue, do not close.”  Based on the 
communications and support challenges, the organization support practices are at 
best inefficient, and at worse have contributed to misaligned support processes. 
The entry above is used to prevent a reported usability-information system 
security failure case to be closed without the failure being addressed by the 
development staff.  In this study the entry suggest that the organization is 
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vulnerable to information risk, and key organizational staff members are not 
aware of the information security threat. 
The question posed from identifying and understanding usability-related 
information system security failures in relation to support challenges is what does 
the information mean?  The challenges that healthcare workers were encountering 
within the organization was linked to how software and hardware are developed 
and integrated into the HIS.  The healthcare organization under study 
development process radically changed in 2009 the way IT projects are delivered 
and managed.  IT projects within this healthcare organization are required to 
deliver customer-facing functionality in six months or less.  Customer-facing 
functionality essentially means to deliver software or hardware to healthcare 
workers within a specified time frame.  The system used to provide the 
deliverables is the Project Management Accountability System (PMAS).  PMAS 
is a disciplined IT development approach that uses data collection and monitoring 
tools along with business rules to produce IT functionality.  In addition to using 
PMAS as part of the development process, ProPath is also used and is the 
companion tool to PMAS.  ProPath is a process asset library that contains 
information of all VA processes that are linked to development projects.  ProPath 
is a one-stop shop of formal approved processes, artifacts, and templates to assist 
project teams in facilitating their daily work.  Respondents that are IT specialist, 
provided insight into how the development and implementation of software and 
hardware has impacted their productivity and performance within the organization 
with the following comment: 
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TECHC1R2, and IT specialist stated:  “The VA has gotten away from using 
the knowledge and programming expertise of its people that have used and 
developed software from the ground up, to now using a development system 
(PMAS/ProPath) that ignores the greatest gift the VA has.” 
 
A second statement expressed by an IT specialist from TSKC1R2 that was 
investigated was: 
“There are project managers, and developers that do not know the VA 
process.  All they know is the PMAS process, if they didn’t want to listen to 
the point of view of seasoned support staff provided to assist them; they 
basically missed an opportunity to use corporate knowledge.” 
 
The security implications discovered interviewing respondents that 
encountered healthcare task characteristic and security technology characteristic 
usability-related information system security failures are grounded in user 
behavior, credibility, economic, legal, productivity, and trust.  Security comes into 
question with user behavior when the healthcare worker seeks workarounds to 
mitigate usability failures.  Credibility, productivity, and trust issues materialized 
when respondents spoke of development and support challenges from usability-
related information system security failures having a resolution rate of 14%.  
Credibility and trust follows two paths from the healthcare worker’s perspective.  
Healthcare worker’s perception is that they are losing credibility and trust from 
the Veterans they are charged to serve, while also feeling the manner in which 
software is developed and implemented in the organization has created credibility 
and trust issues among users of the HIS.  Economic and legal issues manifested 
through information integrity failures where healthcare organization was unable 
to bill for services rendered, while the potential legal issues were concerned with 
inaccurate reporting of patient information. 
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The contradiction in how healthcare workers described their information 
security practices were discovered from analyzing usability-related information 
system security failures.  The usability-related information system security 
failures were not considered an issue because technical security controls were not 
compromised; therefore a reaction to mitigate the failure by security professionals 
within the organization did not materialize.  The non-action by security 
professionals suggest information security risk exist within the organization.  The 
organization has strong security program that was prominently displayed in the 
manner how the respondents described the processes used to secure confidential 
and sensitive information.  There was however, noticeable potential information 
security risk stemming from the information integrity and unavailability of 
applications and systems from both healthcare task characteristic and security 
technology characteristic usability failures.  The information security risk has 
gone unrealized because (a) healthcare workers are unaware of the risk from 
usability-related information systems security failures, and (b) the development 
staff has not addressed the risk in resolving the reported usability failures.  This 
researcher postulates that by the organization’s primary focus being geared 
towards technical security controls, therefore users of the HIS are unaware of the 
pitfalls of using workarounds and alternative methods to accomplish a healthcare 
task.  Applying formal and informal security controls through security policies, 
education and training, along with information security awareness has the 
potential to reduce information risk as it relates to usability failures.  Additionally, 
the organization’s culture must be evaluated to establish the exact measures 
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required to bring awareness to the ramifications of usability failures, and how to 
most effectively reduce work arounds that will ultimately reduce information risk 
within the organization.   
5.4 Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses are statements in quantitative research, traditionally used in 
experiments, in which the investigator makes a prediction or a conjecture about 
the outcome of a relationship among attributes or characteristics (Creswell, 2012).  
Contrary to Creswell’s view of how hypotheses are used, and for which research 
methodology hypotheses are executed, Lee (1991) has provided a blueprint in 
which hypotheses can be used in qualitative research.  Qualitative research can be 
executed with the same amount of analytical vigor as a quantitative study, which 
is done using the positivist paradigm following the rules of natural science.  
Following the rules of natural science the hypotheses under study will be satisfied 
by meeting four checks:  (a) falsifiability, which is detected by contradictory 
observation; (b) logical consistency, which must be logically deducible from the 
same premise; (c) relative explanatory power, wherein one must be able to 
explain or predict the subject matter, and (d) survivability, in that the theory must 
be able to survive attempts to disconfirm (Lee, 1991). 
Given the application of hypothetico-deductive logic (Lee, 1991), the three 
hypotheses tested can be observed by using a three-step process.  The process is 
prescribed by Lee as observing the major premise which is a general theory, the 
minor premise which is a set of facts that describe the conditions, and the third 
step is the conclusion that is predicts or hypothesizes.  The major premise is TTF 
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theory, which holds that, for IT to have a positive impact on individual 
performance, the technology must be utilized and it must be a good fit with the 
task it supports.  The following are the results from hypotheses testing.   
5.4.1 Hypothesis 1:  Healthcare task characteristics will be associated with 
Task-Technology Fit. 
Healthcare tasks were parsed into routine and non-routine tasks.  A routine 
healthcare task is characterized as a task that healthcare workers are comfortable 
and familiar with the steps required to execute the task to completion without the 
need of instructions or assistance.  Routine healthcare task in this study suggest 
that there is a high probability that workarounds or alternative methods will be 
applied to complete a task when healthcare workers encounter usability failures.  
Non-routine tasks require the use of multiple applications, systems 
(interdependence) or additional checklists or instructions to execute a task to 
completion.  The difference between the two task types lies in the strategies and 
resources that must be utilized to achieve task accomplishments.  Of the nine 
healthcare tasks that were investigated, six were routine task, while three were 
non-routine.  The two major types of healthcare task failures were linked to 
unexpected behavior of the software, and information integrity errors that 
prevented the healthcare worker from efficiently interacting with the information.  
All nine cases involved a failure in the handling or use of information.  The list of 
healthcare task characteristic failures cases including the category and code 
selected can be viewed in table 3 (see page 60). 
The arrow leading into Task-Technology Fit box (see page 33) from the 
Healthcare Task Characteristic box shows hypothesis 1.  A high degree of support 
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requires that the codes created for the task failure category and the application 
failure category codes determine the degree of TTF.  There were 9 cases and 13 
participants that provided data to analyze the hypothesis.  There were four 
interview questions developed to test hypothesis 1.  The predominant code count 
consisted of organization culture (13), user behavior (8), user attributes (7), and 
misaligned support processes (5).  The less dominant codes were misaligned 
development processes (4).  The minor premise and conclusion for hypothesis 1 is 
below. 
When the healthcare worker encountered a healthcare task failure, the 
healthcare worker went through a mental checklist to determine whether the task 
failure was due to negligence or the failure was a result of the application or 
system failure.  The manner in which the healthcare task failures were managed as 
well as the manner in how the healthcare worker responded to the error was 
directly connected to his or her role in the organization.  The amount of 
experience the healthcare worker had within the organization, along with the 
amount of time spent working with the software or system comprised of user 
attributes that essentially had a direct correlation to the healthcare worker’s 
behavior.  Healthcare workers with more than five years of experience in the 
organization displayed a high level of emotion when discussing the healthcare 
task failure.  Healthcare workers with greater than five years of experience were 
in a technology alignment assessment mode, as opposed to the healthcare workers 
with less experience who were in a task alignment assessment mode.  The 
healthcare workers in technology alignment assessment mode were technically 
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savvy; however, the healthcare worker displayed frustration, concern, and anger 
while discussing the healthcare task failure.  Less experienced members displayed 
a sense of relief when the errors and failures were not caused by their actions. 
Of the nine usability-related information systems security failure cases 
investigated, six cases were routine healthcare task cases, while three were non-
routine healthcare task cases.  The healthcare workers that encountered failures in 
the routine cases, four were able to use workarounds to complete their task, while 
two healthcare workers were unable to complete the task.  Of the three non-
routine healthcare task cases, two of the healthcare workers were able to complete 
their task when national support and development staff intervened, while the one 
remaining healthcare task was unable to be completed by the healthcare worker.  
The interactions and intervention of the healthcare task cases by support staff 
members and development teams indicated that the healthcare worker 
experienced major delays in accomplishing their task.  Additionally, all nine 
usability-related information systems security failure healthcare task cases 
remains open waiting on a permanent resolution. 
The results of hypothesis 1 strongly suggest that an association exist among 
healthcare task characteristic factors with TTF.  This was conveyed first from the 
phase one data collection process, where nine cases were presented with task 
failure and information integrity usability-related information security failures.  
The combination organization culture, misaligned support processes, user 
attributes, and user behavior pattern codes affords this research to capture and 
demonstrate the total user experience while encountering a usability failure within 
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the healthcare setting albeit varied based on individual ability and experience. The 
identification of the source of task failures essentially shows the correspondence 
of TTF; therefore, the hypothesis has been supported. 
5.4.2 Hypothesis 2:  Security technology characteristics will be associated 
with Task-Technology Fit. 
In order to understand the context in which the participants of the study 
responded, there was a translation of terms required to satisfy testing of 
hypothesis two.  A security technology characteristics construct is expressed by 
the use of the HIS.  The HIS consists of hardware, software, and data.  To ground 
an HIS into the context of security protection, the terms were further linked to 
potential threats to a HIS according to Dhillon (2007): (a) data modification, (b) 
destructions, (c) disclosure, (d) interception, (e) interruption, and (f) fabrication.  
The list of security technology characteristic failures cases including the category 
and code can be viewed in table 4 (see page 62).  
The arrow leading from the Security Technology Characteristic into Task-
Technology Fit box (see page 33) displays hypothesis 2.  A high degree of 
support requires that the codes created for the systems production and the systems 
reliability categories will determine the degree of TTF.  There were 6 cases and 
11 participants that provided data by which to analyze the hypothesis.  Four 
interview questions were developed to test hypothesis two.  The predominant 
code count consists of information integrity failure (6), organization culture (6), 
inadequate security policies (10), technology alignment assessment (11), and user 
security actions (10).  The less dominate codes were misaligned development 
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processes (3), and misaligned support processes (3).  The minor premise and 
conclusion for hypothesis 2 is below.   
The threat to security was linked to the inability of healthcare workers to 
update data, data inconsistencies, data storage, and data transmission 
complications.  To further discern the source of the failures, the participants 
described their task process that provided a means for understanding the source of 
the failure.  The security technology failure was the malfunctioning of 
computerized HIS where the task of receiving data from a database or database 
repository failed to provide the healthcare worker with the expected results of the 
request.  The questions posed to the participants by this research study sought to 
check the status and performance of their HIS, the accuracy and currency of data, 
and the security measures taken to protect data and information.  One hundred 
percent of the respondents stated that the systems were available for use; 
however, two respondents added that the system was sometimes slow.  The 
systems designated as slow performers were web-based applications that 
connected outside of their respective medical centers.  The question related to the 
protection of data and information was answered by 99% of the respondents 
describing the steps they used to protect information.  Each respondent described 
how he or she would transmit sensitive patient information to support staff 
members using encrypted email.  Further descriptions of protecting sensitive 
information resulted in the healthcare workers describing a process of marking 
out sensitive data that were not required to troubleshoot a problem.  The marking 
out of sensitive data eliminated the need for transmitting data via encrypted email.  
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The respondents conveyed that only information that was required to troubleshoot 
the problem was released to support staff personnel.   
There was one outlier response to protection of sensitive information.  One 
respondent described his frustration of working with private support contractors 
that do not have the ability to receive sensitive information to provide the 
necessary support.  The respondent stated that there are private contractor support 
staff personnel who have not received background checks; therefore, they do not 
have the credentials or ability to access sensitive information within the 
organization.  The result of this problem has limited the ability of organization 
employees to openly communicate with the private support contractors about 
security technology failures. 
The primary causes of security technology failures were databases and data 
repositories providing duplicate, inconsistent, and inaccurate data.  One of the 
respondents stated that 7 out of 10 attempts accessing her database would yield 
the information she asked for, while a second respondent stated that an individual 
record may be accurate, but, when she “attempts to run an aggregate report or a 
collection of records, the process fails.”  There was also a case failure that 
reported data inaccuracies due to the discovery of an algorithm that was 
miscalculating a data element that actually created the transmission and use of the 
wrong data. 
Hypothesis 2 had strong results in the area of inadequate security policies, 
technology alignment assessment, and user security actions.  The healthcare 
workers described how well they followed organizational security policies in the 
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manner in which each healthcare worker engaged in good user security practices.  
However, the technical security failures in terms of the manner in which 
healthcare workers were not receiving the data as requested are essentially an 
information integrity issue which weakens security within the organization.  
Therefore, the conclusion found a reduction in security technology characteristics 
that created an association with TTF, hence resulting in a supported hypothesis. 
5.4.3 Hypotheses 3:  Task-Technology Fit is associated with HIS Security 
Performance Impact. 
The HIS security performance impact construct is understood from the 
combination of healthcare task characteristic and security technology 
characteristic constructs to determine the impact on performance.  The 
amalgamation of healthcare task and HIS security technology failure data was 
analyzed to determine the impact.  To understand the HIS security impact, 
additional interview questions were added asking the respondents to describe their 
specific usability-related failure case and impact.  With the combination of all 
cases being used in the analysis of both the task characteristic and technology 
characteristic usability failures, the major themes that were generated from pattern 
coding are used to measure hypothesis 3. 
The arrow leading from Task-Technology Fit box (see page 33) to HIS 
Security Performance Impact box displays hypothesis 3.  A high degree of 
support requires that the pattern codes created for the information security threat, 
organizational security performance impact, and the usability assessment themes 
determine the degree of HIS Security Performance Impact.  A total of 22 
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respondents answered the questions involving the 15 usability cases investigated.  
Nine cases were healthcare task characteristic failures, while six were HIS 
security technology characteristic failures.  Additionally, the total number of 
pattern codes from the three major themes was combined to accurately present the 
number of responses recorded.  The information security threat theme had 26 
responses, the organizational security performance impact theme had 36, and 
usability assessments had 33.  The results of the data analysis process are 
reflected below.  The theme code count exceeded the number of respondents due 
to some of the responses overlapping theme groups. 
Of the 22 respondents who described the impact of their usability failure, two 
stated the failure did not negatively impact them from completing their task, nor 
was the impact of any concern.  One respondent commented that, given the 
experienced and flexible staff, which was amenable to adjusting to the usability 
failure, the staff adjusted by seeking a temporary solution within minutes of the 
failure.  A second respondent suggested that, although the failure was an issue, 
having an alternative plan to complete the task allowed the failure to not pose a 
problem or require the need to focus on the failure.  However, ninety percent of 
the respondents described negative HIS security performance impact. 
Ninety percent of the respondents described the HIS security performance 
impact affecting them in terms of user behavior, credibility, economic, legal, 
productivity, and trust.  The aforementioned terms are the fallout from the 
information security threat, organizational security performance impact, and 
usability assessment themes respectively.  Several healthcare workers described 
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their usability failure encounter by stating they were angry, frustrated, and 
concerned when discovering their failure, which also included assigning blame 
for the cause of the failures.  Another segment of the respondents discussed how 
usability failures have the potential of creating economic and legal issues if 
medical records are audited when medical error cases are investigated.  One of the 
respondents described that inaccurate data from databases can affect the 
accreditation of clinical offices that are responsible to providing spinal care 
treatment and recovery services to veterans.  Inaccurate data also had negative 
economic consequences when a program error mislabeled data, preventing 
medical organizations from billing insurance companies for the services provided 
by medical centers.  Trust, credibility and productivity were discussed when one 
respondent stated that a new system mandated by Congress to eliminate fraud and 
create transparency had increased her department’s workload by 400%.  
Additionally, productivity issues were evident in 86% of the cases primarily due 
to the cases left unresolved.  In essence, the healthcare workers continue to seek 
permanent solutions to their reported usability failure; however, workarounds and 
task failure mitigation is the standard approach to manage said failures. 
The results of hypothesis 3 suggest that Task-Technology Fit correlates with 
HIS Security Performance Impact.  Based on the results, the hypothesis was 
supported.  This conclusion was provided by analyzing the pattern codes, major 
themes, and the terms that emulsified while gaining a true picture of the impact 
from both task characteristic and technology characteristic usability-related 
information systems security failures.  The six attributes of user behavior, 
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credibility, economic, legal, productivity, and trust are sustainable when seeking 
to identify, understand, and reduce the nature and type of usability-related 
information security failures within this organization. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter consisted of completing the phase two data collection and data 
analysis process.  The process consisted of categorizing usability failures into a 
task and technology characteristic case groupings.  Once the case groupings were 
established, pools of participants were interviewed to discuss their specific 
usability failure.  The data collected from the interviews were analyzed using 12 
interview questions.  Information garnered from the interview process led to a 
need to evaluate the development process to reduce information risk from 
usability-related information system security failures.  Additionally, the impact of 
task and technology failures had a pronounced impact on the area of user behavior 
and productivity, and on the organizational front, trust, credibility, legal, and 
economic impacts were expressed as factors that negatively impacted HIS 
security performance. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The research focuses on understanding usability-related information systems 
security failures in a healthcare organization and how such failures impact IS 
security performance.  This research study examined the nature and types of 
usability failures as a method to reduce usability-related information security 
failures within a healthcare organization.  In order to execute this feat, the 
usability failures had to first be identified.  Jacobson et al. (1999) described the 
nine types of usability failures that were covered in chapter 2, while Skov and 
Stage (2005) described usability failures through the use of a concept tool that 
categorizes usability failures as critical, serious, or cosmetic.  Usability problems 
and failures are also identified through usability evaluation methods; however, 
usability evaluation methods cannot be compared reliably because of a lack of a 
standard criterion to measure and quantify usability, as well as not having a 
standard, stable process to follow (Hartson et al., 2001).  Identifying a usability 
problem or failure simply is not enough; in fact, it is insufficient. According to 
Wixon (2003), usability practitioners must be able to explain them, understand 
what they involve, and how can they be fixed.   
6.2 Findings 
The argument presented in the first chapter states to reduce usability security 
failures, organizations must align security technology with tasks performed by 
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healthcare workers and ensure such alignment does not hamper security 
performance in a healthcare organization.  Moreover, this research postulates that 
the actions of the healthcare workers by using workarounds to mitigate usability-
related information systems security failures has rendered the organization’s 
information assets vulnerable to information security risk.  The research problem 
has led to two research questions:  What are the nature and types of usability-
related information systems security failures in a HIS?  How does usability-
related information systems security failures impact task accomplishment in a 
healthcare setting?   
The first key finding was in the discovery, identification, and reporting of 
usability failures by the healthcare workers.  A high number of usability failures 
were identified through the analysis of data and information by the healthcare 
worker after the task had completed.  In essence, the user interface did not alert 
the healthcare worker that the application or system did not effectively, 
satisfactorily, or efficiently process the request.  It was in fact the actions of the 
users that were central to beginning the understanding and remediation of 
healthcare task failures. 
The second key finding is related to how a healthcare task failure affects the 
actions of the healthcare worker.  Among healthcare task failures, routine 
healthcare task failures created the highest opportunity for healthcare workers to 
use workarounds or alternative methods to complete a healthcare task after a 
failure was encountered.  In this study, workaround and alternative methods to 
complete a healthcare task opens the organization up to information risk.  Non-
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routine healthcare task failures, and technology failures often required 
intervention by support staff members or application developers, therefore, 
healthcare workers were less apt to subvert security controls, while providing 
application developers greater opportunities to mitigate information risk in the 
development process. 
The third key finding was the identification and understanding the nature of 
usability-related information systems security failures.  Usability-related 
information systems security failures are information integrity errors and the 
unavailability of application and systems to healthcare workers.  During the 
analysis of task-related and technology-related usability failures, the root cause of 
usability-related information systems security failures were discovered by 
combining the definition of task-related and technology-related usability failures 
along with the information security failures.  The combination of healthcare task 
failures, technology failures, usability failures, and security failures transformed 
the aforementioned failures into usability-related information systems security 
failures. 
The fourth key finding was through the identification of the nature and types 
of usability-related information system security failures created a method to 
identify misaligned healthcare task with the technology currently being developed 
and implemented in a healthcare setting.  Additionally, the method used to capture 
misaligned healthcare task with the technology also has led to identifying and 
understanding the impact a healthcare task failure and security technology failure 
negatively impacts security performance with the HIS.  The impact security 
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performance has on the HIS is realized through user behavior, credibility, 
economics, litigation, productivity, and trust. 
The fifth key finding consisted of discovering how to reduce usability-related 
information systems security failures in the healthcare organization.  There is a 
direct correlation between healthcare task failures and the technology used in this 
healthcare setting as it relates to HIS security performance.  By adapting a method 
within the development process that targets the information integrity errors along 
with the causes of unavailable systems provides flexibility to reduce usability 
failures from misaligned healthcare task and technology failures while increasing 
security performance in the organization. 
6.3 Discussion of Findings 
This section discusses case study phase one data collection and data analysis 
along with case study phase two data collection and data analysis process.   
6.3.1 Case Study Phase One Discussion 
Evaluating the usability of applications and systems in the healthcare context 
proved fruitful by isolating healthcare tasks along with the technology used, 
provided a channel to evaluate the effectiveness, efficient, and satisfaction of the 
task (ISO 9241-11, 1998).  When healthcare workers were unable to effectively, 
efficiently, and satisfactorily complete their task; a usability failure existed and 
was reported by healthcare workers.   
Based on the nine types of usability failures described by Jacobson et al. 
(1999), six types—(a) the user articulates a goal and cannot succeed in attaining 
it, (b) the user explicitly gives up, (c) the user articulates a goal and has to try a 
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different method to find a solution, (d) the user produces a result different from 
the task given, (e) the user expresses surprise, (f) the user expresses some 
negative affect or says something is a problem—were presented in this study, 
therefore aligning with usability research.  Additionally, to further classify the 
gravity of usability failures, in this study all 15 cases of usability failures were 
classified as critical or serious following the failure taxonomy used by (Skov & 
Stage, 2005). 
The discovery of usability failures were identified by using TTF theory as a 
guide.  The usability failures were placed in two categories based on whether the 
usability failures were task-related or technology-related.  Task failures were 
further classified as non-technical information security failures while technology 
failures were classified as technical information security failures.  From the 
usability failure categories, it was discovered that the root cause of the failure 
were due to information integrity failures and the unavailability of applications 
and systems.  The information integrity and unavailability of application and 
systems were identified and understood to be the nature of usability-related 
information systems security failures.  Information integrity failures are directly 
associated with DQ and IQ errors that further established a relationship for the 
identified usability failures.  The unavailability of an application or system 
equates to the unavailability of information to the healthcare worker in this study.  
Both information integrity and the unavailability of information is an information 
security requirement; therefore the integrity of information along with 
unavailability of said information is an information security failure. 
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This research discovered that the healthcare worker’s ability to complete a 
task was related to the quality of information returned while interacting with the 
HIS.  The testing of the TTF theory resulted in (a) the original task can be 
completed by the healthcare worker without full dependency of the technology, 
and (b) individual performance is not a factor in measuring TTF within this study.  
Historical data, manual processes, access to multiple non-primary software 
application and systems have been used to assist healthcare workers in completing 
a task when confronted with a task failure.  Also, in this study, the individual 
performance level was negated primarily by this study focusing on usability-
related information systems security failures that required an intervention.  This 
approach essentially eliminated measuring individual performance which is often 
attributed and measured in similar studies that use TTF theory.  The use of TTF 
theory provides a single focus by creating a pathway to identify a non-technical 
usability failure and follow its path throughout the failure cycle to determine the 
cause and impact.  An interesting aspect of task-related usability-related 
information system security failures within a healthcare organization requires 
additional investigation due to the mitigating circumstances of such failures in a 
healthcare organization.  The mitigating circumstances are the workarounds that 
are available to healthcare workers. 
Healthcare workarounds are prevalent within this study, particularly when 
healthcare workers encounter a task-related usability failure.  In healthcare 
literature, workarounds have been researched from various perspectives using the 
tools clinicians and healthcare workers use; however, according to Halbesleben et 
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al. (2008), there is a lack of theoretically grounded and empirically tested 
understanding of the causes of workarounds and their impact from an HIS.  This 
researcher likewise suggests that workarounds, particularly in this study, are used 
to get around a problem rather than displaying defiance or opposition.  
Additionally, hospitals view workarounds as an evasion of standardized routines 
that the hospitals insist save patient lives and safeguard hospital financial 
resources (Halbesleben et al., 2008), while healthcare employees believe 
workarounds increase their performance and patient safety (Beaudoin & Edgar, 
2003).  Workarounds are part of the culture of healthcare organizations primarily 
to thwart the unavailability of technology.  However, that does not preclude the 
creation of answers to resolve workarounds as suggested by (Halbesleben et al. 
2008; Yang, Ng, Kankanhalli, & Yip, 2012).   
This research has established that usability failures, task failures, and 
technology failures can be addressed by analyzing the dialogue of healthcare 
workers when usability failures are reported.  This approach is significant in the 
area of usability, as usability research primarily evaluates usability empirically 
during the testing or implementation stages of the usability development process 
(Akers et al., 2012).  The research approach in this study has empirically 
evaluated usability failures by focusing on task and technology to determine the 
true user experience while applications and systems are currently used in the 
organization.  Additionally, by analyzing the information provided by users of an 
HIS after usability failures are reported, further allows the capturing of additional 
usability failures that are not detected from the interaction with the user interface. 
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6.3.2 Case Study Phase Two Discussion 
The behavior of healthcare workers was manifested by their response to the 
usability failures they encountered.  The behavior was voiced in frustration, anger, 
lack of production, trust, credibility, and empathy due to the failures, suggests that 
this research should follow the results of said behavior through the actions of the 
users.  The usability failures have led to healthcare workers employing 
workarounds to complete their task.  According to Post and Kagan (2006), 
employees in an organization are more likely to bypass security measures in order 
to complete a task.  In a healthcare organization where task completion can be life 
or death, healthcare workers will seek alternative methods to complete a task.  
Healthcare workers are driven to complete their task; therefore, in this study, the 
line of examination is to determine the type of threat existing from healthcare 
workers using workarounds to complete their task, particularly given the level of 
frustration and anger that goes along with the failure. 
The behavior of users in relation to protecting information and information 
systems assets are covered by (Fagnot, 2008; Stanton et al., 2006).  Two streams 
of information security research that addresses user behavior are 
counterproductive computer usage (Stanton, 2002; Weatherbee, 2010) and insider 
threat (Post & Kagan, 2006; Siponen & Willison, 2009).  Counterproductive 
computer usage consists of a computer user in an organization that exposes the 
information assets to risk or liability or a loss of productivity time by engaging in 
activities that are counter to established computer resource usage policies 
(Ifinedo, 2014; Mastrangelo, Everton, & Jolton, 2006).  Insider threat refers to 
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intentionally disruptive, unethical, or illegal behavior enacted by individuals who 
possess substantial internal access to the organization’s information assets 
(Stanton et al., 2005).  The challenge presented from these two streams of 
research along with the information from this study suggests that the users of the 
HIS are not involved in intentional or unintentional security policy violation; 
therefore, how does user behavior get addressed when the organizational 
information security policies are not knowingly violated, although a potential 
threat exists?  The answer was not forthcoming from Crossler et al. (2013), 
although the researchers made an effort to move behavioral information security 
research forward by separating insider deviant behavior from insider misbehavior; 
however, neither example nor definition applies to the healthcare worker.   
A conceivable solution is to address user behavior through security training 
and awareness.  Healthcare workers are unaware of the effects circumventing 
healthcare task failures through workarounds have on organizational security.  
Also, organizational managers have not yet understood the magnitude usability 
failures have on the organization, primarily because user security is managed 
through the technical view; therefore organizational managers are more concerned 
with security failures that are derived and related to technical failures.  By 
addressing user behavior through security training and awareness has the potential 
of improving organizational security culture—thus reducing healthcare worker 
workarounds. 
While analyzing the impact of usability-related information systems security 
failures, there were findings discovered from the interview process that required 
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addressing.  The research uncovered that usability-related information systems 
security failures highlighting the impact of misaligned task and technology have 
on an organization.  The main areas impacted in the organization were economic, 
legal, trust, and credibility.  The recognition of the impact was expressed from 
feedback healthcare workers experienced while working with the organization 
customers, as well as from the results of organizational policy changes including 
the motivation and implementation of new software applications and systems.  
The credibility, economic, legal, and trust fallout materializes through the 
organizational security performance impact theme.  Based on such “impact 
attributes” discussed, the overarching domain in which the attributes should be 
addressed is through software development. 
The fallout of usability-related information security failures provided the 
foundation for understanding the security implications from the failures.  
Healthcare workers that encountered usability failures whether task-related or 
technology-related had an emotional reaction to the failure.  The emotional 
reaction contributed to workarounds in this study, along with the reluctance to 
report usability-related information systems security failures.  The security 
implications of the user reactions are violation of the organization security 
policies.  This researcher postulates the actions of the healthcare workers to use 
workarounds mitigating usability-related information systems security failures has 
rendered the organization’s information assets vulnerable to information security 
risk. 
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The organization security implications are derived from how the 
organization’s inability to identify, understand, and address usability-related 
information systems security failures.  The healthcare organization under study 
primarily used technical security controls to protect its information assets.  
Technical security controls are visible throughout the organization in the 
organization security program to include the development process.  The 
development process security-related artifacts uses access controls as the primary 
focus to protect information assets.  Researchers (Baskerville, 1993; Straub & 
Welke, 1998; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001) have gone on record stating IS 
security can be more effectively managed if the emphasis goes beyond the 
technical means of protecting information resources.  With the healthcare 
organization development process focus being on the technical view, the user 
viewpoint and role in the organization suffers.   
Siponen (2002) suggested that organizations that employ the technical view 
ensure users can understand and follow their security mission easily, however at 
worst the user will not understand the relevance of security actions which will 
result in the users actions to be enforced or transition in the right direction.  
Moreover, the organization had a clear variance practices in the development 
process between newly developed software and software that required patching 
through maintenance.  Software that required maintenance was the usability-
related information security failures under study.  Evaluating the communication 
history from development staff, reflect that there was not on-going 
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communication established that provided opportunities to address usability-
related information security failures in the development process.   
The question posed while addressing the research questions was how does 
user behavior get addressed when the organizational security policies are not 
knowingly violated, although a potential information threat exist from the fallout 
of usability-related information systems security failures?  To begin to address the 
root cause of usability-related information system security failures is to evaluate 
the organization’s development process.  The development staff must first 
understand the impact of information integrity failures and the unavailability of 
applications and systems have on information security along with the users of the 
HIS.  Additionally, both organization leadership and the development staff must 
recognize that usability failures are directly associated with information security 
failures and ultimately threatens the security of information resources. 
Based on the organization under study primarily using a technical view to 
execute information security in the organization to include the methods used in 
the development process to address and reduce usability-related information 
systems security failures can be done in the development process.  The 
organization currently uses a rigid IT development process of PMAS and ProPath 
that seeks to meet the needs of the customers by producing IT products through 
communications and timelines.  The development process uses a process 
management approach that all project management and development team 
members follow.  Incorporating the meta-notation framework proposed by 
Siponen et al. (2006) that provides the opportunity to incorporate security 
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requirements in the design phase aligns with the current development method and 
processes used in the organization.  A proposed process to reduce usability-related 
information systems security failures consist of applying the security controls 
against the identified usability-related information system security failure.  This 
can be done during the troubleshooting phase of the usability-related information 
systems security failure; the failure will be associated with a specific application 
or system.  The root cause of the usability-related information systems security 
failure can be modeled in the development process through PMAS and ProPath 
process while repairing the reported usability failure.  The organization’s help 
desk repository stores a history of cradle-to-grave communications on all usability 
failures.  The information from the help desk repository is the catalyst to reduce 
usability-related information systems security failures by analyzing the 
information specific to task-related and technology-related failures to ensure 
alignment between the task and technology.  Tracing the source of usability 
failures through the help desk repository improves application and system usage, 
while also improving information security within the organization. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter addressed and discussed the finding of the two research questions 
along with the results of the hypotheses tested.  The findings were 
compartmentalized by case study phase one, and case study phase two of the data 
collection and data analysis process.  The findings for case study phase one 
process found that the nature and types of usability-related information systems 
security failure were caused by information integrity along with the unavailability 
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of applications and systems.  Phase one case study also determined that usability 
failures were also discovered outside of the user interface.  Phase two case study 
found that the organization under study primarily uses technical security controls 
within the organization, therefore usability-related information failures were 
confirmed not to have been addressed by (a) development staff not addressing 
information integrity and application and system availability failures, (b) the 
development staff not identifying  and understanding the nature and types of 
usability-related information system security, to include the threat the failures 
have on information assets, (c) the development process varies between newly 
released software and software that requires a fix, and (d) a lack of 
communication between users of the software and development staff reduces the 
effectiveness of the software released into the field.  To address usability-related 
information systems security failures, a non-technical approach should be applied 
throughout the organization.  A non-technical approach has the potential to 
address the healthcare organization culture of using workarounds when task and 
technology is found to be misaligned, thus creating usability-related information 
systems security failures. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, a summary of the research findings are presented and the 
hypotheses tested, along with the goals of the study.  Additionally, the limitations, 
implications of the study for research and industry, along with future research 
opportunities are covered.  Future research recommendations have the opportunity 
to forge a stronger link between the usability, information security, and healthcare 
communities by better aligning healthcare task with the technology used while 
reducing information risk when usability failures occur. 
7.2 Findings Summary 
 
This research sought to identify and understand the nature and types of 
usability-related information systems security failures within a healthcare context.  
There were five key findings that were unveiled.  The first finding was in the 
discovery, identification, and reporting of usability failures by the healthcare 
workers.  The second finding was related to how a healthcare task failure affects 
the actions of the healthcare worker.  The third finding was the identification and 
understanding the nature of usability-related information systems security 
failures.  The fourth finding was creating a method to identify misaligned 
healthcare task with the technology currently being developed and implemented 
in a healthcare setting from identified usability failures.  The fifth finding 
consisted of discovering how to reduce usability-related information systems 
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security failures in the healthcare organization.  By adapting a method within the 
development process that targets the information integrity errors along with the 
causes of unavailable systems provides flexibility to reduce usability failures from 
misaligned healthcare task and technology failures while increasing security 
performance in the organization. 
The discovery of the five findings required a translation of usability, 
healthcare, and information security terms in order to create a usability failure 
taxonomy to appropriately examine the failures.  The taxonomy allowed the 
discovery that the task-related and technology-related usability failures were 
misaligned and ultimately caused information integrity and the unavailability of 
applications and systems.  The failures the healthcare workers were encountering 
led to creating workarounds in order to complete their task.  In the evaluation of 
the usability-related information systems security failures, it was clear that non-
technical information security controls would be most effective in an effort to 
reduce the failures.  The organization uses a technical view to implement their 
organization security program which carries over to how software is developed 
and maintained in the organization.  Leveraging the information and dialogue 
from reported usability-related information systems security failures and applying 
the information to the organization’s development process have the potential of 
reducing information security risk in the organization. 
7.3 Limitations 
 
This research study had four limitations.  The first limitation is that this 
research study was conducted within a large government healthcare organization 
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that has an integrated HIS that interconnects with 128 medical centers around the 
United States.  The organization uses a combination of proprietary and 
nonproprietary software to include disparate, heterogeneous, and autonomous 
systems.  The architecture used, along with the organization composition, may 
impact generalizability.  A second limitation was the usability case study selection 
process.  Systematic sampling was used to select the cases along with the 
candidates for the study.  The cases selected required a candidate to volunteer to 
participate, which ultimately reduced the case and candidate pool.  The third 
limitation was the temporal aspects surrounding usability-related information 
system security failures that were analyzed.  The average case analyzed was two 
years old from the original date the failure was reported.  Although there was an 
abundance of information available to discuss the cases with the candidates, 
several candidates were unable to recall all the details of usability-related 
information system security failure at the time it happened.  The final limitation 
was the inability to expand the candidate pool and case selection pool to include 
development staff members to participate.  The development staff members are 
composed of contract employees who were unable to participate due to contract 
obligations.  The development staff members provided an opportunity to discuss 
potential security intervention controls related to the specific type of usability-
related information systems security failure identified.  Having development staff 
to participate in a similar study is a future research opportunity, primarily because 
contract staff members are the staff members who most often resolve the reported 
usability failures through the development process.  
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7.4 Implications 
 
This section presents the implication that this research study has for research 
and industry. 
7.4.1 Implications for Research 
 
Through a unique lens, this research developed a method to identify and 
understand the nature and types of usability-related information systems security 
failures within an HIS.  The discovery of the source of usability failures provides 
an opportunity to reduce usability-related information systems security failures.  
A modest amount of research has evaluated the effects a usability failure has on 
information systems security, but none analyzes the alignment of healthcare task 
and technology failures while seeking methods to reduce the failures.   
The nature of usability security is to use technical security controls primarily 
through the user interface to protect information resources.  Focusing only on 
technical security controls assures potential information security risk, when 
researchers argue non-technical security controls are required to protect an 
organization’s IS.  This research has identified the root causes of usability-related 
information security failures, while also providing a proven method through 
secure system development that can reduce usability failures along with 
improving information security failures in the organization.  Researchers have 
also argued for a need to address security controls through the software 
development process; however, very little evidence indicates that organizations 
have successfully adopted that approach. 
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Lastly, TTF theory has a direct and transparent connection to both usability 
and the IS Success model (Delone, 2003; Delone & McLean, 1992).  The 
variables of efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction have the requisite elements 
to form a relationship for academic research in the domains of IS security, 
usability, and healthcare.  The relationship can be used to create a diagnostic tool 
to address breakdowns in processes that affect information security, usability, and 
healthcare work processes.   
7.4.2 Implications for Industry  
 
The implications of this research for industry serve the usability, security, and 
healthcare communities respectively.  Within the usability community, 
practitioners are often charged with explaining usability problems to include 
understanding what the problem involves, and how the problem can be fixed.  
This also holds true for the security community.  This research provides a proven 
process that explains who, what, when, how, and why a usability-related 
information systems security occurred in the organization and the ramifications of 
said failure.  Within the healthcare community, this research provides a novel way 
of identifying the misalignment of a healthcare task with the technology used to 
mitigate information risk particularly when users of the HIS begin to use 
workarounds when usability failures occur. 
7.4.3 Future Research 
 
This research used grounded theory techniques based on anecdotal terms used 
by the healthcare organizations to report usability failures, along with terms that 
defined the CIA triad and TTF theory.  This method allowed the identification of 
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the nature and types of usability-related information systems security failures that 
occur in a large healthcare organization.  The identification of the aforementioned 
failures has led to future research opportunities.   
One research opportunity is to extend this study by analyzing the usability 
related information system security failures after the development staff adds their 
intervention to resolve the failure.  Evaluating the intervention provided by the 
development staff will allow this current research study to be extended by 
accurately diagnosing and recalibrating usability failure interventions to reduce 
usability-related information system security failures in the healthcare setting.  
Integrating such a resolution provides an opportunity to involve all parties to 
create solutions to usability failures, improve healthcare work processes, and 
apply security controls in the areas where vulnerabilities are discovered.  
Moreover, this approach provides an opportunity to bridge the desired link 
identified in literature between the healthcare, information security, and usability 
research communities respectively. 
A second research opportunity is to combine the TTF theory with IS Success 
(Delone, 2003; Delone & McLean, 1992) to evaluate an organization’s security 
program.  Applying the independent construct of IQ from the IS Success model 
with the TTF theory allows a focus on the individual user, the task, and 
technology to determine the information risk that exists within an organization.  
An alternative research opportunity is to use the current research model (fit focus) 
in this study, or apply the Technology-to-Performance Chain (TPC) research 
model (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995, p. 216) in figure 9 comprised of the TTF 
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theory to generalize the current study by applying quantitative methods to analyze 
usability-related information security failures in non-healthcare settings.  By 
applying the individual characteristic construct (TPC model) to analyze usability-
related information systems security failures focuses on usability failures that did 
not require an intervention by development staff.  Therefore casting a wider net to 
capture, identify, and understand the nature and types of usability failures along 
with the impact created within an organization. 
 
Figure 9.  Technology-to-Performance Chain Model 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This research study examined identified usability-related information systems 
security failures within a healthcare organization.  The identified failures were 
then categorized based on task-related and technology-related usability failures.  
The taxonomy of usability failures provided the foundation to determine how to 
mitigate the actions of users based on the root cause of the problem.  The aim of 
this research was to identify and enhance the understanding of usability-related 
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security failures and how the failures impact IS security performance in a 
healthcare organization.  Through a qualitative positivist case study, the goals of 
this research study were obtained. 
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Appendix A 
 
Task-technology Fit Dimensions and Final 8 Factors 
 
Table 7  
Results of Factor Analysis :  16 Original Task-Technology Fit Dimensions and 
8 Final Task-Technology Fit Factors 
8 Final TTF Factors 16 Original TTF Dimensions Cronbach's Alpha 
(After poor questions dropped)   
Quality Currency of the data 0.84 
Right data is maintained 
Right level of detail 
Locatability Locatability 0.75 
Meaning of data is easy to find out 
Authorization Authorization for access to data 0.6 
Compatibility Data compatibility 0.7 
Ease of Use/Training Ease of Use 0.74 
Training 
Production 
Timeliness 
Production Timeliness 0.69 
Systems Reliability Systems Reliability 0.71 
Relationship with 
Users 
IS understanding of business 0.88 
IS interest and dedication 
Responsiveness 
Delivering agreed-upon solutions 
Technical and business planning 
assistance 
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Appendix B 
 
Phase One Data Collection Search Terms 
 
Table 8 
Phase 1 Data Collection Keyword Search Terms  
    Search Phase                                                Key Word Search Terms 
Anecdotal Search 
Phase One 
Access 
Denied Connections Denied Disconnect 
 Failures Interfaces Interactions Kajee 
 Login Permissions Unable to Access Usability 
 User errors User Preferences Verify Vista Link 
Axial Coding 
Search Phase 
Two 
Access 
Violations Bypass Context 
Continuous 
Connections 
 Display Dropped Connection 
Locked 
Record Security 
 User 
Complaints    
TTF (Task 
Characteristic) 
Search Phase 
Three 
Authorized 
Access Bad Data 
Changed 
Data Data 
 Data 
Compatibility Data Quality Ease of Use Hard to Use 
 Locate Data Misplaced Data Missing Data Quality 
 System 
Compatibility System Conflict System Crash System Down 
 System 
Failure Training   
TTF (Technology 
Characteristic) 
Search  
Phase Three 
Delays Flexible IS Relationships No Response 
 Operations Production Production Lag 
Production 
Slow 
 Production 
Timeliness 
Scheduled 
Operations 
System 
Reliability Unavailable 
 Unreliable       
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Appendix C 
 
Usability Failure Semi-structured Interview Questions 
 
Table 9 
Interview Questions with Mapping to Research Measures 
Research Questions Factors/Focus Interview Questions 
Research Question 
Two 
IS Security/Usability Describe your thoughts and 
reaction once the failure 
occurred while using the 
system? 
Research Question 
Two 
IS Security/Usability Did the task or process design 
factor into the application or 
system failure?   
Research Question 
Two 
IS Security/Usability What steps or alternative 
methods did you take to 
complete your task? 
Hypothesis One Healthcare Task 
Characteristics 
Were you able to complete the 
task? If not, how did the failure 
affect your ability to 
accomplish the task?      
Hypothesis Two Security Technology 
Characteristics 
Were you able to complete the 
task? If not, how did the failure 
affect your ability to 
accomplish the task?      
Hypothesis Three HIS Security 
Performance  
Impact 
Were you able to complete the 
task? If not, how did the failure 
affect your ability to 
accomplish the task?      
Hypothesis One Healthcare Task  
Characteristics 
How do the alternative steps 
align with the original task 
design? 
Hypothesis Two Security Technology 
Characteristics 
Is the application or system 
readily available for use?  (If 
not, please explain.) 
Hypothesis Two Security Technology 
Characteristics 
Does the application or system 
provide you accurate and 
current information?  (If not, 
please explain.) 
Hypothesis Two Security Technology 
Characteristics 
Describe the security steps that 
are associated with the 
application/system used to 
complete the task. 
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Research Questions Factors/Focus Interview Questions 
Hypothesis Three HIS Security 
Performance  
Impact 
What recommendations do you 
have that could resolve the 
failure you encountered? 
Hypothesis Three HIS Security 
Performance  
Impact 
How did the failure impact 
task accomplishment? 
Hypothesis Three TTF Theory Describe your experience level 
with the application or system. 
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Appendix D 
 
Task Characteristic Usability Failure Sub Code List 
 
Access denied Personal identified information 
display 
Unable to import 
information 
Access violation error Receiving confusing 
information 
Unable to interpret 
information 
Application error Remote connection unavailable Unable to locate 
information 
Application failed Report display data errors Unable to log into the 
system 
Application not 
responding 
Report generates application 
errors 
Unable to print 
information 
Application responding 
slowly 
Report generating incorrect 
information 
Unable to remove 
information 
Application timeout Report generation failure Unable to retrieve 
information 
Application training 
request 
Sensitive information 
displaying 
Unable to retrieve 
information 
Applications allows 
user to circumvent task 
Software forced logoff Unable to terminate 
user connection 
Confusing information 
display 
Software modification request Unable to update 
record 
Error generating report Solicited information not 
returned 
Unable to verify 
information 
Inaccurate information 
display 
System timeout issue Unsolicited 
information display 
Inconsistent 
information display 
Unable to access system Unsolicited 
information 
transmitted 
Incorrect data display Unable to add information Unsolicited removal 
of information 
Incorrect data returned Unable to complete task User access violation 
Information is not 
displaying as expected 
Unable to create report User training issue 
Information missing 
from display 
Unable to display image User unable to 
complete task 
Information missing 
from report 
Unable to enter information Wrong data update 
Information not 
received 
Unable to execute task Wrong information 
released 
New Feature Request Unable to generate report Wrong information 
returned 
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Appendix E 
 
Technology Characteristic Usability Failure Sub Code List 
 
Access Violation Database full error System create duplicate 
transmissions 
Application connection 
failure 
System failure System not responding 
Application Failure Distorted image display System not transmitting 
Application timeout Duplicate data display System responding 
slowly 
Application transmitted 
wrong data 
Inaccurate data during 
import 
System unavailable 
Bad data display Incorrect data stored in 
database 
Unable to access system 
Confusing data display Incorrect data used in 
application 
Unable to display data 
Corrupt report returned Invalid data display Unable to display image 
Data display request Missing data Unable to generate 
report 
Data entry limitation Network connectivity 
problem 
Unable to receive data 
Data inconsistencies Record lock during access Unable to store data 
Data mismatch Record locked Unable to transfer data 
Data not received Slow system response Unable to transmit data 
Data not updating Software Bug Unable to update 
database 
Data transmission problem Software error Unable to upload data 
Data unavailable Software modification 
request 
Unsolicited data display 
Data validation error System authentication 
failure 
Unsolicited data merge  
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Appendix F 
Theme Emergence Interview Comments from Respondents 
Table 10 
  
Theme Emergence Table 
Pattern Codes Participant's Words Theme Emergence 
User Security 
Actions 
"I see the potential of placing information 
in the wrong record"; "We cannot always 
trust our data"; "The host file is sent via 
secure FTP connection"  
Information 
Security Threat 
User Security 
Actions 
"I am aware of privacy and security 
implications when transmitting patient 
information"; "Security measures are in 
place" "If patient information is written 
down on paper, once the use is completed, 
the paper is shredded."    
Information 
Security Threat 
Support System 
Breakdowns 
"There is not much troubleshooting that 
can be done"; "some of these problem 
occurs because it is a web-based program" 
Organizational 
Security 
Performance 
Impact 
Organizational 
Culture Change 
"I have a problem that users don’t report  
problems to me, because they feel nothing 
will be done about it."   
Organizational 
Security 
Performance 
Impact  
User Behavior "None of this would be a problem if billers  
and coders would do what they are 
supposed to do" 
Usability 
Assessment 
Task Assessment "I ran through the problem in our test 
account"; 
"The initial troubleshoot I done, I asked 
HR to look at the old system, and was it 
displayed correctly" 
Usability 
Assessment 
Task Assessment "There was nothing wrong with the 
ordering process, it was not a user error"; 
"I thought I had done something wrong 
because I was new" 
Usability 
Assessment 
Technology 
Assessment 
"I had to look at the code, and figure out 
how to get this fixed"; "There is something 
wrong here, because if things were 
working right, I would not get this 
information" 
Usability 
Assessment 
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Appendix G 
 
Case Study Interview Record 
 
Table 11           
Interview Record for Case Study       
Date Respondent 
Key 
Start  
Time 
End  
Time 
Total  
Time 
Special Notes 
11/20/2013 TSKC1R1 3:30 4:36 66 
 
11/26/2013 TSKC1R2 12:30 2:04 94 
Interactive 
Interview 
11/14/2013 TSKC2R1 10:30 11:29 59 
 11/15/2013 TSKC2R2 9:30 10:31 61 
 12/11/2013 TSKC3R1 1:00 1:53 53 
 
11/27/2013 TSKC3R2 1:00 2:30 90 
Respondent 
discussed tskc3, 
techc3, and 
techc5 
11/21/2013 TSKC4R2 2:00 3:15 75 
Respondent 
discussed tskc4, 
and techc5 
11/15/2013 TSKC5R1 1:30 2:44 74 
 12/11/2013 TSKC6R1 4:00 5:09 69 
 11/29/2013 TSKC7R2 10:00 10:43 43 
 11/21/2013 TSKC8R1 11:00 11:47 47 
 11/21/2013 TSKC8R2 2:00 3:15 75 
 11/13/2013 TSKC9R1 11:30 12:24 54 
 11/20/2013 TECHC1R1 9:30 10:32 62 
 11/25/2013 TECHC1R2 10:00 11:18 88 
 11/27/2013 TECHC2R1 12:00 12:58 58 
 11/21/2013 TECHC2R2 12:30 1:19 49 
 12/05/2013 TECHC3R1 2:00 2:52 52 
 
11/27/2013 TECHC3R2 1:00 2:30 90 
Interactive 
Interview 
11/15/2013 TECHC4R1 3:00 4:05 65 
 
12/05/2013 TECHC42R2 4:00 5:45 
110 
 12/13/2013 TECHC5R1 11:00 12:00 60 
 11/27/2013 TECHC5R2 2:00 3:15 75 
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Date Respondent 
Key 
Start  
Time 
End  
Time 
Total  
Time 
Special Notes 
11/14/2013 TECHC6R1 2:00 2:57 57   
 
Total Interview Minutes 1,626 
   Total Number of Interviews 24   
Note. An interactive interview consisted of an reenactment of the reported 
usability failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
References  
Akers, D., Jeffries, R., Simpson, M., & Winograd, T. (2012). Backtracking events as 
indicators of usability problems in creation-oriented applications. ACM Transactions 
on Computer-Human Interaction (tochi), 19(2), 16-40. 
 
Albrechtsen, E., & Hovden, J. (2009). The information security digital divide 
between information security managers and users. Computers & Security, 28, 
476-490. 
 
Albrechtsen, E., & Hovden, J. (2010). Improving information security awareness and 
behavior through dialogue, participation and collective reflection. An intervention 
study. Computers & Security, 29(4), 432-445. 
 
Al-Ghatani, S. S., & King, M. (1999). Attitudes, satisfaction and usage:  Factors 
contributing to each in the acceptance of information technology. Behaviour 
& Information Technology, 18, 277-297. 
 
Allam, S., Flowerday, S. V., & Flowerday, E. (2014). Smartphone information security 
awareness: A victim of operational pressures. Computers & Security, 42, 56-65. 
 
Alter, S., & Sherer, S. (2004). A general, but readily adaptable model of 
information system risk. Communications of the AIS, 14(1), 1-28. 
 
Ammenwerth, E., Iller., C., & Mahler, C. (2006). IT-adoption and the interaction 
of task, technology and individuals: a fit framework and a case study. 
Biomedcentral Medical Informatics Decision Making, 6(3). doi:10.1186/1472-
6947. 
 
Anderson, J. (1972).  Computer security technology planning study. Deputy for 
Command and Management Systems, United States Air Force, Fort 
Washington, PA. 
 
Anderson, J.M. (2003). Why we need a new definition of information security. 
Computers & Security, 22(4), 308-313.  
 
August, T., & Tunca, T. I. (2006). Network security and user incentives. 
Management Science, 52(11), 1703-1720. 
 
Austin, C. J., & Boxerman, S. B. (2003). Information systems for healthcare 
management (6th ed.). Association of university programs in health 
administration. 
 
Avison, D. E., & Fitzgerald, G. (1995). Information systems development:  
Methods, techniques, and tools. London: McGraw-Hill. 
 
 
157 
 
Backhouse, J., & Dhillon, G. (1996). Structures of responsibility and security of 
information systems. European Journal of Information Systems, 5, 2-9. 
 
Ballou, D., Wang, Pazer, H., & Kumar, G. (1998). Modeling informational 
manufacturing systems to determine information product quality. Management 
Science, 44(4), 462-484. 
 
Bardram, J. E. (2005). Applications of context-aware computing in hospital work:  
examples and design principles. In Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Symposium 
on Applied Computing (pp. 1574-1579). New York: ACM. 
 
Barkhuus, L., & Dey, A. K. (2003). Is context-aware computing taking control away 
from the user? Three levels of interactivity examined. In Proceedings of UbiComp 
2003 (pp. 149-156). 
 
Baskerville, R. (1988).  Designing information systems security.  Chichester: J. 
Wiley. 
 
Baskerville, R. (1991). Risk analysis: an interpretive feasibility tool in justifying 
information systems security. European Journal of Information Systems, 1(2), 121-130. 
 
Baskerville, R. (1993). Information systems security design methods: implications for 
information systems development. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 25(4), 375-414. 
 
Beaudoin, L.E., & Edgar, L. (2003). Hassles: Their importance to nurses’ quality 
of work life. Nursing Economics, 21(3), 106-113. 
 
Beaudry, A., & Pinsonneault, A. (2005). Understanding user responses to 
Information Technology: A copy Model of User Adaptation. MIS Quarterly, 
29(3), 493-524. 
 
Benbasat, I., Dexter, A. S., & Todd, P. (1986). An experimental program 
investigating color-enhanced and graphical information presentation: An 
integration of the findings. Communications of the ACM, 29(11), 1094-1105. 
 
Bennett, S. P., & Kailay, M. P. (1992). An application of qualitative risk analysis 
to computer security for the commercial sector. In Computer Security 
Applications Conference (pp. 64-73).  
 
Bevan, N. (2005). International standards for HCI. In C. Ghaoui (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Human Computer Interaction. Idea Group Publishing. 
 
Bevan, N., Kirakowski, J., & Maissel, J. (1991). What is usability? In 
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on HCI: Vol. 1. Stuttgart, 
Germany: Amsterdam:  Elsevier. 
 
 
158 
 
Bhattacherjee, A., & Hikmet, N. (2007). Physicians’ resistance toward healthcare 
information technologies:  A dual-factor model. In Proceedings of the 40th 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 1-10). 
 
Blandford, A., Thimbleby, H., & Bryan-Kinn, N. (2003). Understanding Interaction 
Traps. In Proceedings of HCI 2003 (Vol. 2, pp. 57-60). 
 
Blythe, S. E. (2008). Croatia's computer laws: Promotion of growth in e-
commerce via greater cyber security. European Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 75-103. 
 
Bonoma, T. V. (1985). Case-research in marketing: Problems and opportunities 
and a process. Journal of Marketing Research, XXII, 199-208. 
 
Borek, A., Parlikad, A. K., Woodall, P., & Tomasella, M. (2014). A risk-based model for 
quantifying the impact of information quality. Computers in Industry, 65, 354-
366. 
 
Boswell, A. (1995). Specification and validation of a security policy model. IEEE 
Transaction on Software Engineering, 21(2), 63-68. 
 
Bourimi, M., Barth, T., Kesdogan., Abou-Tair., D., Hermann., F., & Thiel, S. 
(2012). Using distributed user interfaces in collaborative, secure, and privacy-
preserving software environments. International Journal of Human Computer 
Interaction, 28, 748-754. 
 
Braz, C., & Robert, J. M. (2006). Security and usability:  The case of the user 
authentication methods. In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference 
of the Association Francophone interaction Homme-Machine New York: 
ACM. 
 
Brostoff, A. (2004). Improving password system effectiveness (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of London). Dissertation Abstracts. 
 
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010). Information security policy 
compliance: an empirical study of rationality-based beliefs and information security 
awareness. Mis Quarterly, 34(3), 523-548. 
 
Card, S. K., Moran, T. P., &  Newell, A. (1983). The psychology of human-
computer interaction. Erlbaum. 
 
Charmaz, K., (2001). Grounded theory. In R.M. Emerson (ed.), Contemporary 
field research: Perspectives and formulations (2nd ed.) (pp. 335-352). Prospect 
Heights, Il: Waveland Press  
 
 
159 
 
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through 
qualitative analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
Cockton, G. (2008). Revisiting usability's three key principles. In CHI 2008 
Proceedings alt.chi (pp. 2473-2484). Florence, Italy. 
 
Cranor, L., & Garfinkel, S. (2005). Security and usability: Designing secure 
systems that people can use. Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly Media, Inc. 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2012). Educational research: Planning, conducting, and 
evaluating quantitative and qualitative research (4th ed.). Boston: Pearson  
 
Crossler, R. E., Johnston, A. C., Lowry, P. B., Hu, Q., Warkentin, M., & Baskerville, R. 
(2013). Future directions for behavioral information security research. Computers & 
Security, 32, 90-101. 
 
Delone, W. H. (2003). The DeLone and McLean model of information systems 
success: a ten-year update. Journal of Management Information 
Systems,19(4), 9-30. 
 
DeLone, W. H., & McLean, E. R. (1992). Information systems success:  The 
quest for the dependent variable. Information Systems Research, 3(1), 60-95. 
 
Denning, D. (1987). An intrusion-detection model. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 
13(1), 222-226. 
 
Denning, P. J. (1992). Passwords. American Scientist, 80, 117-120.   
 
Dennison, R. D. (2005). Creating an organizational culture for medication safety. 
Nursing Clinics of North America, 40(1), 1-23. 
 
Devaraj, S., & Kohli, R. (2000). Information technology payoff in the health-care 
industry:  A longitudinal study. Journal of Management Information Systems, 
16(4), 41-67. 
 
Dey, A. K., & Newberger, A. (2009). Support for context-aware intelligibility and 
control. In CHI 2009 - Programming Tools and Architecture (pp. 859-868). 
Boston. 
 
Dhillon, G. (2001). Violation of safeguards by trusted personnel and 
understanding related information security concerns. Computers & Security, 
20, 165-172. 
 
Dhillon, G. (2007). Principles of information systems security: Texts and cases. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
 
160 
 
Dhillon, G., & Backhouse, J. (1996). Risks in the use of information technology within 
organizations. International Journal of Information Management, 16(1), 65-74. 
 
Dhillon, G. & Backhouse, J. (2000). Information system security management in the new 
millennium. Communications of the ACM, 43(7), 125-128. 
 
Dhillon, G., & Backhouse, J. (2001). Current directions in IS security research. 
Information Systems Journal, 11, 127-153. 
 
Dhillon, G., Tejay, G., & Hong, W. (2007). Identifying governance dimensions to 
evaluation information systems security in organizations. Paper presented to 
the Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences. IEEE, 157b. 
 
Dickson, G. W., DeSantics, G., & McBride, D. J. (1986). Understanding the 
effectiveness of computer graphics for decision support: A cumulative 
experimental approach. Communications of the ACM, 29(1), 40-47. 
 
Dunkerley, K., & Tejay, G. (2009). Developing an information systems security 
success model for eGovernment context. In America’s Conference on 
Information Systems (AMCIS) (pp. 1-8). San Francisco. 
 
Eckman, B. A., Bennett, C. A., Kaufman, J. H., & Tenner, J. W. (2007). Varieties 
of interoperability in the transformation of the health-care information 
infrastructure. IBM Systems Journal, 46(1), 19-41. 
 
Ellis, T., & Levy, Y. (2006). A systems approach to conduct an effective literature 
review in support of information systems researchers. Informing Science 
Journal, 9, 181-212. 
 
Eminagaoglu, M., Ucar, E., & Eren, S. (2009). The positive outcomes of information 
security awareness training in companies: A case study. Information Security 
Tech Report, 14(1), 223-229. 
 
Fernandez, A., Insfran, E., & Abrahao, S. (2011). Usability evaluation methods 
for web: A systematic mapping study. Information and Software Technology, 
53, 789-817. 
 
Flechais, I., Mascolo, C., & Sase, M. A. (2007). Integrating security and usability 
into the requirements and design process. International Journal of Electronic 
Security and Digital Forensics, 1(1), 12-26. 
 
Frincke, D. (2000). Balancing cooperation and risk in intrusion detection. ACM 
Transactions on Information and System Security (tissec), 3(1), 1-29. 
 
 
161 
 
Gerber, M., & von Solms, R. (2005). Management of risk in the information age. 
Computers & Security, 24, 16-30. 
 
Glaser, B. G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity. Mill Valley, CA: The Sociology Press. 
 
Goodhue, D. L. (1988). IS attitudes: Toward theoretical and definition clarity. 
Database, 19(3-4), 6-15. 
 
Goodhue, D. L. (1995). Understanding user evaluation of information systems. 
Management Science, 41(12), 1827-1844. 
 
Goodhue, D. L. (1998). Development and measurement validity of a task-
technology fit instrument for user evaluations of information systems. 
Decision Science, 29(1), 105-138. 
 
Goodhue, D., & Thompson, R. L. (1995). Task-technology fit and individual 
performance. MIS Quarterly, 19(2), 213-235. 
 
Gould, J. D., & Lewis, C. (1985). Designing for usability:  key principles and 
what designers think. Communications of the ACM, 28(3), 300-311. 
 
Guarro, S. B. (1987). Principles and procedure of the LRAM approach to 
information systems risk analysis and management. Computers & Security, 6, 
493-504. 
 
Halbesleben, J. R. B., Wakefield, D. S., & Wakefield, B. J. (2008). Work-arounds 
in health care settings:  Literature review and research agenda. Health Care 
Management, 33(1), 2-12. 
 
Hammond, R. (1988). Improving productivity through risk management. In R. F. 
Umbaugh (ed). Handbook of MIS Management (pp. 655-665). Boston: 
Auerbach. 
 
Harkee, V. Alessi, D. & Collan, M. (2003).  IT and institutional constraints: 
Effects of legal and administrative constraints use IT in production of health 
care services. In R. H. Sprague Jr. (ed.). Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp.1-6). Los 
Alamitos. CA. 
 
Hartson, H.R., Andre T., & Williges, R. C. (2001). Criteria for evaluating 
usability evaluation methods. International Journal of Human Computer 
Interaction, 13(4), 373-410. 
 
Hendry, M. (1997). Smart card security and applications. Norwood, MA: Artech 
House. 
 
 
162 
 
Hilbert, D. M., & Redmiles, D. F. (2000). Extracting usability information from 
user interface events. ACM Computer Surveys, 32(4), 384-421. 
 
Huang, J., Ding, Y., Hu, Z., 2008. Knowledge based model for holistic 
information security risk analysis. In International Symposium on Computer 
Science and Computational Technology (pp. 88-91). IEEE. Shanghai. 
 
Hubbard, W. (2002). Methods and techniques of implementing a security 
awareness program. SANS Institute [White paper]. 
 
Iivari, J., & Hirchheim, R. (1996). Analyzing information systems development: a 
comparison and analysis of eight IS development approaches. Information 
Systems, 21 (7), 551–575. 
 
Ifinedo, P. (2012). Understanding information systems security policy 
compliance: An integration of the theory of planned behavior and the 
protection motivation theory. Computer & Security, 31, 83-95. 
 
Ifinedo, P. (2014). Information systems security policy compliance: An empirical study 
of the effects of socialization, influence, and cognition. Information & 
Management, 51, 69-79. 
 
Institute of Medicine. (1999). To err is human: Building a safer health system.  
Washington, D.C. National Academy Press. 
 
ISF. (2003). The standard of good practice for information security.  Information 
Security Forum. 
 
ISO 9241-11. (1998) Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display 
terminals (VDTs) Part 11: Guidance on usability. 
 
Jacobson, I., Booch, G., & Rumbaugh, R. (1999). The unified software 
development process. Addison Wesley, Reading. 
 
John, B. E., Prevas, K., Salvucci, D. D., & Koedinger, K. (2004). Predictive 
human performance modeling made easy. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. 455–462. 
 
Johnson, C. M., Johnson, T. R., & Zhang, J. (2005). A user-centered framework 
for redesigning health care interfaces. Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 38, 
75-87. 
 
Johnson, M. E., & Willey, N. D. (2011). Usability failures and healthcare data 
hemorrhages. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 9(2), 35-42. 
 
 
163 
 
Johnson, M. E., & Pfleeger, S. L. (2011). Addressing Information Risk in 
Turbulent Times. IEEE Security & Privacy, 9(1), 0049-57. 
 
Juristo, N., Moreno, A. M., & Sanchez-Segura, M. I. (2007). Analysing the 
importance of usability on software design. The Journal of Systems and 
Software, 80, 1506-1516. 
 
Ka-Ping, Y. (2002). User interaction design for secure systems. In Information 
and Communications Security (Vol. 2513, pp. 278-290). 
 
Klein, H., & Hirschheim, R. (1987). Social change and the future of information 
systems development. In Critical Issues in Information Systems Research (pp. 
275-308). Chichester, England: Wiley. 
 
Knapp, K. J., & Marshall, T. E. (2006). Information security: management's effect 
on culture and policy. Information Management & & Computer Security, 
14(1), 24-36. 
 
Kruger, H. A., & Kearney, W. D. (2006). A prototype for assessing information security 
awareness. Computers & Security, 25, 289-296. 
 
Lategan, N., & Solms, R., (2006). Towards enterprise information risk 
management a body analogy. Computer Fraud & Security (12), 15–19. 
 
Lee, A. S. (1991). Integrating positivist and interpretive approaches to organizational 
research. Organization Science, 2, 342-365. 
 
Lee, A. S., & Baskerville, R. L. (2003). Generalizing generalizability in 
information systems research. Information Systems Research, 14(3), 221-243. 
 
Levina, N. (2005). Collaborating on multiparty information systems development 
projects: A collective reflection-in-action view. Information Systems 
Research, 16(2), 109-130. 
 
Liebenau, J., & Backhouse, J. (1990). Understanding information: An 
introduction. London: Macmillan. 
 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage. 
 
Luftman, J., & Brier, T. (1999). Achieving and Sustaining Business-IT 
Alignment. California management review, 42(1). 
 
Marcus, A. (2002). Dare we define user-interface design? Interactions, 9(5), 19-
26. 
 
 
164 
 
Markus, M. L. (1983). Power, politics, and MIS implementation. In 
Communications of the ACM (Vol. 26, pp. 430-444).  
 
Mastrangelo, P., Everton, W., & Jolton, J. (2006). Personal use of work 
computers: Distraction versus destruction. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 
9(6), 730−741. 
 
Maycut, P., & Morehouse, R. (1994). Beginning qualitative research: A philosophic and 
practical guide. London Falmer Press. 
 
Mclean, J. (1990). The specification of modelling of computer security. IEEE 
Computer, 23(1), 9-16. 
 
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: an expanded 
sourcebook (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldana, J. (2013). Quality data analysis (3rd ed.) [A 
Methods Sourcebook]. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
 
Newton, J. D., & Snyder, C. A. (1987). Risk analysis for computerized 
information systems. In Proceedings, Southern Management Association (pp. 
306-308). 
 
Niekerk, L., Labuschagne, L., 2006. The PECULIUM model: information 
security risk management for the south African SMME. In Proceedings of the 
ISSA from Insight to Foresight Conference, 5–7th July 2006, Sandton, South 
Africa. 
 
Nielsen, J. (1993). Usability engineering. Academic Press. 
 
Nielsen, J. & Molich, R. (1990). Heuristic evaluation of user interfaces. In 
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems. ACM, 249–256. 
 
Orgun, B., & Vu, J. (2006). HL7 ontology and mobile agents for interoperability 
in heterogeneous medical information systems. Computers in Biology and 
Medicine, 36, 817-836. 
 
Pare, G. (2004). Investigating Information Systems with positivist case study 
research. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 13, 
233-264. 
 
Payne, B. D., & Edwards, W. K. (2008). A brief introduction to usable security. 
Internet Computing, 12(3), 13-21. 
 
 
165 
 
Peterson., R. (2004). Crafting information technology governance. Information Systems 
Management, 21(4), 7-22. 
 
Post, G. V., & Diltz, J. D. (1986). A stochastic dominance approach to risk 
analysis of computer systems. MIS Quarterly, 10(4), 363-375. 
 
Post, G. V., & Kagan, A. (2006). Information security tradeoffs:  The user 
perspective. Information Security and Risk Management, 15(5), 22-29. 
 
Price, R., & Shanks, G. (2005). A semiotic information quality framework: 
development and comparative analysis. Journal of Information Technology, 
20(2), 88-102. 
 
Rainer, R.K., Snyder, C.A., & Carr, H.H. (1991). Risk analysis for information 
technology. Journal of Management Information Systems, 8(1), 129-147. 
 
Rasmussen., J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling 
problem. Safety Science, 27(2), 183-213. 
 
Rivest, R. L. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public key 
cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21(2), 120-126.  
 
Rubin, J., Chisnell, D., & Spool, J. (2008). Handbook of usability testing:  How to 
plan, design, and conduct effective tests (2nd ed.). New York: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc. 
 
Saleh, M. S., & Alfantookh, A. (2011). A new comprehensive framework for 
enterprise information security risk management. Applied Computing and 
Informatics, 9, 107-118. 
 
Saldana, J. (2012). The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (2nd ed.). Thousands 
Oak, CA: SAGE. (Original work published 2009) 
 
Salkind, N. J. (2006). Exploring research (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 
Sambamurthy, V., & Zmud, R. W. (2000). Research commentary: The organizing 
logic for an enterprise's IT activities in the digital era—A prognosis of 
practice and a call for research. Information systems research, 11(2), 105-114. 
 
Sandhu, R. S. (1993). Lattice-based access controls. IEEE Computer, 26(11), 9-
19. 
 
Sandhu, R. S., Coyne, E. J., Feinstein, H. L., & Youman, C. E. (1996). Role-based 
access control models. IEEE Computing, 29(2), 38-47. 
 
 
166 
 
Sandhu, R. S., & Samarati, P. (1996). Authentication, access control, and audit. 
ACM Computing Surveys, 28(1). 
 
Sarker S., & Lee, A. S. (2003). Using case study to test the role of three key social 
enablers in ERP implementation. Information & Management, 40, 813-829. 
 
Schecter, S. E., Dhamija, R., Ozment, A., & Fischer, I. (2007). The emperor's new 
security indicators:  An evaluation of website authentication and the effect of 
role playing on usability studies. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 
(pp. 51-65). Berkeley, CA. 
 
Schneier, B. (1996). Applied cryptography (2nd ed.). NY: Wiley. 
 
Selig, G. J. (2008). Implementing IT governance: A practical guide to global best 
practices in IT management. Norwich, UK: Van Haren. 
 
Sheng, S., Broderick, L., Koranda, C. A., & Hyland, J. J. (2006). Why Johnny 
Still Can't Encrypt: Evaluating the Usability of Email Encryption Software 
[Abstract]. Soups 2006 Poster, 1-2. 
 
Shimeall, T. J., & McDermott, J. J. (1999). Software security in an Internet world: 
an executive summary. Software, IEEE, 16(4), 58-61. 
 
Shneiderman, B. (1987). Designing the User Interface: Strategies for Effective Human-
Computer Interaction. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Shneiderman, B., Jacobs, S., Cohen, M., Plaisant, C., &. (2009). Designing the 
user interface:  Strategies for effective human-computer interaction (5th ed.). 
Menlo Park, CA: Addison Wesley. 
 
Siponen, M.T. (2001). On the role of human morality in information systems 
security. Information Resources Management Journal, 14(4), 15-23. 
 
Siponen, M. (2002). Towards maturity of information security maturity criteria: 
six lessons learned from software maturity criteria. Information Management 
& Computer Security, 10(5), 210-224 
 
Siponen, M. (2006). Information security standards focus on the existence of 
process, not its content. Communications of the ACM, 49(8), 97-100. 
 
Siponen, M., & Iivari, J. (2006). Six Design Theories for IS Security Policies and 
Guidelines. Journal of the Association for Information systems, 7(7). 
 
Siponen, M., & Willison, R. (2009). Information security management standards: 
Problems and solutions. Information & Management, 46(5), 267-270. 
 
 
167 
 
Skov, M. B., & Stage, J. (2005, November). Supporting problem identification in 
usability evaluations. In Proceedings of the 17th Australia conference on 
Computer-Human Interaction: Citizens Online: Considerations for Today and 
the Future (pp. 1-9). Computer-Human Interaction Special Interest Group 
(CHISIG) of Australia. 
 
Spears, J., 2006. A holistic risk analysis method for identifying information 
security risks: Security management, integrity, and internal control in 
information systems. International Federation for Information Processing 
(Vol. 193, pp. 185-202). 
 
Stanton, J. M. (2002). Company profile of the frequent internet user. Communications of 
the ACM, 45(1), 55-59. 
 
Stanton, J. M., Stam, K. R., Mastrangelo, P., & Jolton, J. (2005). Analysis of end 
user security behaviors. Computers & Security, 24(2), 124-133 
 
Straub, D. W., & Welke, R. J. (1998). Coping with systems risk: security planning 
models for management decision making. Mis Quarterly, 441-469. 
 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research:  Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. London: Sage. 
 
Suh, B., and Han, I. (2003). The IS risk analysis based on a business model. 
Information & Management (41:2), pp. 149-158 
 
Sun, L., Srivastava, R.P., & Mock, T.J. (2006). An information systems security 
risk assessment model under the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 22(4), 109-142. 
 
Tejay, G., Dhillon, G., & Chin, A.G. (2005). Data quality dimensions for 
information systems security: A theoretical exposition. In P. Dowland, S. 
Furnell, B. Thuraisingham, & X. S. Wang (Eds.), Security Management, 
Integrity, and Internal Control in Information Systems (pp. 21-39). New York: 
Springer. 
 
Toussaint, P. Bakker. A., & Groenewegen, L. (1992). Integration of information 
systems: Assessing its quality. Computer Methods and Programs in 
Biomedicine, 64(I) 9-35. 
 
Van Grembergen, W., & DeHaes, S. (2007). Implementing information 
technology governance: Models, practices and cases. IGI Publishing. 
 
Vega, D.E., Schieferdecker, I., & Din, G. (2010). Design of a test framework for 
automated interoperability testing of healthcare information systems. In 
 
168 
 
Proceedings of Second International Conference on eHealth, Telemedicine, 
and Social Medicine. 134-140. 
 
Vigna, G. & Kemmeerer, R.A. (1999). NetSTAT: A network-based intrusion 
detection system. Journal of Computing Security, 7, 1, 37-71. 
 
Vilbergsdottir, S. G., Hvannberg, E. T., & Law, E. L. C. (2014). Assessing the 
reliability, validity and acceptance of a classification scheme of usability 
problems (CUP). Journal of Systems and Software, 87, 18-37. 
 
Von Solms, B. (2005). Information security governance: COBIT or ISO 17799 or 
both? Computers & Security, 24(2), 99-104. 
 
Von Solms, B., & von Solms, R. (2004). The 10 deadly sins of information 
security management. Computers & Security, 23(5), 371-376 
 
Von Solms, R., & von Solms, S. H. (2006). Information security governance: A 
model based on the direct–control cycle. Computers & Security, 25(6), 408-
412. 
 
Voss, B.D. (2001). The ultimate defense of depth: Security awareness in your 
company. SANS Institute [White paper]. 
 
Wang, R. Y., Storey, V. C., & Firth, C. P. (1995). A framework for analysis of 
data quality research. Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions 
on, 7(4), 623-640. 
 
Wang, R. Y., & Strong, D. M. (1996). Beyond accuracy: What data quality means to data 
consumers. Journal of Management Information Systems, 12(4), 5-34. 
 
Warkentin, M., & Willison, R. (2009). Behavioral and policy issues in 
information systems security: The insider threat. European Journal of 
Information Systems, 18(2), 101-105. 
 
Weatherbee, T. G. (2010). Counterproductive use of technology at work: 
Information & communications technologies and cyberdeviancy. Human 
Resource Management Review, 20, 35-44. 
 
Weill, P., & Ross, J. W. (2004). IT governance: How top performers manage IT 
decision rights for superior results. Harvard Business Press. 
 
Wharton, C., Bradford, J., Jeffries, R., & Franzke, M. (1992). Applying cognitive 
walkthroughs to more complex user interfaces: Experiences, issues, and 
recommendations. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 381–388. 
 
 
169 
 
Whitman, M. E. (2004). In defense of the realm: Understanding the threats to 
information security. International Journal of Information Management, 24, 
43-57. 
 
Whitman, M.E., & Mattord, H.J. (2012). Principles of information security. (4th 
ed). Boston: Cengage. 
Whitten, A., & Tygar, J. D. (1999). Why Johnny can't encrypt:  A usability 
evaluation of PGP 5.0. In Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Security Symposium 
(pp. 169-183). 
 
Winograd, T., & Flores, F. (1986). Understanding computers and cognition: A 
new foundation for design. Norwood, NY: Ablex. 
 
Wixon, D. (2003). Evaluating usability methods: why the current literature fails the 
practitioner. Interactions, 10(4), 28-34. 
 
Woodall, P., Borek, A., & Parlikad, A. K. (2013). Data quality assessment: The 
hybrid approach. Information & Management, 50(7), 369-382. 
 
Woody, C. (2006). Applying OCTAVE: Practitioners report. Carnegie Mellon 
University. 
 
Worthley, J.A. (2000).  Managing information in healthcare:  Concepts and 
cases.  Chicago, IL. Health Administration Press. 
 
Yang, Z., Ng., Kankanhalli, A., & Yip, J. W. L. (2012). Workarounds in the use of IS in 
healthcare: A case study of an electronic medication administration system. 
International Journal Human-Computer Studies, 70, 43-65. 
 
Yee, K. P. (2004). Aligning security and usability. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 
2(5), 48-55. 
 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research:  Design and methods (4th ed., Vol. 5). 
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE. 
 
Zuccato, A. (2007). Holistic security management framework applied in 
electronic commerce. Computers & Security, 26, 256-265. 
 
Zhang, P., Benbasat, I.,Carey, J.,Davis, F.,Galletta, D., & Strong, D. (2002). 
Human Computer Interaction Research in the MIS Discipline. 
Communications of the AIS, 9(20), 334-355. 
 
Zigurs, I., & Buckland, B. K. (1998). A theory of task/technology fit and group 
support systems effectiveness. MIS Quarterly, 22(3), 313-334. 
 
 
170 
 
Zviran, M., & Haga, W. J. (1993). A comparison of password techniques for 
multilevel authentication mechanisms. The Computer Journal, 36(3), 227-
237. 
 
 
